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Abstract 
This thesis is an analysis of policy and change in Hong Kong, primarily focusing 
upon the period 1984 - 1998. This was a period marked by the transition of Hong Kong to 
China, which triggered a great deal of challenge to the traditional structure of policy 
making. This study adopts the notion of p'olicy networks, developed in liberal 
democracies, to examine public policy in Hong Kong. To evaluate the 'extent to which 
policy networks have affected policy outputs and change, two case studies are carried out. 
In this work, it is argued that the policy network concept has an explanatory utility 
in Hong Kong. Compared to the traditional approaches to policy analysis, the concept 
offers a fuller understanding in three aspects: government and group relations; how 
policy was made; and how policy was changed. Within networks, government and group 
relations were of resource inter-dependence, negotiation and mutual advantage, varying 
across sectors. Networks affected not only the policy process but also policy outputs and 
policy change. Through the inclusion and exclusion ofissues and groups, policy networks 
explain why policies were consistently made in favour of particular interests. However, 
the networks in this thesis were not completely static. They have changed to some extent 
due to the political transition. But even in the cases of change, the impact of this political 
pressure has depended on the structure/ types of the networks. Hence, the dialectical 
relationship between context and networks has been important in accounting for the 
trajectory of policy change in Hong Kong. 
Three issues have also been highlighted for the development of network analysis in 
Asian authoritarian capitalist regimes: the need to examine the mechanisms allowing 
networks to develop and succeed; the need to demonstrate the importance of networks in 
explaining policy; and the integration of the concept with micro-level and macro-level 
analysis to understand the distinctiveness of networks. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 1 
Chapter One 
Introduction 
This thesis is a study of policy-making and policy change in Hong Kong during the 
transition from colony to China. In the colonial past, change was limited because Hong 
Kong was regarded as a unique 'living fossil ofimperial government'. Whilst other Asian 
countries underwent dramatic political transformation, which involved decolonisation or 
democratisation, Hong Kong remained politically unchanged until the early 1980s. It 
continued to function according to a 19th century constitution (Cheek-Milby, 1989, p. 1). 
Over the last two decades, however, profound and irreversible political and social 
changes have occurred in Hong Kong. The 1984 Sino-British Joint Agreement (also 
known as the Joint Agreement), which provided for the termination of Britain's 
sovereignty over Hong Kong, triggered these far-reaching changes. The Joint Agreement 
stated that on July 1, 1997, Hong Kong would become a special administrative region of 
the People's Republic of China (PRC) enjoying a high degree of autonomy. Under the 
widely publicised precept of 'one country, two systems', Hong Kong was allowed to 
preserve its form of capitalist system with executive, legislative and independent judicial 
power, including that of final adjudication after 1997. . 
To a certain degree, the political future of Hon& Kong was settled in accordance 
with the content of the Joint Agreement. However, the transition of Hong Kong to China 
and the 'one country, two systems' principle embodied in the Joint Agreement 
precipitated an intense search for new administrative and social structures for Hong Kong 
during the colonial transition (perry and Tang, 1987, p. 113). This led to institutional 
reform and political restructuring, which saw the development of a representative system 
and the growing influence of China over Hong Kong politics. It also created new issues 
and problems to which traditional interests did not have available solutions. 
This thesis has two aims. The first is to study how these changes in 'high politics' 
have affected policy-making and policy change in Hong Kong during the colonial 
transition. The second is to examine whether or not the policy network approach to policy 
analysis can help to understand policy outcomes and policy change in Hong Kong. In 
other words, this thesis will use the concept of policy networks to analyse a number of 
policy areas in Hong Kong when these areas were constantly under pressure from the 
colonial transition after 1984. Its focus is on how and why policy was made and changed 
in Hong Kong during the political transition. 
Chapter 1 Introduction 2 
1. Setting the Problem 
, From the early 1980s, the traditional policy-making structure and public policy in 
Hong Kong have been subject to increasing challenges. Most of these challenges arose as 
a result ofthe transition from colonialism in Hong Kong. The political transition included 
two fundamental trends - the return of Hong Kong to China; and the development of a 
representative system in Hong Kong. 
The complexities of change in sovereignty over Hong Kong are well documented 
(see Buckley, 1997; Thomas, 1999). Suffice it to say that the 1984 Sino-British Joint 
Agreement prov~ded for the tennination of British rule over Hong Kong in July 1997, 
transfonning Hong Kong into a special administrative region (SAR) of the People's 
Republic of China (PRC). According to the Joint Agreement, the Hong Kong SAR would 
have its own government, legislature. and jUdiciary composed of local inhabitants, and 
would enjoy a high degree of autonomy except in foreign and defence policies, which 
were to be the responsibilities of the central government. Furthennore, the Joint 
Agreement promised that China's socialist system and socialist policies would not apply 
to Hong Kong after the handover. Whilst the Joint Agreement set the framework for 
post-1997 Hong Kong, a large number of political, legal, economic, social and 
administrative issues in relation to the colonial transition needed to be resolved prior and 
after the handover (Cheek-Milby, 1989, p. 2). 
The other reason why the traditional structure of policy-making in Hong Kong was 
under increasing pressure to change during the 1980s and 1990s was that the British Hong 
Kong government restructured the political arena by initiating and subsequently 
accelerating the development of a representative system in Hong Kong. Many reasons 
have been advanced for this move by the British Hong Kong government to democratise 
the administration of Hong Kong during the transitional period. For example, the 
government claimed that the move was a sincere response to political demands made by 
the sophisticated local people. Others took a more cynical view on this issue. Tsang (1997, 
pp. 34-35) argued that the British withdrawal from Hong Kong differed from their 
withdrawals from other British colonies in that it required them to transfer power not to 
the local people but to socialist China. In order to secure the support of Parliament and the 
international community, the Conservative government decided to 'build up· a 
finnly-based, democratic administration in Hong Kong' . In a similar vein, Cheung (1997, 
p. 82) argued that the British Hong Kong government set out to develop a representative 
system in Hong Kong during the transitIon 'not only for the sake of democratisation itself, 
but also to avoid letting the Communist Chinese Government and its appointed governing 
agents in Hong Kong inherit all the autocratic powers of the fonner British governor and 
his mandarins'. In any case, the process of democratisation had a major impact on the 
political system in Hong Kong. 
Democratisation began in 1984 with the release of the ~ite Paper entitled The 
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Further Development of Representative Government in Hong Kong, which set out the 
decision of the British Hong Kong government regarding political reform. The White 
Paper stated that the main aim of political reform was 'to develop progressively a system 
of representative government at the central level which is more directly accountable to the 
people of Hong Kong and is firmly rooted in Hong Kong' (Hon'g Kong government, 
1984). As had been mooted in the 1984 White Paper, the Legislative Council (LegCo), a 
law-making body in Hong Kong, was expanded in 1985 to include indirectly elected 
members for the first time in Hong Kong's colonial history (Thomas, 1999, pp. 161-170). 
Further changes occurred in the 1990s. The Legislative Council formed in 1991 was 
very different from its predecessors that had traditionally been regarded as little more 
than a 'bureaucratic' arm of the government. For the first time, 18 of its members were 
directly elected by the Hong Kong people in nine geographical constituencies. The 
members representing functional constituencies increased from 12 to 21. The members 
appointed by the Governor were reduced from 20 to 18, and the number of senior civil 
servants on the Council substantially dropped from 10 to 3. In all there were 57 members 
(out of 60) who were not civil servants, and the elected members for the first time held a 
majority of 39 votes to 21 (Miners, 1994, p. 233). Under Governor Patten the 
democratisation process gained pace. Patten's political reform further developed the 
. representative system, which included: expanded direct elections to the Legislative 
Council in 1995 (20 seats); expanded functional constituencies (30 seats) to reflect a 
larger community; and an elimination of official and appointed members (Thomas, 1999, 
p. 225). Although the democratisation process came to a halt when Hong Kong was 
returned to China after 1997, elections and legislative politics had already become an 
. . 
important part of the political system and remained so. 
The change in sovereignty over Hong Kong and the democratisation process 
provided the motors of change both within and outside the government. Most of the 
pressures on the traditional structure of policy-making were structural pressures ensuing 
from the changes in 'high politics' from the early 1980s. In general, there were two major 
ways in which the structural pressures arose. First, the changes in political environment 
created new issues and problems, to which traditional interests did not have available 
solutions. One of the biggest problems arising from the change in sovereignty over Hong 
Kong was how to facilitate the integration of Hong Kong into People's Republic of China 
(PRC), which was the territory's new sovereign (Segcl, 1993, p. 2; Postiglione, 1992). 
Ironically, the integration itself courted other new problems besetting the traditional 
interests in policy-making. For example, the change in sovereignty set in motion and then 
accelerated the economic integration between Hong Kong and mainland China. In the 
1980s and the 1990s, many manufacturing plants were relocated to the South China 
region where land and labour were much cheaper than in Hong Kong. The relocation of 
labour-intensive production to mainland China precipitated the problem of structural 
unemployment in Hong Kong (Chiu and Levin, 2000, pp. 96-97). Faced by the 
Chapter 1 Introduction 4 
deteriorating labour market and growing workers' grievances, the policy-makers came' 
under immense pressure to change the traditional policies that often prioritised economic 
growth at the expense of labour protection (which will be discussed in Chapter 8). 
Second, the change in sovereignty and the development of a representative system 
posed a major challenge to the traditional structure of policy-making and public policy 
because they have restructured the political landscape in Hong Kong. They affected the 
relative power of various actors, including domestic groups and the Chinese authorities, 
and active participants in the political arena of Hong Kong increased (Perry and Tang, 
19·89, p. 245). A number of groups or organisations, such as the organised labour, political 
activists and environmentalists that were previously at the margins or completely 
excluded from the policy process, gained political. strength and penetrated the political 
arena of Hong Kong as a result of the contextual changes. Hence, they were able to bring 
more pressure to bear on the government to change policies inimical to their interests or 
values (Cheung, 1997, p. 98; Tsang, 1997, p. 32; King, 1988, p. 52). 
The transition of Hong Kong to Chinese sovereignty has placed the issue of change 
at the very heart of policy analysis in Hong Kong. Actually, change in Hong Kong is not 
only a local but also an international concern. Given its status as one of the most 
important banking, financial and commercial centres of the world, any political or 
economic crisis concerning Hong Kong is very likely to destabilise the vital regional 
economy in East Asia and, therefore, destabilise international trade and finance (Segel, 
1993, p. 1). As a result, a large number of foreign and local studies have been made and 
published of Hong Kong's colonial transition and its impact on Hong Kong's governance. 
In fact, many studies of Hong Kong's transition define the processes of decolonisation 
and democratisation as the key determinants of change in either the structure of 
policy-making, policy outputs or both (which will be discussed in detail in Chapter 2). 
The underlying argument of this thesis is that too much attention has been paid to 
the possibility of policy change and to the importance of macro-level variables in the 
analysis of the policy process. Lui and Chiu (2000, p. 1) argue, excessive emphasis has 
been placed on 'diplomatic conflicts and their consequences' and on 'institutional politics, 
more precisely activities in the legislature' in explaining policy decisions. The major 
problem ensuing from this undue emphasis is that a number of policy changes these 
studies predicted would occur have not yet materialised. In this regard, this thesis 
suggests that more consideration needs to be paid to the meso-level factor - the structural 
relationships between the government and groups involved in the policy process in 
various policy areas or sub-sectors, i.e. the nature of policy networks. The important 
variables that influenced policy decisions in Hong Kong during the transition are the 
nature of policy networks (meso-level), and their interactive relationships with the 
processes of decolonisation and democratisation (macro-level). This thesis aims to 
investigate whether or not the policy network theory can supplement existing studies and 
thus provide a more sophisticated analysis of policy outcomes and policy change. As the 
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colonial transition of Hong Kong, which has begun since the signing of the Joint 
Agreement in 1984, is an ongoing process, this study may also help to make sense of 
current affairs that are related to the transition of Hong Kong. 
2. Definition of the Policy Network Concept 
Since the key focus of analysis is t?e nature of policy networks in Hong Kong and 
the impact they have had on policy outcomes and policy change, it is important to define 
policy networks. Generally speaking, policy networks. are a concept that are used to 
analyse the relationships between government and groups having access to the policy 
process. A policy network is 'a group or cluster of organisations, or indeed sections of 
organisations, represented by individuals/ agents and aiming to achieve mutual advantage 
through collective action, which is distinguished from other groups or clusters by breaks 
in the structure of resource dependence' (Marsh and Smith, 1996, p. 30). 
Groups and the government in a policy network are mutually dependent, as the 
, government wishes to achieve specific policy goals with the help of incorporated groups, 
whilst the groups wish to influence policy. Policy-making is segmented, and thus 
decisions in a given substantive policy area are made within this group or cluster of 
interconnecting and interpenetrating organisations (Richardson and Jordan, 1979, p. 74). 
A policy network develops when there is an exchange of resources between groups and 
the governme~t (or parts of the government) in the policy process. Resource exchange 
ieads to the recognition by the government that it is useful to consult these groups on a 
regular basis in a certain policy area (Smith, 1993, p. 56). Groups not possessing 
significant resources for exchange are normally unable to gain recognition and to access 
the process of decision-making. Hence, a policy network is an entity in which there are 
institutional and non-institutional mechanisms for inclusion 'and exclusion. Policy 
networks are also a means of categorising the relationships that· exist between the 
gove~ent and groups in the policy process. Networks vary in a number of ways, from 
. the number of participants to the degree of consensus and the structure of power 
(positive-sum or zero-sum) (Marsh and Rhodes, 1992c,p. 251). Smith (1993, p. 8) argues 
that the types of policy networks are an important factor affecting policy outcomes and 
how policy changes (which will be discussed in detail in Chapter 3). 
Discussions of policy networks are common in the analysis of p~blic policy in 
Britain, Europe and the United States. However, as Marsh and Smith (1996) point out, 
there is little agreement as to whether or not the concept can be used to explain policy. 
Some authors use the concept merely as a heuristic ~evice giving insights into the 
structure of policy-making, whereas others assert that the concept has explanatory power 
(see Chapter 3). It is the intention of this thesis to examine the explanatory utility of 
policy networks in the context of Hong Kong. 
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3. Applicability of the Policy Network Concept 
The notion of policy networks has developed in Britain, Europe and the USA, and 
the policy network theory has been confined to policy analysis in liberal democracies. It 
is, therefore, important to examine if the concept has any applicability to the context of 
Hong Kong before we can go further to investigate how the policy network approach can 
supplement the existing studies and provide a more sophisticated analysis of policy 
outcomes and policy change in Hong Kong. This section will demonstrate that the 
colonial governance and administrative structures in Hong Kong facilitated the creation 
of policy networks. Therefore, in accounting for the applicability of the policy network 
concept, it is essential to examine the political structures in Hong Kong, and how these 
mechanisms prompted policy networks to develop. 
3.1 The Political Structures in Hong Kong 
, In order to define the political context in Hong Kong before the 1980s, it is 
necessary to look at its various aspects. First of all, Hong Kong was a British colony, but 
it was not a colony over which the British government had direct control. This is not to 
say that Britain, as the sovereign state of Hong Kong, could not directly impose policies 
on the territory. However, Hong Kong in truth enjoyed a high degree of ~dministrative 
autonomy. As argued by Hook (1997, pp. 12-13), 'apart from the extension of British 
legislation chiefly to enable Hong Kong to fwlction in the international arena, British 
policy towards Hong Kong was in fact the policy of the local administration ... acting to 
all intents and purposes autonomously'. The administrative autonomy stemmed from the 
fact that Hong Kong was economically self-sufficient, With large foreign exchange gain 
from booming modern tourist industry, overseas investments, trade, manufacturing and 
other economic activities (Hook, 1997, pp. 12-13). The economic str~ngth of Hong Kong 
meant that the British government did not have to interfere in the day-to-day management 
of Hong Kong, and that it could not influence Hong Kong's administration through the 
provision of financial assistance. As a result of the administrative autonomy, local politics 
was important in shaping its policy decisions. It is, therefore, crucial to analyse the 
administrative structures in Hong Kong. 
Until 1997 , Hong Kong was formally ruled by the Governor, who was appointed by 
the Crown and was the symbolic representative of the British sovereignty over the 
territory. Although the Governor's powers, as set out in a number of constitutional 
documents like t~e Letters Patent, were considerable. he was neither an autocratic ruler 
nor the most important actor in policy-making. His actual exercise of power was hedged 
in by a number of factors. First, the power of the Governor was circumscribed by the 
Executive Council, which was a decision-making body within the administration 
composed of top officials and co-opted unofficial members. The Executive Council was 
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able to limit the power of the Governor because, according to conventions, it had to be 
consulted by the Governor prior to any important decisions. Moreover, decisions of the 
majority within the Executive Council carried great weight with the Governor. Although 
the Governor had the right to take action counter to the advice of the Executive Council, 
he could not do so without good cause shown (Harris, 1988, p. 90). 
Second, the power of the Governor was restricted by a complex cultural setting in 
. Hong Kong. There was a distinctive Hong Kong method of interest articulation. Some 
groups launched their campaigns under the banner of what was good for the Chinese 
people and traditions, in order to extract concessions from the government. In normal 
circumstances, the Governor was 'not able to ride roughshod over these claims' (Harris, 
1988, p. 48). The third and the greatest check on the Governor's influence in the policy 
process was the senior administrative civil service. It cannot be denied that directives 
from the Governor could affect decisions taken by the top officials. Yet the Governor still 
needed to secure the full cooperation and whole-hearted support of the policy secretaries 
and department heads if he wished to propel his agenda forward and achieve the policy 
goals.· The civil servants had developed their routines, standards of behaviour, 
bureaucratic culture and values, which were usually incompatible with the Governor's 
agenda and difficult to change (Cheung, 1997, p. 88). In order to avoid policy or 
administrative dislocation, the Governor was generally prepared to seek consensus with 
the senior officials on policy issues (Miners, 1995, pp. 68-84). 
The civil service was more than a check on the Governor's influence in the policy 
process. In fact, the senior officials were the ones who initiated and implemented policies 
(Perry and Tang, 1987, p. 116). Agenda-setting and policy initiation normally took place 
in policy branches or departments. Only if policy proposals including their goals, 
parameters and contents were completed would they be submitted to the Governor and 
the Executive Council for final approval. In other words, the senior civil servants were the 
chief policy-makers, whereas the Governor and the unofficial members ofthe Executive 
Council acted only as 'gatekeepers'. The Governor-in-Council had the power to amend 
the policy proposals or refer them back to the policy secretaries or department heads 
concerned for further consideration. Yet outright rejections of the policy proposals 
enacted by the senior civil servants were rare. This was because outright rejections of the 
policy proposals that had already gone through a lengthy process of deliberation and 
consultation carried out by the civil servants would c~use further delays and rising costs. 
The possession of information, expertise and organisation resources by the senior civil 
servants also gave them certain advantages over the Governor and the unofficial members 
of the Executive Council in the policy process (Miners, 1995, pp. 68-84). 
Moreover, the senior civil servants played a central role in policy-making by the 
fact that they were not only executive but also 'political' in their role orientation. In the 
absence of professional politicians in Hong Kong's political system, the senior civil 
servants took on the high-profile duties of representing the government, explaining and 
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defending government policies, mobilising and organising political support for the 
government and countering the critics of the government. They took up the role of 
political officers and acted like ministers in policy formulation and coordination. 
Therefore, according to Cheung (1997, p.90), they formed 'the de facto "governing 
party'" in Hong Kong. This is not to say that the Governor could not be directly involved 
in policy either by forcing new issues onto the agenda or by setting the central planks of 
policy. However, given the complexity of modem policy matters, there was clearly a 
physical limit to how often this could be done. As a result, the top civil servants were 
generally the most important actors in policy-making in Hong Kong. 
Due to the importance of civil servants to policy-making, Hong Kong was a 
putative 'administrative state'. It was not 'devoid oflegislative and judicial organs', but 
'administrative organisations and operations are particularly prominent' (Harris, 1988, p. 
70). Most ofthe decisions 'were made by a small number of senior civil servants who were 
only subject to limited check and balance by the appointed unofficial members of the 
Legislative Council (LegCo). The LegCo ostensibly established to debate government 
proposals and pass legislation was 'a "bureaucratic" rather than a "legislative" arm ofthe 
machinery of government'. The policy secretaries and department heads dominated the 
LegCo by having a majority of seats in the institution (Harris, 1988, pp. 91-92). Until 
1985 other unofficial members were all selected by the Governor, and thus the LegCo 
'was little more than an assembly of yes-men who were content to act like a rubber stamp, 
obediently signifying their approval to whatever proposals the colonial government put 
before them' (Miners, 1994, p. 224). 
Nevertheless, the senior civil servants were not a single group of actors in 
policy-making. Pressure groups within policy networks also had the potential to shape 
policy. The remaining part of this section will provide an analysis of the applicability of 
the policy network concept to the context of Hong Kong. More specifically, it will 
examine the mechanisms leading to the development and success of policy networks in 
Hong Kong's administrative state. 
3.2 Policy Networks in Hong Kong's Administrative State 
The concept of policy networks has barely been applied to Hong Kong's policy 
studies. However, this does not necessarily mean that the concept is not apposite to policy 
analysis in Hong Kong. In fact, the colonial governance and administrative structures in 
Hong Kong were highly facilitative of pressure group involvement in the policy process 
and the creation of policy networks that existed between government and groups. This is . 
. the case for a number of structural reasons. First, despite the evidence that the majority of 
policy decisions were made by a small number of top bureaucrats, Hong Kong had a 
political style that was highly consultative. Following the pattern set in Britain, the 
governance in Hong Kong was characterised by 'extensive consultation which occurs 
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among government officials, pressure groups and advisory committees' (Perry and Tang, 
1987, p. 116). This approach was encapsulated by the term 'government by discussion' 
(Endacott, 1964, p. 229). The approach was important in forming policy networks in 
Hong Kong. Some groups having an interest in particular policy areas or sub-sectors were 
allowed access to the government, mostly through various ad hoc or advisory committees, 
and they were consulted continuously by sections of the government before any 
important decisions were taken. 
Second, the idiosyncratic nature of pressure group politics in Hong Kong led to the 
creation and maintenance of policy networks. In the absence of any parliamentary modes 
of government and competitive party politics, interest groups wer~ exceptionally active in 
Hong Kong's political life. The vast miscellany of interest groups articulated and voiced 
popular demands more effectively than political parties (Harris, 1988, pp. 45-46).· This 
might not be so different from pressure group politics in liberal democracies. However, 
unlike pressure groups in democratic countries, the absence of parliamentary politics 
meant that direct access to the source of authority became a very important issue for the 
groups in Hong Kong. There were '11:0 parliamentarians or intermediaries between the 
interest groups and the central governmental organisation'. Until 1985 there was no 
election to the Legislative Council, on which members were appointed by the governor 
and had no constituents to whom they must address themselves. As a result, compared 
with interest groups elsewhere, the groups in Hong Kong did not have the alternative of 
advancing their interests by lobbying Parliament or Congress members. Instead, 'they 
must find access to decision-makers within the bureaucracy itself'. As some groups 
pulled it off and gained access to the government, policy networks developed. The 
'institutionalisation of these concerns at the very heart of the machine constitutes 
formidable internal lobbies' (Harris, 1988, p. 47). 
Third, policy networks tended to develop in Hong Kong because the civil service 
needed routine relationships with certain groups to bolster the legitimacy of the colonial 
government and to build a consensus in support of its policies. The notion of legitimacy 
was particularly important for the government of Hong Kong. The status of Hong Kong 
as a colony and the undemocratic nature of the government contributed to an inherent 
legitimacy problem for the government. The Hong Kong government did not possess the 
legitimacy that would otherwise come through elections. Therefore, it tried to deal with 
this legitimacy problem through creating policy networks within different sections of the 
government (Cheng, 1992, pp. 98-99; Miners, 1996, pp. 251-252). In these policy 
networks, the civil servants exchanged access to policy-making for. support of the 
incorporated groups in the policy process. Certainly, not all groups were able to gain entry 
to the government. But well-established groups on which the government relied for 
political support and legitimisation, or groups that could provide the government with 
assistance in policy-making and implementation, were allowed access to the process of 
decision-making. Consultation with the incorporated groups at all stages of 
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policy-making and implementation was firmly established throughout the civil service. 
Fourth, policy networks developed in Hong Kong as a result of two trends: the rapid 
expansion in the scope of governmental responsibility, and the increasing complexity of 
public affairs. The scope and complexity of governmental responsibility has considerably 
increased as the economy has flourished and society has expanded after the Japanese 
occupation in 1945 (Miners, 1996, p. 248). The increase in the scope and complexity of 
governmental responsibility was also attributable to the precarious status of Hong Kong's 
colonial rule. There were cases in which the government decided to intervene in policy so 
as to contain the threats, either real or perceived, to the colonial regime in Hong Kong 
(which are discussed in Chapter 5). Expansion and specialisation meant that the 
government, which adhered to the principle of financial conservatism, needed to extend 
its infrastructural power to intervene in society and accurate information to design policy 
to achieve its objectives in the most cost-efficient manner. Therefore, policy networks 
were created within various branches and departments of government, through which 
officials could obtain from the incorporated groups the support and advice on which to 
base and implement their policy decisions (Miners, 1996, pp. 250-251). 
The existence of me~hanisms facilitative of networks means that it is justifiable to 
examine how the policy network approach can provide a better understanding of public 
policy in Hong Kong than the traditional approaches to policy-making and policy change 
discussed in Chapter 2. Of course, networks might develop between government and 
groups and influence policy in some areas but not in others. This is an empirical issue. 
What we have to accept here is that there is a natural tendency for the political structures 
in Hong Kong to encourage the formation of stable and regular relationships between 
government and groups in different policy arenas. This leads to the central questions of 
this thesis: were policy networks important in affecting policy outcomes? How did the 
changes in Hong Kong's political environment influence the pre-existing structure of 
policy-making? Could the traditional policy networks survive these contextual changes· 
and affect the trajectory of policy change? 
4. Chapter Outline 
Chapters 2 and 3 will establish the thesis's analytical framework. In Chapter 2, I 
shall outline the theoretical approaches that are popularly used to explain the process of 
policy-making in Hong Kong and, particularly, focus on how they deal with the issue of 
. 
Hong Kong's transition. It will suggest that the general theories that focus on marco-level 
factors are inadequate for explaining policy and the course of change in Hong Kong. 
Chapter 3 will discuss the notion of policy networks as an alternative approach, and 
develop a number of propositions in order to provide a better understanding of Hong 
Kong's policy-making. The propositions will focus on three important aspects of policy 
'-
analysis: government! group relations in the policy process; how policy was made; and 
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how policy was changed in Hong Kong's transition. Chapter 4 will deal with the issues of 
methodology and research design. In order to examine whether or not the notion of policy 
networks explains the government! group relations in Hong Kong and the extent to which . 
policy networks affected policy outcomes and policy change, this thesis takes two case 
studies in Hong Kong. Chapter 4 will also justify the use of case studies. It will examine 
. why the cases are selected and how the case studies are carried out. 
The following chapters (5, 6, 7 and 8) are an empirical part of the thesis. They will 
turn to the case studies of policy networks and look at why networks developed, what 
features they had, how they affected policy, and whether or not they have survived the 
colonial transition and affected policy change. The final chapter will return to the central 
questions of this thesis. It will provide a comparison of the case studies and assess the 
extent to which the propositions outlined in Chapter 3 have been corroborated. Having 
. established the utility of policy networks in understanding the policy process·, policy 
outcomes and policy change in the context of Hong Kong, the chapter will also return to 
the theoretical discussion of the concept. It will highlight some issues for the future of 
policy network research, with particular reference to the development of network analysis 
in Asian authoritarian capitalist regimes. 
, . 
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Chapter Two 
Cooption, Elitism and 
Political Explanations of Change: 
Traditional Approaches to Policy-making 
and Policy Change in Hong kong 
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There have been a number of approaches to the analysis of policy-making and 
policy change in Hong Kong. These studies have been conducted within the confines of 
three theoretical perspectives: cooption, elitism and the political explanations of change. 
Undoubtedly, these perspectives have offered some useful insights into understanding 
how policy was made and changed in Hong Kong during the colonial transition. However, 
this chapter will demonstrate that e~ch of these perspectives has important limitations and, 
therefore, does not offer a comprehensive account of policy in Hong Kong. 
First, the perspectives, like cooption and elitism, offer general theories concerning 
policy-making in Hong Kong, but they do not provide an account of variations across 
sectors. Second, the elitist approach suggests that a small range of social and economic 
elites dominated the policy process in Hong Kong, but it says very little about how they 
actually influenced policy. Third, the elitist approach and the concept of cooption have 
difficulty in explaining policy change in Hong Kong during the colonial transition, 
because the processes of decolonisation and democratisation and the concomitant change 
in society have led to the decline of the elitist structure in policy-making. Meanwhile, the 
political explanations of change that merely focus on the changes in Hong Kong's 
political context, namely decolonisation and democratisation, are too simplistic, general 
and voluntaristic. They exaggerate the changes in Hong Kong's political context and the 
, , 
impact that they had on policy. They also ignore the pre-existing structure of 
policy-making within which the new political forces, such 'as the Chinese authorities and 
local politicians, had to operate. 
This chapter will outline the traditional approaches to policy-making in Hong Kong. 
It will demonstrate that the general theories that focus on macro-level factors have 
important limitations in explaining policy and, particularly, the course of policy change in 
Hong Kong. It will highlight the need for an alternative approach. This chapter will begin 
by discussing the theoretical perspective of the administrative absorption of politics~ 
cooption. 
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1. The Administrative Absorption of Politics/ Cooption 
. . 
The theoretical perspective of the administrative absorption of politics has 
dominated much of the analysis of policy-making in Hong Kong. It has long been 
recognised 'as the key to the understanding of colonial governance in Hong Kong' 
(Cheung, 1997, p. 85). The concept, which was coined by King (1975) in the 1970s, 
primarily denotes 'the phenomenon by which business and grass-roots leaders are 
coopted into the administrative machinery in Hong Kong' in order to bolster the 
legitimacy ofthe undemocratic colonial government (Perry and Tang, 1989, p. 241). The 
. government of Hong Kong has consciously and deliberately created hundreds of 
consultative committees at various levels of the bureaucracy, and these advisory 
committees provided a mechanism for integrating business and grassroots leaders into the 
policy process. More importantly, the Legislative and the Executive Councils acted as a 
further means of cooption. Through these institutions, 'the views and feelings of the 
industrial-business elites, professionals, and even ordinary citizens were fed back into the 
administrative decision-making processes' (King, 1988, p. 45). 
On the whole, the concept of the administrative absorption of politics corresponds 
to the concept of coopt ion. Saward (1992, pp. 1-2) argues that cooption is 'a strategy 
more or less available to state actors in pursuit of their goals, and as such can involve 
. . 
groupS and individuals from a variety of professional, producer or promotional 
standpoints'. State actors may use the mechanism to enhance legitimacy, take informed 
action and gain public support for contentious policies. In the context of Hong Kong, the 
government has long relied on the mechanism of cooption to shore up its legitimacy and 
to promote political stability. In terms of enhancing legitimacy and stability, the system of 
cooption was exceptionally efficient and effective in Hong Kong. The timely absorption 
. of potential elites into the administration 'has made politics almost unnecessary outside 
of the government'. To a large extent, it has contributed to the political stability of Hong 
Kong (King, 1988, pp. 45-46; Lo, 1997, pp. 47-48; King, 1975). 
Like cooption, the administrative absorption of politics also emphasises the simple, 
static and unidirectional relationship between the government and incorporated groups. It 
argues that access to the policy process was controlled by senior civil servants, who 
attributed the consultation status to groups that abided by the 'rules of the game' set by the 
government. The government agency was able to dominate or at least considerably shape 
policy if it wanted to do so, regardless of other interests and demands within the policy 
process. In other words, it sees the relationship between the government and groups as 
static. The flow of power was essentially unidirectional, from government officials to 
incorporated groups rather than the other way round. This nature of government! group 
relations is encapsulated by Lau (1999) in his a~count of Hong Kong's politics. He argues 
that (Lau, 1999, pp. 49-50): 
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... the indigenous political leaders that appeared in colonial Hong Kong were the products 
of colonial political largesse. Their political influence was derived from their colonial 
masters. Their relationship with their political overlords was one of dependence, deference 
and supplication. In the eyes of the colonial regime, these indigenous leaders were 
employed primarily to legitimize colonial rule, to enhance its understanding of the 
colonial subjects and to serve as the transmission belt between the government and the 
governed. 
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This theoretical perspective highlights some important aspects of the policy process 
in Hong Kong. It focuses on the strategy of cooption that was used by the government to 
achieve its goals, be they enhancing legitimacy, promoting political stability or simply 
making informed policies. Thus only a small range of groups and individuals were 
allowed access to the government. The Hong Kong government has a strong tendency 
towards elitism. It also points out that the relationship between the government and groups 
in the policy process was asymmetric. Therefore, although in some areas policy was 
biased, the elite groups did not capture the government agency. Nevertheless, there are two 
major problems with this approach, which can be divided into a general problem and the 
one that relates particularly to the analysis of change. 
First, it seems that in examining the policy process in Hong Kong this approach 
overemphasises the static and unidirectional relationship between the government and 
groups. Lau (1999, pp. 49-50) makes continual reference to the dependence of the social 
and economic leaders on the government that accorded limited political influence to the 
incorporated groups. This account of power may be too simplistic. Although it is obvious 
that power was not evenly distributed between the government and groups in the 
executive-led political system in Hong Kong, it does not necessarily mean that the groups 
were completely subservient to the government in policy-making and that their influence 
was the product of 'political largesse' . In fact, the government! group relations in Hong . 
Kong were more complex, intricate and dynamic than this theoretical perspective allows. 
The case studies of civic education and manpower policy in chapters 5 to 8 will show that 
in particular .situations the government! group relations were one of mutual dependence 
and resource exchange rather than one of dependence, deference and supplication. 
Second, there are difficulties within this theoretical perspective in explaining policy 
change in Hong Kong during the colonial transition. It has offered useful insights into 
understanding policy in Hong Kong where the level of politicisation was very low in the . 
post-war period. It is based on the premise that 'Hong Kong had been a politically inactive 
and economically dynamic city' in which 'the low and middle strata had been basically . 
politically indifferent and apathetic' (King, 1988, p. 45). Since a large part of society was 
politically unorganised, the government could easily tell which interests should be 
incorporated in the policy process and seldom encountered opposition in society. In this 
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situation, the system of cooption worked effectively, and thus the concept of the 
administrative absorption of politics has been a useful tool for understanding policy in 
Hong Kong. 
However, with the decline of cooptive politics ,in Hong Kong in the 1980s and 1990s 
when the processes of decolonisation and democratisation gained pace, this theoretical 
perspective seems to have difficulty in explaining policy in Hong Kong's transition. As 
Hong 'Kong went through the processes of decolonisation and democratisation, 
politicisation at the societal level accelerated and intensified. Pressure and political groups 
emerged one after another. It became increasingly difficult for the government to maintain 
the system of cooption and fail to take into account the views of the masses. In fact, as 
argued in Chapter 1 (Section 2), a number of middle-class and grassroots groups that had 
been excluded from the policy process managed to penetrate the political arena through 
elections to the Legislative Council and flexed their political muscles as never before. In 
short, the arrangement of cooption has declined since the early 1980s. The political reality 
of Hong Kong has become more complex than the theoretical account offered by the 
concept of the administrative absorption of politics/ cooption. Therefore, the utility of this 
approach has inevitably dwindled. 
2. The Elitist ,Approach to Hong Kong's Politics 
Like cooption, the elitist approach also focuses on how a small range of groups were 
integrated into government. However, there is a major difference between the two 
approaches. Unlike cooption, the elitist approach does not see government! group 
interaction as the relationship of dependence, deference and supplication. Rather, it 
emphasises the nature of synarchy or co-ruling in Hong Kong's politics. 
Davies (1977, p. 69), one of the key elitist writers in the context of Hong Kong, 
argues that 'there is in Hong Kong a relatively small elite which controls the policy 
process'. This class of elites had 'almost exclusive control of the policy-initiating, policy 
enacting and policy-executing branches of the government', and they dominated 'the 
principle sources of information that feed the policy arms of the system'. Therefore, 'the 
interpretative perspective of the elite class overwhelms any other, and applies when policy 
is being formulated and executed and when its success or failure is being assessed' (Davies, 
1977, pp. 46-47). Hong Kong's elite class contained two major components. On one side 
of Hong Kong's power elite were the civil servants in Hong Kong, especially the most 
senior government officials including the Chief Secretary, Financial Secretary, Attorney 
General, heads of government departments and their deputies or assistants. They 'occupy 
the very hub of the policy making process' and 'have the main voice'. Given that Hong 
Kong was an 'administrative state' in which the executive was particularly prominent 
compared to the legislature and judiciary (see Chapter 1), the importance of civil servants 
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was palpable. According to Davies (1977, p. 54), 'their key position in the policy process 
is maintained more .by ubiquity than by numbers'. They controlled the administrative 
machinery and occupied the places on government committees, panels, boards and the 
Executive, Legislative and Urban Councils. They were well paid, well housed and 
economically and socially isolated from the average citizens of Hong Kong. They were 
only in close contact with other wealthy elements in the community that led recognisably 
similar lives and constituted the other part of the elite class (Davies, 1977, p.' 61). 
On the other side of Hong Kong's elite were business and business-related 
professional interests. These elites had great influence because they had a powerful voice 
in the appointed governing institutions. For example, in 1972, these business and 
professional elites constituted 95.4 percent of the members of the tribunal panels, 66.4 
percent of the membership of the general committees, and 52.9 percent of the voices on 
the Executive, Legislative and Urban Councils. In short, they 'command a two-thirds 
voice in advice and policy ratification' (Davies, 1977, p. 63). In addition, their influence 
derived from th~ir socio-economic background which was in common with that of senior 
government officials. They were in close social contact with senior civil servants who 
could afford to join recreational clubs whose membership was not open to the bulk of the 
population (Davies, 1977, p. 61). Therefore, the advice that the government received was 
heavily distorted towards the Hong Kong businessmen, especially towards the large and 
wealthy end of the business spectrum. Consequently, alternative views had little or even 
no chance of being raised at a level at which they might require serious consideration, and 
policies were generally biased. Davies (1977,p. 45) sees this phenomenon as 'a basic 
~efect in the system which must be corrected before the ordinary people of Hong Kong 
can be said to enjoy real and substantial benefits from Hong Kong's phenomenal 
economic performance' . ' 
Harris (1988, p. 57) also maintains that there has been an elite class in Hong Kong. 
For him, 'to say that Hong Kong has conspicuous elites is to state the obvious. They are in 
evidence in many areas ofthe society'. The apparent elites in Hong Kong were its officials 
and councillors (Executive, Legislative and Urban), who belonged to the formal 
governmental structure. Hong Kong is seen as an elitist conspiracy in which the business 
interests, both Western and Chinese, had a powerful voice in the Executive and Legislative 
Councils. There was 'an unholy alliance of businessmen and bureaucrats' that dominated 
the policy process. However, Harris distinguishes this apparent elite from other elites in 
society. He argues that 'Hong Kong's apparent elite is often only one of a number of elites 
which exist at a number oflevels, both positional and reputational' (Harris, 1988, p. 58). 
Harris broadens the concept of elite to include those in different areas of society. The 
elite class contained 'active persons by reason of the positions they occupy, the resources 
they command, the status they enjoy, the deference they are accorded by official 
policy-makers and constitute a sub-set that is distinguishable from the general population' 
(Harris, 1988, p. 57). The honours system was perhaps the most significant focus for Hong 
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Kong's various privileged groups. In the field of education, there were also many 
important elitist influences. Since the degree of competition to enter well-established 
schools and universities was fierce, graduating from one of the 'top ten' schools and the 
University of Hong Kong gave one special status. There was further evidence of elites in 
the area of salaries and earnings. The highest class in Hong Kong contained many 
extremely rich individuals and families, whilst the professionals like medical practitioners· 
and lawyers who could earn over a million Hong Kong dollars per annum were also highly 
placed in the spectrum (Harris, 1988, pp. 58-61). In short, Harris regards elites as a class 
comprising people of widely different political, economic and social status. The problem 
with his definition of elite is that by stretching the concept so far it is difficult to evaluate to 
what extent such a class, either by position or reputation, held the reins of political power 
in Hong Kong. Moreover, Harris says very little about any disparities between the 
'apparent' and other elites in terms of political influence. 
Leung (1990), the other writer who examines the elite of Hong Kong, narrows the 
focus of concern and concentrates on business/ ~overnment interaction. For Leung, the 
business elites and business-related professionals traditionally had strong influence on 
" . 
policy, and such dominance was still evident after the political reform during the 1980s 
. (Leung, 1990, p. 146). She explains the political strength and influence of these elites by 
referring to their organisation and financial resources that were not available" to other 
groups. Professional groups, such as the Law Society and the Hong Kong Society of 
Accountants, were in a strong position to voice their demands to the government because 
they could claim monopolistic representation of their members' interests.· For many 
professions, mandatory membership of their respective professional bodies was a 
requirement to practi~e in Hong Kong. Moreover, as most of the professional groups were 
self-regulating bodies, they could control their members through the systems of 
accreditation, qualification for registration, licensure to practice, professional conduct and 
discipline of their members. Similarly, business associations in Hong Kong could 
represent business interests autho.ritatively because there was interlocking and 
overlapping membership among various business associations. This means that they could 
effectively perform the role of aggregating and limiting demands and then speak with one 
authoritative voice (Leung, 1990, pp. 148-156). 
Besides, Leung (1990, p. 163) argues that 'financial resources are another factor 
affecting the political strength and influence of an association'. Generally speaking, the 
financial condition of business chambers and professional bodies in Hong Kong was 
affiuent, which accounts for their considerable influence in policy-making. They had some 
important sources of revenue that were not available to other groups in society. They were 
authorised to perform a number of quasi-government functions that generated hefty 
financial resources. For example, the major business chambers were designated as 
Government Approved Certification Organisations (GACOs) and responsible for issuing 
the Certificates of Origin. The fees collected from these certificates contributed up to 72.5 
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percent of their total incomes. Likewise, the professional bodies like the Law Society and 
the Hong Kong Society of Accountants were empowered to issue annual practising 
certificates to their practitioners upon payment of prescribed fees (Leung, 1990, pp. 
163-169). 
Certainly, the elitist approach can bring something to the understanding of policy in 
I:Iong Kong. It highlights the structural inequality in Hong Kong with the existence of an 
elite class that has dominated the policy process. It also points out that the business and 
professional groups had considerable influence on policy rather than seeing them as 
subservient to the government. Therefore, the government constantly acted in the interests 
of business. Nevertheless, there are four major problems with this approach in explaining 
policy in Hong Kong during the transition. 
~ First, this perspective may not be a useful tool for explaining policy because there 
. was the problem of cohesion among the business elites in Hong Kong. Even though we 
accept the argument that the elites of big business have been· continuously 
over-represented in the government, it tells us little about the policy process and policy 
outcomes because the business voice was not necessarily unanimous. Although Davies 
(1977) and Leung (1990) emphasise the existence of a cohesive and homogenous elite 
class in Hong Kong, in reality the situation was more complicated and untidy. In the 1960s 
and 1970s, the business voice in Hong Kong was split between the European expatriate 
interests and the local business community. During the 1980s, however, this division 
became less conspicuous, as Hong Kong's local entrepreneurs were closely involved in the 
international economy. Since then, a new division has opened up between the large 
corporations and small businesses, with the large corporations preferring low tax rates and 
. free market whilst small businesses preferring subsidies and low-interest loans provided 
,by the government (Davies, 1989, pp. 36-37). Further divisions have existed between 
. . 
financial, commercial, industrial and property interests over a variety of issues (Miners, 
1995, p. 193; Chan, 1998, pp. 21-24; Choi, 1997, pp. 160-162). In short, the business 
community was largely a community in name only. The business elites did not necessarily 
, " 
constitute a cohesive and homogenous ensemble in Hong Kong. This suggests that the 
elitist approach, which concentrates on the elitist structure rather than analysing the 
. 
conflicts and interaction between various business interests, is not a very precise or useful 
tool for explaining policy in Hong Kong .. 
Second, the elitist approach is a general theory containing a presumption that the 
moneyed and professional interests have had substantial influence on policy. However, 
there are difficulties within the elitist approach in explaining how these elites actually 
influenced policy. It is often unclear about the mechanism that allowed these groups to 
transform their advantages of education, honours, organisation and financial resources 
into influence on policy. Elitists argued that the business and professional interests were 
integrated into the Legislative and Executive Councils. Yet they fail to demonstrate that 
their representation within the councils ensured that the government would act in their 
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interests. In fact, it is questionable how much influence this representation actually 
provided. '. 
As argued in Chapter 1 (Section 1), Hong Kong was an 'administrative state' in 
which the Legislative Council was a 'bureaucratic' ann of the machinery of government. 
The policy secretaries and department heads dominated the council, and the council 'was 
little more than an assembly of yes-men who were content to act like a rubber stamp' 
(Miners, 1994, p. 224). Moreover, few business and professional elites managed to access 
the Executive Council, and they had far less influence on policy than some would argue 
(Miners, 1996, p. 248). The majority of policy decisions were made by the policy branches 
or departments within the government, only to be formally approved, in some cases, by the 
Executive Council. The possession of information, expertise and organisational resources 
by the senior civil servants also gave them certain advantages over the business and 
professional elites within the Executive Council in the policy process (Miners, 1995, pp. 
68-84). Hence, business and professional representation within the councils did not 
necessarily equal influence. This means that the elitist approach does not explain policy. 
We need to be concerned with the mechanism whereby the business, professional and 
other interests were reflected in the government and then in policy outcomes, in order to 
have a better understanding of policy. 
Leung (1990) has attempted to overcome this problem by using pluralist techniques. 
, 
She focuses on the organisation and financial resources of business and professional 
groups, and argues that these factors account for their influence in Hong Kong. In doing so, 
she pays insufficient attention to the interests and activities of the civil service and the 
structural context in which the elites operated. She fails to recognise the ability of the civil 
service to make policy independently of groups in the executive-dominated political 
system of Hong Kong. In many cases only if the government decided to intervene in policy 
would groups be coopted into the policy process and then have substantial influence on 
policy (which are discussed in detail in Chapters 5 and 7). In other words, the influence of 
groups derived not only from their resources b~t also from the interests and activities of 
the government. In addition, the influence of groups also stemmed from the organisation 
of the policy-making process, which privileged certain interests and ideas over others. 
The third problem of this approach is that it is a general theory which cannot explain 
variations across sectors. The elitists depict a general picture in which the business and 
business-related professional groups were dominant in the process of decision-making in 
Hong Kong. However, in fact, their influence varied from sector to sector and from time to 
time. For instance, in education policy it was the school bodies, educational organisations 
and specialists that made most of the decisions, whilst in health policy the agents of the 
Hong Kong Medical Association (HKMA) and medical schools were important. This is 
not to say that the elitist approach, which puts so much emphasis on the' 
over-representation of business in the government, is inaccurate. However, this approach 
is obviously inadequate, as the business groups were not necessarily important in 
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policy-making, let alone the key actors in various policy areas and sub-sectors. As a result, 
it is necessary to develop a meso-level theory that can supplement th7 elitist theory with an 
explanation of variations across sectors. 
Lastly, like the concept of cooption, the elitist approach seems to have difficulty in 
explaining policy change that occurred in Hong Kong during the transition. Due to the 
processes of de co Ionisation and, especially, democratisation, the elitist structure of 
policy-making declined. The influence of business flagged and became less significant 
after 1984. Since then, politicisation at the societal level has accelerated and intensified. 
The people in Hong Kong became less lukewarm towards political participation. 
Demonstrations elamouring for popular policies were frequent. Pressure groups were 
formed and active in lobbying 'the government. Middle-class and grassroots political 
parties developed to contest elections to the Legislative Council, in which they embarked 
on an attack of policies favouring the business interests. In a number of cases, such as the 
Mandatory Provident Fund Scheme and the expansion of welfare provision, the 
government was compelled to accept policies unpalatable to business (Miners, 1996, p. , 
254). As the colonial transition has vitiated the elitist nature of policy-making, the elitist 
theory becomes a less useful tool for understanding policy change in Hong Kong. 
In order to deal with the policy change in Hong Kong's transition, two theoretical 
perspectives have been advanced. Both of them focus on macro factors and emphasis the 
importance of political change in Hong Kong. 
3. Political Explanations of Change: The Politics of 
Decolonisation 
Despite the promises from China of 'one country, two systems' and a high degree of 
administrative autonomy, many writers (Li, 1997; Hook, 1997; Newman, 1985; Segel, 
1993; Wang, 1995) maintain that the interests and power of the Chinese authorities are the 
key focus of analysis in understanding policy change in Hong Kong. For them, since Hong 
Kong has not followed the usual path of decolonisation to become an independent state, 
the analysis ofC~ina's policy towards Hong Kong is pivotal. Li (1997a, p. xv) argues that 
'as a non-sovereign political entity, Hong Kong's political destiny has been shaped n:t0stly 
by exogenous, rather than endogenous, political forces'. Thus it is important to incorporate 
China's policy towards Hong Kong in the analysis of policy change. 'By doing so, the 
readers should be better able to comprehend the complex process of power transition'. 
Segel (1993, p. 2) also argues that as the sovereign state of Hong Kong after 1997, the 
interests and actions of China 'have always been the single most important determinant of 
, the fate of Hong Kong'. For him, 'in any case, the evolution of Chinese policy towards 
Hong Kong must be the starting point for any assessment of where Hong Kong is going' 
(Segcl, 1993, p. 3). 
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Hook (1997) examines the importance of China's influence on Hong Kong's policy 
from a historical perspective. The People's Republic of China (PRC), as a mighty state 
bordering tiny Hong Kong, traditionally had massive influence on its governance. To this 
geo-politics was added the fact that China after 1949 repeatedly refused to accept the 
status of Hong Kong as a legitimate British colony and asserted that it would resume its 
sovereignty over Hong Kong in due course. This caused anxiety within the British and 
Hong Kong governments about imminent China's 'liberation' of the territory (Hook, 1997, . 
pp. 6-7). Consequently, 'the preoccupation with the need to avoid unnecessarily provoking 
China remained as a major criterion in the formation of policy for Hong Kong in London 
and in policy formation and implementation by the administration in Hong Kong' (Hook, 
1997, p. 9). Policy 'was formulated with the expressed views of the leadership of the 
People's Republic of China (PRC) in mind' (Hook, 1997, p. 4). This preoccupation existed 
throughout the post-war period and became more intense during the colonial transition. 
The role of China was important in the course of policy change in Hong Kong 
because the Chinese authorities had a keen interest in influencing Hong Kong's policy 
during the colonial transition. It is argued that 'from China's point of view, the transitional 
period serves the purposes of preparing Hong Kong to be retroceded to China and of 
enhancing the interests of China as defined by the leadership in Beijing. It has no other 
value'. As a result, 'Beijing feels entirely justified to call the shots in the politics of 
transition in Hong Kong', and had the intention of intervening in Hong Kong's policies if 
it was deemed necessary to defend or advance its interests (Tsang, 1997, p. 32). 
In fact, during the colonial transition, there was a wide range of new issues and 
problems that were seen by China as important to its interests in Hong Kong, which 
prompted the Chinese government to push forward its plans for policy change in Hong 
Kong. For Segcl (1993), the basic approach of the Chinese government to Hong Kong was 
resuming sovereignty and, particularly, promoting the integration of Hong Kong into the 
mainland China. Hong Kong was 'part of an unfinished agenda of an unsatisfied great 
power'. Therefore, the Chinese authorities promoted policies in Hong Kong to encourage 
Hong Kong to 'grow closer to the rest of the Chinese people' (Segel, 1993, pp. 77-79). By 
the same token, the Chinese authorities intervened in Hong Kong's policies, especially on 
political reform, in order to preclude Hong Kong from being a base for undermining the 
communist party's control over the territory and its hegemony in mainland China (Sing, 
. 2000, p. 23). Related to the goal of enhancing sovereignty and convergence was China's 
intervention in Hong Kong's local affairs in an attempt to increase its influence in the 
territory. According to Wang (1995, p. 176), the Chinese government planned to 
participate in Hong Kong's local affairs in order to 'increase China's influence in the 
region, to win support from the Hong Kong people, and to prepare for resuming 
sovereignty' . 
In addition to the symbolic issues of sovereignty, convergence and influence, the 
Chinese government also acted to defend its practical economic interests in Hong Kong. 
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Mesquita, Newman and Rabushka '(1985, p. 139) argue that since the late 1970s the 
Chinese government has been committed to economic modernisation and has regarded the 
dynamic and stable economy in Hong Kong as vital to the economic growth in China. As a 
result of this belief, the Chinese government intervened in Hong Kong's fiscal and 
economic policies in order to maintain Hong Kong's pragmatic value for China (Sing, 
2000, p. 23). One of the clearest examples of this intervention is the Port and Airport 
Development Strategy (PADS). As Segcl (1993, p. 93) indicates: 
More specifically, Chinese officials worried that the project was so grandiose and poorly 
costed that it would eat into the colony'S financial reserves. Peking always had a tendency 
to fret that Britain was seeking ways to drain the colony before 1997, and the major 
building projects were seen by some as a way in which British firms might be paid Hong 
Kong money which might otherwise be left to the post-1997 Chinese rulers. It was not so 
much that China did not want a new airport to be built as a way of promoting confidence in 
. the colony;. it was a case of China demanding that Hong Kong's accumulated reserves 
should be kept at roughly stable levels until 1997. 
This perceivable threat to China's economic interests in Hong Kong galvanised the 
Chinese government into openly challenging the plans for the PADS. The Chinese 
government demanded that it must be more closely consulted over the plans in the Joint 
Liaison Group (JLG), which was set up under the Sino-British Joint Agreement to discuss 
matters relating to the smooth transfer of government. 
Segel (1993), among others, argues that the Chinese authorities not only had the 
intention of participating in Hong Kong's politics, but also had the ability to make a major 
impact on, ifnot dominate, policies in Hong Kong. As Segcl (1993, p. 3) elaborates: . 
... this study sees China as the primary determinant of the fate of Hong Kong. If China, 
whether in reforming mode or not, feels that Hong Kong can only be safely incorporated 
into China if it is sufficiently slowed down to a pace where it can converge with the . 
mainland, then there is little that the people of Hong Kong, the government of Britain or, 
indeed, the government of any other state can do about it. 
A number of reasons have been advanced to understand China's influence on Hong 
Kong. First, in Segel's,view, China's policy towards Hong Kong has become a dominant 
factor in Hong Kong's political scene because China, as the new sovereign state, had the 
ultimate say in what would be permitted in Hong Kong after 1997. In some cases the 
British Hong Kong government tentatively threatened China with the suggestion that they 
would press ahead with major policies without China's support. However, the Chinese 
authorities were determined and able to pursue their own agenda after the handover, 
although protests were made by the governments of Britain and Hong Kong. In other 
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words, China held a trump card in Hong Kong's transition, and 'was in charge of the fate 
of Hong Kong' (Segel, 1993, p. 92). Indeed, after 1997, the Chinese government had the 
authority to influence policy within the confines of Hong Kong's administrative autonomy. 
It could do so by re-interpreting or even amending some equivocal sections of the Basic 
Law, which was a 'mini-constitution' governing the behaviour of both the Chinese and 
Hong Kong governments. Yet this would be a very grave matter. 
Second, Tsang (1997, pp. 42-47) argues that, ironically, the convergence policy 
adopted by the British Hong Kong government for a smooth political transition 
strengthened the ability of the Chinese authorities to intervene in Hong Kong policy 
during the colonial transition. The rationale behind the convergence policy was to ensure 
that major arrangements in government during the transitional period would remain in 
force beyond the handover. For example, Chapter 5 will demonstrate that officials in the 
Education Department wished to formulate a curriculum policy on civic education that 
would be used by the post-1997 government. Guided by this principle, the British Hong • 
Kong government was 'in general terms prepared to be sensitive to the wishes and needs 
of China, the prospective new sovereign'. The convergence policy seemed to have an 
equally significant impact on the post-1997 government, which was sensitive to any 
challenges by the Chinese authorities to its decisions. In doing so, it effectively gave tacit 
consent to China's influence on Hong Kong's local affairs, although these affairs were 
often within the confines of Hong Kong's administrative autonomy after 1997. 
Third, Wang (1995, p. 163) points out that the Chinese government was able to 
influence Hong Kong policy because its attitude affected the financial market and was 
crucial to the success of any major infrastructural projects straddling 1997. As many 
projects would not be completed unti12006, bankers would not provide loans to the Hong 
Kong government if the Chinese government did not endorse these plans, which 
sharpened their suspicions that their loans might not be repaid after 1997. In this situation, . 
the Hong Kong government had to reach agreement with the Chinese authorities. This, 
together with the change of sovereignty and the convergence policy, enabled the Chinese 
authorities to influence the policies in Hong Kong. Hence, China not only participated in 
Hong Kong's local affairs-, but also had a major impact on its policy change. 
It might be reasonable to argue that since 1984 the Chinese authorities have had 
significant influence on Hong Kong's policy. by virtue of the asymmetric power 
relationship between the Chinese and Hong Kong governments (Emmons, 1988, pp. 
123-124). However, such an explanation of change is too simplistic. One of the major 
problems of this approach is that, to a certain degree, it exaggerates the intention and 
power of the Chinese government to affect the policies in Hong Kong. Of course, the 
Chinese authorities could directly influence policy and effect change in Hong Kong 
through diplomatic means or by raising the disputable issues in the Joint Liaison Group 
(JLG) (see Chapter 1). Yet there was clearly a political limit to how often this could be 
done. This was because the primary objectives ofthe Chinese government were to benefit 
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from Hong Kong economically and to use Hong Kong's successful integration into China 
as an example to persuade Taiwan into unification, rather than simply taking over the 
territory. This meant that the Chinese government had to work within the political 
environment that it found in Hong Kong during the colonial transition. As Cheng (1984, 
pp. 12-13) indicates, the vast majority of people in Hong Kong wished to preserve their 
freedom, way oflife and standard of living after 1997, and were worried that China would 
meddle in the territory's domestic activities. A successful unification, therefore, largely 
depended on the ability of the Chi~ese government to convince the local people that China 
would fulfil its promise of 'one country, two systems' and not interfere in their affairs. In 
other words, it had to 'win the hearts and minds of the local people in order to ensure a 
smooth transition' (Tsang, 1997, p. 43). Consequently, the delicacy of China's position 
tempered its interest in intervening in Hong Kong's policy and hobbled its power over the 
territory's fate. 
Second, this explanation of change tends to be general and highly voluntaristic. 
Many studies contain the presumption that the Chinese government was bound to get its 
way if it participated in Hong Kong's local affairs. They see policy change occurring 
because of the will of China. However, they do not identify clearly the strategies that the 
Chinese authorities followed to influence Hong Kong's policy. They fail to recognise the 
distinction between the strategies of 'repossession' and 'penetration', and pay little 
attention to the context in Hong Kong as a whole and its structure of policy-making in 
particular, within which the Chinese authorities have operated. Therefore, in many areas . 
the political explanations of change overestimate the ease' with which the Chinese 
authorities could change Hong Kong's policy. They have difficulty in dealing with the 
subtleties of policy change. 
One of the strategies that the Chinese authorities used to influence Hong Kong's 
policy was 'repossession', which means 'taking overt control of formal institutions' in 
Hong Kong (Emmons, 1988, p. 118). Although the Chinese government did not send 
cadres down from Beijing to rule Hong Kong, it could determine Hong Kong's policy 
through diplomatic means, the Joint Liaison Group (JLG) or directives. 'Repossession' 
was a direct strategy on which many writers focus, but there was clearly a political limit to 
it. In fact, it was not frequently used as China, in the face of its delicate position, flinched 
from scaring away capital and professio'nals and thereby turning Hong Kong into a liability. 
Therefore, we need a more sophisticated evaluation of China's influence. 
As Emmons (1988, pp. 118-119) points out, many writers fail to recognise that' 
China's influence on Hong Kong was not only a matter of 'repossession', but also a matter 
of 'penetration'. 'Penetration' was an increase in China's personnel, organisations and 
activities in Hong Kong, which were intended to influence its policy informally. Since the 
early 1980s, the activities of penetration or informal influence have occurred. For example, 
in 1983 the New China News Agency (NCNA), China's de facto diplomatic mission in 
Hong Kong, was substantially upgraded with the appointment ofHsu Chia-t'un, who was 
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an important political figure in China's communist party, as its new director. Moreover, the 
Chinese officials assigned to or recruited from Hong Kong became more outspoken in 
various fields of Hong Kong's p()licy. In terms of quantity (frequency of being used), ifnot 
quality (influence), 'penetration' was a more important strategy than 'repossession'. 
Perhaps, as the writers fail to recognise the importance of 'penetration', they pay 
little attention to the context in Hong Kong within which the Chinese authorities had to act. 
However, 'penetration' was an indirect and informal measure, and so its influence heavily 
depended on Hong Kong's policy-makers, enthusiastically or grudgingly, taking on board 
the concerns of the Chinese authorities. Therefore, China's ability to achieve its goals was 
clearly affected by the structural context of policy-making in Hong Kong. This was where 
policy networks in Hong Kong came into play. Policy networks were an important part of 
the structural context (see Chapter 1). In particular situations they were able to mediate the. 
effect of China's participation, and thus they affected the speed and extent of policy 
change. This demonstrates that the purely political explanations have difficulty in dealing' 
with the subtleties involved in changing policy. 
In short, there were two types of intervention, which have different implications for 
policy analysis. If the Chinese government was prepared to bear the costs of 'repossession' 
and took overt control over the policy process in Hong Kong, the China factor might be 
sufficient to explain policy chan'ge, and the neglect of the context in Hong Kong by the 
purely political explanations might be justifiable. Yet the participation of the Chinese 
authorities in Hong Kong's local affairs rarely took the form of 'repossession' or direct 
control. Rather, to a larger extent, China intervened through 'penetration' or informal 
. , 
influence. It pursued its agenda by pressurising the policy-makers in Hong Kong, who 
were also influenced by the structure of policy-making. Therefore, in many areas the 
purely political explanations cannot explain policy change. They also do not deal w~th the ' 
question of why policies in certain areas were changed relatively easy and others were not. 
Hence, it is essential to develop a more sophisticated view of change that analyses the 
context within which the Chinese a~thorities operated. Policy networks were an important 
part of this context, and thus need to be examined. 
Lastly, it is often difficult to use the political authority of China to explain policy 
change in Hong Kong because there was no single and homogenous' 1997 effect'. Whilst 
China served as a motor of change in some policies like education and aviation, it also 
scuppered the local attempts to initiate change in other areas like social welfare and 
financial management. As Lui and Chiu (2000, p. 17) point out, 'China's intervention into 
Hong Kong's social and public affairs, while no doubt always bring about the 
politicisation of social issues~ does not necessarily create more opportunities for social 
movement organisations'. The '1997 effect' varied from sector to sector, and even from 
issue to issue. The China factor should not be used as a blanket term to understand change 
in Hong Kong. To evaluate the impact of China on policy outcomes, we need to examine 
the nature of China's intervention in particular policy arenas, and how it actually 
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interacted with the policy networks concerned. In other words, we need a meso-level 
theory that can supplement the political explanations of change. The next section will 
examine the other political explanations of change in Hong Kong. 
4. Political Explanations of Change: Democratisation and 
Electoral Politics 
Like the last approach, the main concern of this explanation of change is with the 
broader political environment in Hong Kong. It sees policy change occurring as a result of 
the development of a representative system and electoral politics in Hong Kong. It is 
undoubtedly the case that Hong Kong has gone through some major political-institutional 
transformations in the last two decades. Chapter 1 (Section 2) has shown that for a number 
of reasons the British Hong Kong government in the 1980s and 1990s initiated an array of 
political reforms aimed at developing a democratic political system in Hong Kong. The 
government introduced and expanded indirect elections based on functional constituencies 
and direct geographical electio~s to the Legislative Council. In 1995, official and 
appointed members of the Legislative Council were eliminated, and all members were 
directly or indirectly elected (Thomas, 1999, p. 225). It is argued that the development of a 
representative system and electoral politics had a major impact on domestic politics and 
'policy change because it affected the relative power of various groups in Hong Kong 
(Chiu and Levin, 2000; Cheung, 1997; Miners, 1994; Lau, 1999; Yukari, 1996). 
For Lau (1999, pp. 51-54), the development of representative system 'drastically 
changed Hong Kong's political landscape' and enlarged the political arena. It 'provided a 
great impetus to mass political participation' and precipitated the decline of the elitist 
structure of policy-making. A number of individuals and groups that had been excluded 
from the policy process formed political groups for the purpose of contesting elections to 
the Legislative Council. They appealed vigorously to the public as anti-communists, 
democratic activists, social welfarists, labour-rights advocates or plain popUlists (Chiu and 
Levin, 2000, p. 129). Consequently, they managed to access the expanded political arena 
through elections to the Legislative Council, in which they became major political forces 
and forged alliances with each other for the control of legislative power (Chiu and Levin, ' 
2000, p. 108). Of course, some previous outsiders did not manage to access the Legislative 
Council through elections. Yet the newly elected politicians could play an intermediary 
role which provided them with important access points to policy-making. 
Until the 1980s only a small range of groups were able to participate in the policy 
process. It is argued that electoral politics has substantially changed the policy-making , 
process and policy outcomes in Hong Kong. The development of a representative system 
enlivened and strengthened the political groups that represented the middle-class or 
grassroots interests, and these groups capitalised aggressively on their newly acquired 
Chapter 2 Cooption, Elitism and Political Explanations of Change 
. 27 
legislative muscle to break up the elitist structure of policy-making. Cheung (1997, p. 98) 
argues that: '. 
On the other hand, newly emerging elected politicians, particularly pro-democratic forces, 
are demanding a say in the way the government is being run, on the basis of their popular 
mandate gained through elections. To them, political reform is not just constitutional 
change per se, to suit Hong Kong's new post-1997 status, but also an important process of 
redistribution of political power, from the business and professional elite sectors to the less 
endowed middle-class and working class. In the course of political reform, elected 
politicians demand the same form of political accountability from the civil servants as that 
which exists in established democracies. 
Miners (1994, p. 224) also argues that in the course of the last two decades, the Legislative 
Council 'has changed from a wholly appointed body subservient to the executive into an 
obstreperous assembly with an elected majority where government proposals are 
frequently defeated'. Hong Kong 'is no longer a simple cosy arrangement which allows 
for dialogue and decision between the bureaucracy and strongly entrenched elites and 
interest groups' (Harris, 1988, pp. x-xi). 
Hence, it is claimed that the development of a representative system and electoral 
politics has redressed the balance of power from the groups that previously had special 
access to the government to the groups representing middle-class and working class 
interests. This political restructuring has led to policy change. Generally speaking, the 
newly elected politicians acted as a motor of change. They took up new issues and 
problems that arose from the colonial transition, such as those in civic education 
(discussed in Chapter 6) and unemployment (Chapter 8). Often these issues bumped 
against the pre-existing policies and vested interests. They delivered what they had 
promised their constituencies by' means of their legislative power. They amended 
government proposals, tabled motions and introduced private member's bills (Miners, 
1994, p. 239). For instance, in 1995, the alliance of the Democratic Party (DP), the 
Democratic Alliance for the Betterment of Hong Kong (DAB) and several trade unions in 
the Legislative Council succeeded in compelling the government and business groups, 
which traditionally refrained from involvement in the field of retirement pensions, to 
accept the Mandatory Provident Fund Scheme (MPF) (Yukari, 1996, p. 11). 
Despite the fact that there has been significant political reform in Hong Kong, this 
approach has a number of limitations. It seems that this approach exaggerates the degree 
of change in the political system and policy. It also underestimates the importance of the 
context within which the newly elected politicians have operated. As King (1988) suggests, 
although there has been change in the political system of Hong Kong, the political reform 
di~ not lead to a new political order. Both the Hong Kong and Chinese go'vernments were 
half-hearted towards democratisation and political re-structuring. They clung to the belief 
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that 'capitalists and professionals are the pillars of the economic market of Hong Kong and 
with their participation and involvement in the political market, the spirit and inner logic 
of capitalist economy can be guarded against the possible distortion by democratic 
sentiments 'and welfarist ideologies'. There was a paradox that whilst the Hong Kong 
government opened up and expanded the political arena through a series of political 
reforms, it tried hard to avoid the tendency of mass-oriented democratisation that it and the 
Chinese government believed would mar Hong Kong's prosperity and economic stability 
(King, 1988, p. 47). Therefore, the political reform was manipulated in a way that 
balanced the interests between traditionally privileged groups and outsiders, rather than 
leading to a new political order. 
Leung (1990) also disputes the extent of change in the political system. She argues 
that whilst an increasing number of outsider groups managed to penetrate the political 
arena. through elections to the Legislative Council, the introduction of functional 
representation in effect reversed the trend. The demarcation of functional constituencies 
consolidated and institutionalised the elitist structure of policy-making that had previously 
existed between the government and a small range of business and professional groups 
(Leung, 1990, p. 144). Moreover, the penetration of the Legislative Council did not 
necessarily equal access to the policy process. Despite the political reform, Hong Kong 
still had the executive-dominated system in which the legislature was relatively weak. The 
relationship betWeen the executive and the legislature was not structured in such a way as 
to enhance the executive's accountability to the latter. The majority of policy decisions 
were still made by the government in consultation with insider groups. These decisions 
were only to be formally approved, in some cases, by the Legislative Council (Li, 1997b, p .. 
71). All of this indicates that this approach has exaggerated the extent of change in Hong 
Kong's political system. " 
This approach, by exaggerating the extent of change in the political system, 
overestimates the extent of change in some areas of policy. One of the clearest examples of 
this exaggeration is the pension policy. To return to Yukari's argument that the alliance of 
elected legislators succeeded in compelling the government to approve the MPF scheme, it 
is clear that this scheme was a compromise agreement rather than a resounding victory. 
Facing concerted opposition from the government and business groups, the alliance failed 
i 
to push through its pay-as-you-go Central Provident Fund scheme (CPF) in the Legislative 
Council. Instead, it had to accept the watered-down MPF bill proposed by the government 
because it was regarded as the last chance to introduce a pension system in Hong Kong 
before 1997 (Chiu and Levin, 2000, p. 118). The curriculum policy on civic education is 
another case in point. Although many pressure groups made a great deal of noise on the 
issue and a number of legislators also supported the idea of mandatory political education 
in schools, the curriculum-makers have so far refused to give in and accept their demands 
(which is discussed in detail in Chapter 6). Hence, in some areas of policy the newly 
elected politicians might not achieve what they wanted. 
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This demonstrates that this approach fails to explain the subtleties of policy change 
because it over-emphasises the importance of electoral politics. It does not e~plain why in 
some areas the extent of policy change was smaller than in others. More importantly, it 
does not pay enough attention to the context within which the newly elected politicians 
had to operate. These politicians accessed the Legislative Council and faced the 
pre-existing structure of policy-making and government! group relations. Although they 
wanted to change policy and had a popular mandate, their interests and demands did not 
occur in a vacuum. T~eir. influence was mediated by the structure and relationship that 
existed in particular areas of policy. The pre-existing structure and relationship were 
p~icularly significant because the political reform in Hong Kong nei~her overhauled the 
executive-led system' nor enabled the elected legislators to substantially vitiate the 
executive power in policy-making. Therefore, in order to have a better understanding of 
policy change in Hong Kong during the colonial transition, we need to pay more attention 
to the interactive relationship between the political reform, as a macro factor, and the 
pre-existing meso-level policy networks . 
. 
5. Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined the traditional approaches to policy-making and policy 
change in Hong Kong. When analysing policy in Hong Kong, the theoretical perspective 
of the administrative absorption of politics/ cooption entirely concentrates on a particular 
, 
arrangement by which a small range of groups were integrated into the government. The 
elitist approach also focuses on the system of cooption, but it emphasises the elitist nature 
of policy-making. A generally cohesive and homogenous group of elites, including senior 
civil servants and a small range of business and business-related professional leaders, 
dominated the policy process. Thus the policies were constantly biased towards business 
interests in Hong Kong. The political explanations of change, which were advanced to 
understand the policy-making in Hong Kong during the transition, see policy change 
occurring either because of political reform or because of the change of sovereignty. It is' 
argued that the processes of decolonisation and democratisation had a major impact on 
Hong Kong's politics. They gave rise to new issues and political forces like the Chinese 
authorities and newly elected politicians that threatened the interests and policies that 
were seen as important. 
Undoubtedly, these approaches have offered some useful . insights into 
understanding how policy was made and changed in Hong Kong. For example, the 
theoretical perspectives like the administrative absorption of politics! cooption and 
elitism point out that there has been a fundamental defect in Hong Kong's political system, 
as the government's policy process was dominated by a small range of groups. In addition, 
. the political explanations of change have demonstrated the impact of contextual changes. 
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Nevertheless, there are also fundamental problems. The perspective of the 
administrative absorption of politics concentrates on the system of cooption in order to 
understand policy in Hong Kong. When emphasising the static and patron-client 
relationships between the government and groups, it ignores the fact that government! 
group relations in policy-making could be far more complex, intricate and dynamic. In 
particular situations, the relations were of mutual dependence and negotiation rather than 
dependence and deference. Moreover, ther~ are difficultie"s within this theoretical 
approach in explaining policy in Hong Kong during the transition. In the face of 
decolonisation and democratisation, the cooptive arrangement that had existed at the 
macro level became less significant in the 1980s and 1990s. As a result, the utility of this 
approach inevitably diminished. 
Elitists' main concern is with a small range of business and business-related 
professional interests in particular areas of policy. They see the policy process being 
dominated by senior civil servants and business elites, but seem unable to explain how the 
business elites actually influenced policy. Although the business elites were integrated 
into the Legislative Council, the Executive Council and a number of advisory committees, 
it is questionable how much influence this provided in the context of Hong Kong, where 
the executive power was paramount. Even if it was true that the business elites had a 
significant impact on policy, it tells us little about' policy in Hong Kong, because the 
business voice was not necessarily unanimous. Like the theoretical perspective of 
cooption, this approach also has difficulty in explaining policy change in Hong Kong's 
transition as the processes of decolonisation and gemocratisation weakened the elitist 
structure of policy-making. 
The important limitation of the political explanations of change is that they 
exaggerate the extent of contextual and policy changes. They overemphasise the intention 
and power of China to intervene in Hong Kong's policy. But they ignore the fact that the 
Chinese authorities also had to work within the political environment of Hong Kong, 
which allowed China to recover Hong Kong smoothly and benefit from it in both 
economic and political terms. By assuming that China had the intention and power to 
intervene, they do not clearly identify the strategies adopted by the Chinese authorities to 
influence Hong Kong's policy. In other words, they fail to distinguish between the 
strategies of repossession and penetration that frequently led to different policy outcomes. 
Similarly, the explanations that concentrate on the democratisation process in Hong Kong 
overemphasise the degree of change in its political system. In doing so they exaggerate 
the extent of policy change, and ignore the fact that in many areas of policy the newly 
mandated politicians were unable to achieve what they wanted. As has been argued, this 
demonstrates that the purely political explanations of change are too simplistic and 
voluntaristic. 
Perhaps the most significant limitation is that they are all general theories which 
focus entirely on macro factors. As has been seen, the theoretical perspectives of cooption 
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and elitism are concerned with the macro-level features of Hong Kong's political system, 
and the political explanations of change focus on the changes in Hong Kong's political 
environment. Whilst these theoretical perspectives can offer a general picture of how 
policy was made and changed, they have difficulty in dealing with variations across 
policy sectors. The concept of cooption and the elitist approach are concerned with the 
political system in which power was concentrated in the hands of a few groups. Yet they 
ignored the fact that in various policy arenas there were different structures, groups 
involved and policy outcomes.' Likewise, the political. explanations of change that 
concentrate on Hong Kong's political environment can account for the growing pressures 
for policy change, but they do not explain why the degree of change was greater in some 
policy areas than in others. 
The political explanations of change also fail to pay sufficient attention to the 
subtleties of policy change. Their main concern is with the macro-level contextual factors. 
They see policy change occurring as a result of the changes in Hong Kong's political 
environment. However, in many areas the Chinese authorities and newly elected 
politicians did not achieve what they wanted. This demonstrates that the purely political 
explanations of change fail because they do not take account of the role of government! 
group relations and their structural arrangements in the course of policy change. They do 
not recognise that the processes of decolonisation and democratisation did not occur 
within a vacuum. The Chinese authorities and new legislators had to operate within the 
pre-existing structure of policy-making, which affected their ability to propel forward 
their agendas of policy change, especially when the Chinese authorities adopted the 
strategy of penetration rather than coercion. All of this demonstrates that. we need a 
meso-level approach in order to have a fuller understanding of policy in Hong Kong 
during the colonial transition. Hence, in the. next chapter I shall examine the policy 
network concept in order to develop a more sophisticated view of policy-making and 
policy change in Hong Kong. 
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Chapter 2 demonstrated that in order fully to understand how policy developed and 
changed in Hong Kong during the transition, it is important to shift the focus of concern 
from general theories to the analysis of the structure of policy-making and the 
government! group relations involved. In this regard, this chapter wIII examine the notion 
of policy networks and demonstrate how it can reconceptualise policy-making and policy 
change in Hong Kong. It will argue that the concept has a number of advantages over the 
traditional approaches to policy analysis in Hong Kong. 
First, the traditional approaches offer general theories concerning policy-making 
and policy change in Hong Kong. However, there is no account of variations across 
sectors. By contrast, the notion of policy network is more flexible. It is a meso-level 
concept that is concerned with explaining policy within particular areas or sub-sectors. 
Therefore, it allows analysis of variations in the structure of decision-making, policy 
outcomes and policy change that exist in different policy arenas. Second, in the 
theoretical perspectives of cooption and elitism, it is assumed that only a small range of 
. groups are able to access the policy process. However, they say very little about how the 
integrated groups actually influence policy. The notion of policy network provides a 
. mechanism for explaining why policy has constantly served the interests of certain 
groups at the expense of others in particular policy arenas. It introduces the concept of 
structural power, which means that the interests of dominant actors might be built into the 
structure of policy networks in Hong Kong. This structure has a great impact on policy 
outcomes. 
Third, the network approach offers a better understanding of policy change in Hong 
Kong than the traditional approaches. The political explanations of change are. too 
simplistic and voluntaristic. They see policy change occurring as a result of the changes 
in Hong Kong's political environment during the transition. However, they exaggerate 
the contextual changes and the impact they have had on policy. By contrast, the 
dialectical approach to policy networks provides a more sophisticated view of policy 
change. It allows analysis of the interactive relationship between the' context and 
networks in explaining the· trajectory of policy change. With the concept of policy 
network, the pace and degree of changes that have occurred might have been mediated by 
the nature of policy networks. In the light of these advantages, this chapter will use the 
notion of policy network to re-conceptualise policy-making and policy change in Hong 
Kong. 
· . 
Chapter 3 Government, Groups and Policy Networks 33 
This chapter will begin by outlining the development of policy network approach. It 
will then demonstrate how the approach can supplement and modify the traditional 
approaches to policy analysis in Hong Kong. It will focus on three aspects of policy 
analysis: government! group relations in policy-making; how policy was made; and how 
policy was changed in Hong Kong's transition. Finally, it will develop a number of 
propositions about policy-making and policy change in Hong Kong. 
1. The Development of Policy Network Theory 
A brief summary of the development of policy network theory will suffice here as 
the process has been well documented in many writings (see Marsh, 1998, Chapter 1; 
Rhodes, 1997, Chapter 2; Marsh and Rhodes, 1992a; Marsh and Rhodes, 1992b; Marsh 
and Smith, 1996), and some of the key elements of this theory will be discussed in detail 
in other parts of this chapter. 
1.1 The American Literature 
Jordan (1990, pp. 319-320) suggests that the idea of 'policy network', although not 
the term itself, sprouted in the United States in the 1950s and 1960s. The American usage 
emphasises constant contacts between individuals representing, interest groups, 
bureaucratic agencies and government that provide the basis of a sub-government. 
Freeman (1965, p. 5), one of the key writers on the policy network approach, looks at 
patterns of policy-making within sub-systems. He focuses on the '~elati~ns among 
sub-system actors from the bureaucracy, from congressional committees, and from 
interested segments of the public'. He argues that these sub-systems tend to take over the 
task of decision-making officially allotted to the government as a whole, and thus they 
have a major impact on policy. According to Freeman, many of the decisions reached in 
subsystems may be regarded as minor or detailed, but they are 'collectively the stuff of 
which a large share of our total public policy is made'. Hence, the cumulative importance 
of their decisions cannot.be disregarded (Jordan, 1990, pp. 322-323).' 
The policy network approach is a critique, sometimes implicit, of the pluralist 
model of interest group intermediation, i.e. of government! group relations in 
policy-making (Marsh, 1998, p. 4). Writers like Ripley and Franklin (1984) emphasise 
that there are problems with the pluralist view of the world, which exaggerates the 
dispersal of power in society and the ease of access to government. They argue that in 
particular policy areas, policy-making is not open but is made within sub-governments 
(Smith, 1993, p. 57). They characterise the sub-government phenomenon as follows: 
Subgovemments are clusters of individuals that effectively make most of the routine 
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decisions in a given substantive area ofpolicy ... A typical subgovernment is composed of 
members of the House and! or Senate, members of Congressional staffs, a few bureaucrats 
and representatives of private groups and organisations interested in the policy area 
(Ripley and Franklin, 1984, p. 10; quoted in Jordan, 1990, p. 321). 
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According to Ripley and Franklin (1984), only a small range of actors manage to access 
the sub-governments, which are: 
... small groups of political actors, both governmental and non-governmental, that 
specialize in specific issue areas. Subgovernments are in part created by the complexity of 
. the national policy agenda, and they help sustain that complexity (Ripley and Franklin, 
1984, p. 8; quoted in Jordan, 1990, p. 321). 
The policy network approach is also different from the pluralist model because it 
argues that the state is not impartial. State actors have interests and often need to 
exchange resources with private groups or organisations within policy networks in order 
to achieve their interests. In policy networks, the relationships between government and 
gr~ups are regarded as resource dependent or symbiotic. For example, Lowi (1969) 
emphasises the triangular nature of relationships involved, with the central government 
agency, the Congressional Committee and the interest group enjoying symbiotic 
interaction (Rhodes, 1997, p. 34). This insight gave rise to the label of 'iron triangle' 
within the American literature. Peters (1986, p. 24) describes an iron triangle as follows: 
Each actor in the iron triangle needs the other two to succeed, and the style that develops is 
symbiotic. The pressure group needs the agency to deliver services to its members and to 
provide a friendly point of access to government, while the agency needs the pressure 
I group to mobilise political support for its programs among the affected clientele (quoted in . 
Rhodes, 1997, p. 34). 
This approach represents an attempt to shift the focus of policy analysis away from 
institutional arrangements into the relationships between government and groups in 
. . 
policy-making. Griffith's work (1939), which is an important part of the intellectual 
pre-history of network analysis in the United States, focuses on the relationships between 
legislators, administrators, lobbyists and scholars who are interested in a common 
problem. He claims that 'instead of studying the formal institutions', a person 'may 
possibly obtain a better picture of the way things really happen if he would study these 
'whirlpools' of special social interest and problems' (quoted in Jordan, 1990, p. 321). As 
has been shown, Freeman (1965) also stresses disaggregating the study of policy-making 
. to sub-systems in which bureaucrats, Congressmen and interest groups interact and make 
policies (Rhodes, 1997, p. 33). Overall, the American literature emphasises the 
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micro-level analysis that examines the personal relations between key actors rather than 
the structural relations between groups or organisations within the policy process (Marsh, 
1998, p. 6). 
1.2 The British Literature 
Although this section will not discuss the European literature on policy networks, it 
, needs to point out that most British and American literature is narrower in focus. 
Generally speaking, the German and the Dutch literature is more ambitious. It views 
policy networks as a new form of governance, and in this sense as an alternative to 
markets and hierarchies. As Mayntz (1994, p. 5) puts it, 'the notion of policy networks 
does not so much represent a new analytical perspective but rather signals a real change in 
the structure of the polity'. In contrast, most British writers on policy networks have a 
narrower focus. They regard policy networks a$ a model ofinterest group intermediation, 
and concentrate on the role networks play in the development and implementation of 
policy (Marsh, 1998, p. 8; Marsh and Smith, 2000, p, 4). 
Although many agree on this focus of network analysis, there are major distinctions 
. in the approach to policy networks within the British literature. The European literature 
has influenced many British authors, but there have been· some important American 
contributions. Both Richardson and Jordan (1979) and Wilks and Wright (1987) were 
strongly influenced by the work of Heclo and Wildavsky (1974) on public expenditure 
decision-making within the British government. Evans (1997) categorises their work. as 
the anthropological approach to policy networks. Heclo and Wildavsky (1974) focus on a 
policy community that refers to 'the personal relationships between major political and 
administrative actors - sometimes in conflict, often in agreement, but always in touch and 
operating within a shared framework' (Heclo and Wildavsky, 1981, p. xv). In explaining 
the budgetary decisions, they examine the cultural bonds, kinship and common 
calculations among insiders within the community, which 'help political administrators 
deal with a complex world but also separate them from the laymen' (Helco and Wildavsky, 
1981, p. 2). 
Richardson and Jordan (1979) adopt Heclo and Wildavsky's idea of a policy 
network and. suggest . that such arrangements· are vital to understanding· most 
policy-making in stable liberal democracies. For them, policy-making in Britain takes 
place within policy communities in which govel11I1'ient agencies and pressure groups 
interact, and access to these sub-systems is generally restricted. They argue that 
(Richardson and Jordan, 1979, p. 74): 
, , -' 
. 
The policy-making map is in reality a series of vertical compartments or segments - each 
segment inhabited by a different set of organised groups and generally impenetrable by 
'unrecognised groups' or by the general public. 
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They emphasise disaggregation. There are many divisions within government and society 
is fragmented with the growing number of interest groups. Policy-making is segmented 
and policy is made within a variety of policy communities characterised by close relations 
between particular interests and different sections of government. Like HecIo and 
Wildavsky, they stress the interpersonal rather than the structural nature of these relations· 
within policy communities in order to understand policy-making (Marsh, 1998, pp. 6-7). 
Wilks and Wright (1987) examine the relations between government and industry in 
Britain. Influenced by HecIo and Wildavsky's work, they also place considerable 
emphasis on interpersonal relations as a key aspect of policy networks, within which there 
is an unwritten set of values and culture that guides the behaviour of actors and thus shapes 
policy. Moreover, they emphasise the dis aggregated nature of policy networks in the 
industrial policy sector, and suggest that such disaggregation exists in all policy sectors. 
For them, industry is 'neither monolithic nor homogenous', and government is 
'fragmented, differentiated and fissiparous'. Therefore, they argue that the key to 
understanding government-industry relationships is to disaggregate analysis to 
sub-sectoral policy networks, and that any analysis ignoring the sub-sectoral level would 
be incomplete (Rhodes, 1997, pp. 40-41). 
The anthropological approach offers many useful insights into understanding the 
policy process and policy outcomes. However, it has three major limitations. First, it 
overemphasises the interpersonal relations between the government and groups, and thus 
it pays little attention to the structure within policy networks. Second, it says virtually 
nothing about the way in which the culture, trust and values within networks and the 
resultant network behaviour interact with exogenous factors or the environment of 
networks. Therefore, it cannot explain the origins of the culture and values that dominate 
the networks, and how the networks actually change (Marsh and Smith, 1996, p. 11). Third, 
as Smith (1993, p. 57) points out, this approach is very much within a pluralist framework. 
Although Richardson and Jordan (1979) suggest that there are closed and regularised 
policy networks in Britain, they see most policy networks as being relatively open. HecIo 
(1978) emphasises the importance of issue networks, and asserts that there is a tendency 
for closed policy networks to break down into issue networks (Marsh, 1998, p. 5). 
Rhodes (1981) develops his model for a study of British central-local relations. He 
takes a different approach to policy networks by drawing on the European literature on 
inter-organisational relations, rather than on the American literature on sub-governments. 
Therefore, he emphasises the structural relationships between actors representing various 
organisations as the crucial element in policy networks rather than the interpersonal 
relations between individuals within these organisations (Marsh, 1998, p. 6). For him, 
networks are rooted in the structure of power dependence and resource exchange (Rhodes, 
1986, Chapter 2). He, after Benson (1982), defines a policy network as: 
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a cluster or complex of organisations connected to each other by resource 
dependencies and distinguished from other clusters or complexes by breaks in the 
structure of resource dependencies (Benson, 1982,. p. 148). 
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In the initial version of Rhodes' model, central-local relations are a 'game' in which 
both central and local actors are interdependent. They deploy their resources, be they 
constitutional-legal, organisational, financial, political or informational, to maximise 
influence over outcomes, while trying to avoid becoming dependent on others (Rhodes, 
1981, Chapters 1 and 5). One of the major problems of this model is that it seems to blur 
the boundaries be~een micro-, meso- and macro-levels of analysis and so the links 
between different levels of analysis are not adequately explored (Rhodes, 1997, p. 36). 
Hence, Rhodes in his later work (1986) distinguishes clearly between the three 
levels of analysis. The macro-level analysis involves an account of the changing 
characteristics, structures and processes of British government during the post-war period. 
The meso-level of analysis is where the concept of policy network is located. It focuses 
on the patterns of linkage between the centre and sub-central political and governmental 
organisations, or between government and groups. The micro-level of analysis stresses 
the behaviour of particular actors, be it individuals or organisations (Rhodes, 1997, p. 37). 
In other words, policy networks are a meso-level concept as opposed to other concepts in 
macro- or micro-level theories (Daugbjerg and Marsh, 1998, pp. 53-54). This thesis 
adopts Rhodes' definition of policy network, and this definition is also followed by other 
writers like Marsh and Rhodes (1992a; 1992b) and Marsh and Smith (2000). However, 
being a meso-level concept does not mean that a policy network can operate 
independently of macro or micro factors. It has more utility as an explanatory concept ifit 
is integrated with macro-level and micro-level analysis (Marsh, 1998, p. 15). Hence, 
Marsh and Smith (2000) develop the dialectical approach to policy networks that focuses. 
on the interaction between networks and the other levels of factors, which will be 
discussed in Sections 3 and 4. 
Rhodes (1986; 1988) also attempts to make the concept of policy network more 
theoretically informed. He suggests that networks vary across five key dimensions (see 
Smith, 1993, p. 58): 
• Constellation of interests - the interests of those involved in a policy network, which 
can vary according to service! function! territory! client group. 
• Membership - who are the members? Are they public or private groups? Is the 
membership stable and highly restricted? 
• Vertical independence - to what extent is a participant dependent on the actors above 
or below it? 
• Hori~ontal independence":" to what extent is a network insulated from other networks 
and the public? 
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• The distribution of resources - what resources do participants have to exchange, and 
how important are their resources? 
By using these criteria, Rhodes identifies five types of policy networks. First, policy 
communities are characterised by the stability and continuity of a restrictive membership, 
vertical interdependence, and insulation from other networks and the public (including 
Parliament). Policy communities are normally based on the major functional interests in 
and of government, such as education and fire service. Second, professional networks 
'express the interests of a particular profession. They have a substantial degree of vertical 
interdependence whilst insulating themselves from other networks and the public. Third, 
intergovernmental networks are the networks in which the local government is 
represented at national level. They have limited vertical interdependence but extensive 
horizontal articulation. Fourth, producer networks are distinguished by: the prominent 
role of economic interests, including both the public and private sectors, in policy-making; 
their fluctuating membership; dependence of the centre on economic organisations for 
delivering the desired goods and for information; and the limited interdependence among 
the economic interests. Finally, issue networks are loosely integrated and volatile. They 
are characterised by their large number of participants and limited degree of 
interdependence (Rhodes, 1986, Chapter 2). 
Perhaps the most important weakness in this typology is that it conflates two 
separate dimensions. Clearly, policy networks differ according to their degrees of 
integration, stability and exclusiveness, and thus there is the distinction between policy 
communities, policy networks and issue networks. However, in Rhodes' typology, 
networks also differ according to which interest dominates them. As Rhodes indicates, 
networks may be dominated by professional interests (professionalised networks), 
economic interests (producer networks) or government (intergovernmentaV policy 
communities). In combining these, dimensions, Rhodes' model suggests that there is no 
such thing as a professional or producer dominated policy community. In addition, 
Rhodes' model suggests that, by definition, a producer network is necessarily less 
integrated and cohesive than a professional network. Yet these matters are best regarded 
as empirica.l questions (Marsh and Rhodes, 1992a, p. 184). In fact, Chapter 7 will 
demonstrate that a closed and cohesive producer network developed and dominated 
manpower policy in Hong Kong in the 1970s and 1980s. 
Given this weakness, Marsh and Rhodes (1992a; 1992b) have revised Rhodes' 
model. In Marsh and Rhodes' typology, the term 'policy network' is used as a generic 
term encompassing all types of networks. They distinguish between different types of-
networks according to the closeness of the relationships within them, whilst leaving open 
the question of the interests served by a particular policy network. This approach will be 
discussed below. Moreover, unlike Wilks and Wright (1987), they argue that policy 
networks exist at both the sectoral and sub-sectoral levels (Marsh and Rhodes, 1992a, p. 
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203). The remaining parts ofthis chapter will examine how the policy network theory can 
be used to supplement the traditional approaches to policy analysis in Hong Kong. 
2. Government/ Group Relations in Policy Networks 
The last chapter argued that there are major problems with the traditional 
approaches to policy-making and policy change in Hong Kong during the transition. This 
section will examine how the policy network theory can be used to reconceptualise 
government! group relations in policy-making. By using the policy network theory, it is 
possible to develop a more sophisticated view of policy-making in the context of Hong 
Kong. 
The last chapter showed that in examining the policy process in Hong Kong, the 
theoretical perspective of cooption overemphasises the static and unidirectional 
relationship between the government and groups. Power is regarded as a zero-sum. It 
maintains that the incorporated groups were completely dependent on the government 
and their influence was the product of governmental political largesse. However, this 
account of government! group relations is too simplistic and rarely borne out by evidence. 
In contrast, the policy network approach offers a more dynamic and sophisticated 
view of government! group relations in policy-making. It includes the concepts of 
resource dependence and resource exchange in policy analysis. In policy networks, the 
government! group interaction is not a patron-client relationship; instead, the relationship 
is one of mutual dependence. As Smith (1993, p. 58-59) points out, 'any organisation is 
dependent on another organisation for resources'. Of course, in some cases the 
government and groups can survive without each other. However, in particular situations 
when the government wishes to achieve specific policy goals and groups need to 
influence policy, the government and groups are mutually dependent. In the context of 
Hong Kong, which is characterised by its administrative state, the government has the 
potential to be autonomous. Yet, ifit does intend to achieve specific policy goals with the 
minimum of conflict and political reverberation, it needs the assistance of groups in the 
development and implementation of policy. In order to gain the political and practical 
support of groups, resources have to be exchanged. The government can exchange access 
to the policy process for cooperation, and thus· establish a policy network. This 
phenomenon of resource dependence has been elaborated in Chapter 1, which argues that 
the administrative state in Hong Kong was highly facilitative of the development of 
policy networks. 
Power is not a zero-sum in networks, especially in· highly integrated policy 
communities. If mutual dependence develops between the government and groups in 
policy-making and a cohesive network is created, policy is developed through 
negotiations rather than supplication or gimmicky consultation. In this situation, power is 
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not something that belongs either to the government agency or to the groups involved. A 
policy network does not involve one group or agency sacrificing power and interests to 
others. Moreover, by working together, the groups and government agency can actually 
increase each other's power over policy in relation to other parts of the government and 
society. A policy network allows the government agency and groups to de-politicise and 
seal off the policy process from other agencies, pressure groups and networks (Smith, 
1993, pp. 53-54). Therefore, if a policy network develops, it can 'involve each group in a 
mutual expansion of power as each increases its influence over policy' (Smith, 1993, p. 
64). 
In addition, the notion of policy network has an advantage over the traditional 
approaches to' policy analysis in Hong Kong. This is because the policy network theory 
allows analysis of variations across policy areas and sub-sectors. It has been shown that 
the analytical perspectives of cooption and elitism are general theories concerning the 
nature of Hong Kong state. They see most policies in Hong Kong being shaped by the 
government officials and a small range of economic! professional elites. This might be 
the general pattern of policy-making in Hong Kong. However, the influence of these 
elites has varied from sector to sector and from time to time. There have been cases in 
which the relations between the government and groups differed from the overall pattern 
(see Chapter 2). In this regard, the meso-level notion of policy network is much more' 
flexible. It pays more attention to these variations in government! group relations that 
, exist in a range of policy arenas. 
The policy network approach demonstrates that government! group relations vary 
across sectors. For Marsh and Rhodes (1992a), policy networks is a meso-level concept 
that can vary along a continuum according to the closeness of the government! group 
relations within them. They treat policy networks as a generic term. On the other hand, 
policy communities and issue networks are types of relations that exist between interest 
groups and government. Policy communities are at one end of the continuum and 
distinguished by close relations; issue networks are at the other end and involve loose 
government! group relations (Rhodes, 1997, p. 43). 
Marsh and Rhodes (1992a, pp. 186-188) outline a number of dimensions that 
determine a network's position on the policy community-issue network continuum (see 
Table 3.1). First, a network depends on the number of participants. A policy community 
contains a limited number of participants with some groups deliberately excluded, 
whereas there are a large number of participants and a wide range of interests within issue 
networks. However, the issue of exclusion is sometimes complicated because a policy 
community can have two tiers, a core and a periphery or a primary and secondary 
community. The primary/ core contains the key actors who set the rules of the game, 
determine membership and set the main direction of policy. In the secondary community 
are the groups that are occasionally consulted on particular issues and have to abide by 
the rules of the game (Marsh and Rhodes, 1992b, pp. 255-257; Smith, 1993, p. 61). 
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Second, the frequency of interaction determines a network's position on the continuum. 
In a policy community, there is frequent interaction between all members on matters 
related to the policy issues. In contrast, there is fluctuating interaction within an issue 
network. The third dimension is continuity. A policy community involves consistency in 
values, membership and policy outcomes over time. In an issue network, access 
fluctuates significantly and so do values and policy outcomes. Fourth, the nature of a 
p~licy network depends on the degree of consensus. If a network is to develop into a 
highly integrated policy community, there has to be a hi~h degree of consensus on the 
rules of the game, values, policy goals and broad policy preferences among the actors 
within it. A policy community may even have a shared ideology that influences the 
community's 'world-view'. On the other hand, it is unlikely that there is a consensus 
within an issue network. The sheer number of groups and fluid membership mean that 
consensus is almo'st unachievable. There is no shared understanding either among groups 
or between the groups and government. 
The fifth dimension which determines the nature of a policy network is the nature of 
relationship and interaction. In a policy community, it is likely that the relationship is one 
of exchange with all members having some resources. Therefore, the interaction involves 
bargaining between members with resources. In an issue network, although some 
members may have resources to exchange, their resources are limited. In fact, most of the 
groups do not have significant ~esources. Therefore, an issue network involves policy 
consultation rather than shared decision-making. Sixth, in a policy community the 
participating groups are hierarchically structured so that their leaders can guarantee the 
compliance of their members. In contrast, the integrated groups in an issue network have 
little ability to regulate members. Finally, a policy network depends on the distribution of 
power among participants. There is. ~ balance of power in a policy community, not 
necessarily one in which all members equally benefit but one in which they see 
themselves as involved in a positive-sum game. However, power can be a zero-sum in an 
issu~ network. Despite these characteristics, Marsh and Rhodes (1992a, p: 190) stress that 
issue networks remain networks as the relations between government and groups are 
ordered. In other words, even issue networks are different from usual pressure group 
politics where a large number of groups compete against each other for access to the 
government and political influence. 
The implication of this typology is that it sees government! group relations in 
policy-making varying from sector to sector. The relations also differ across sub-sectors 
and even around particular issues (Smith, 1993, p. 58 and 65). Hence, it is important to 
use the dimensions outlined above to identify the differences between policy arenas. 
Marsh and RhC?des (1992a, p. 187) and Smith (1993, p. 65) emphasise the diagnostic role 
of this typology. They argue that these characteristics are ideal types at either end of a 
continuum. It is seldom, if ever, the case that a network conforms exactly to the 
dimensions outlined above. Nevertheless, these dimensions have important empirical 
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relevance. By comparing the actual government! group relatio'ns with these dimensions, 
we can gain a better understanding of the nature of these relationships that exist in 
particular policy arenas. 
Table 3.1 The Nature/ Types of Policy Networks 
Dimension 
1. Membership 
(a) Number of 
participants 
(b) Type of interest 
2. Integration 
(a) Frequency of 
interaction 
(b) Continuity 
(c) Consensus 
3. Resources 
(a) Distribution of 
resources 
(Within network) 
(b) Distribution of 
distribution 
resources 
(within participating 
organisations) 
Policy Community 
Very limited number, some 
groups consciously excluded 
Economic and! or professional 
interests dominate 
Frequent, high quality, interaction 
of all groups on all matters related 
to policy issue 
Membership, values and outcomes 
persistent over time 
All participants share basic values 
and accept the legitimacy of the 
outcome 
All participants have resources, 
basic relationship is an exchange 
relationship 
Hierarchical, leaders can deliver 
members 
Issue Networks 
Large 
Encompasses range of 
affected interests 
Contacts fluctuate in 
frequency and intensity 
Access fluctuates 
significantly 
A measure of agreement 
exists but conflict is 
present 
Some participants may 
have resources, but 
they are limited and 
basic relationship is 
consultative 
Varied and variable 
distribution and 
capacity to regulate 
members 
4. Power There is a balance of power 
between members. One group 
may be dominant but power is 
positive-sum . 
Unequal powers, reflects 
unequal resources and unequal 
access. It is a zero-sum game 
Source: Marsh and Rhodes (1992b, p. 251) 
The policy network approach not only allows for variations in government! group 
relations across sectors, but also suggests a number of reasons for these variations. For 
Smith (1993, p. 59), although the government always has an interest in creating closed 
policy communities to facilitate resource exchange, the type of network that develops is 
not always determined by the government. Instead, 'the type of network that develops 
often depends on the groups involved, the interests of various actors within government, 
the nature of the policy and the institutional arrangements that are available'. A policy 
community is likely to develop if the integrated groups have significant resources and 
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there is a single decision-making centre within government. In addition, there has to be a 
strong consensus on policy and institutional arrangements that allow the participants to 
exclude other groups and issues from the policy process. Policy communities often 
develop in areas that are salient to the government. Of course, these meso-level factors 
are by no means exhaustive. Marsh and Smith (2009, p. 7) argue that the structure of 
networks is also likely to 'reflect the broader pattern of structured inequality within 
society'. The structural positions of groups, for example, based on class, gender or 
ethnicity, are reflected in networks' membership and structure. 
3. Policy Networks and Policy Outcomes 
The policy network theory can provide a more sophisticated explanation of policy 
outcomes in Hong Kong than the other approaches discussed. The last chapter argued that 
with the elitist approach it is often unclear how the economic and professional elites 
actually influenced policy. It contains presumptions about the distribution of power in 
. . . 
Hong Kong, but it says very little about the mechanism that allowed the elite groups to 
influence policy. Leung (1990) tries to overcome this problem by concentrating on the 
financial resources and organisation of business and professional groups. However, as 
argued before, there is no real reason why these resources should necessarily lead to high 
influence. 
Contrary to the elitist approach, Smith (1993, pp. 72-73) emphasises the concept of 
structural power in order to explain policy. For him, some integrated groups are able to 
influence policy not because they have more resources than other groups but because 
their interests are built into the structure within a policy network, and this structure 
privileges their interests in the policy process. Within the policy network the structure is a 
set of rules, standard operating procedures, values, consensus and formal and informal 
institutions. The structure creates a certain range of policy options and as such it 
represents the interests of the key actors within the network. This range of policy options 
is routinised within the policy process, and thus only particular decisions will be made. 
<;onsequently, the government's policies constantly favour the interests of these groups. 
Moreover, the establishment of a closed policy network means that alternative groups, 
issues and policy options are routinely excluded from the policy process through the 
consensus and institutions within the network. As a result, any challenges to the policies 
. biased in these groups' favour are minimised. . 
But again, policy may vary from sector to sector and from time to time. The policy 
\ 
n~twork theory offers an explanation of these variations. For Smith (1993, p. 71) and 
Marsh and Rhodes (1992a, pp. 197-198), various patterns of policy outcomes are the 
consequences of different types of policy networks. Where a policy community exists, it 
is likely that policy will reflect the goals of the key actors within the community. As we 
, 
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have seen, the interests of the key actors are built into the structure within a policy 
community, and thus they have substantial control over the issues that are raised and the 
response to them. Policy is limited to what is acceptable to the consensus within the 
policy community. By constraining the policy agenda and excluding certain groups and 
policy options from the policy process, the policy community is also a cause of policy 
continuity. 
On the other hand, issue networks mean that the potential policy outcomes tend to 
be more varied. Since agreement is difficult to achieve between various actors within an 
issue network, it is much easier for insider or outsider groups to get alternative issues and 
policy options onto the agenda. Even if agreement is temporarily achieved, there are 
likely to be groups within the network who will attempt to resist the implementation of 
policy. The absence of a strong mechanism for exclusion makes it much easier for 
outsider groups to penetrate the network and challenge the status quo. Hence, 'the 
consequence of an issue network is policy inertia, a policy mess, or constantly changing 
policy as different actors gain the upper hand and attempt to implement a policy that suits 
their goals' (Smith, 1993, p. 71). In short, the policy network approach demonstrates that 
in Hong Kong the networks as a structure within the policy process might have a major 
impact on policy. Policy networks are an independent variable, whilst policy outcomes 
are a dependent variable. 
However, Dowding (1994; 1995; 2001) examines the causal relationship between 
policy networks and policy outcomes from a different theoretical perspective. He seeks to 
explain policy by adopting a micro-level rational choice approach to policy networks. For 
him, policy networks are a metaphor or a typology void of any explanatory utility. He 
maintains that in order to understand how policy networks affect policy outcomes, 'we 
need to investigate the processes by which groups become excluded, the processes by· 
which issue consensus often emerges, the processes by which network characteristics are 
transformed'. Yet 'policy network language does not explain these processes, rather it 
identifies characteristics in.need of explanation' (Dowding, 1994, p. 68). He argues that 
different types of networks are likely to be associated with different policy outcomes, but 
the independent variable is not policy networks per se. Instead, the components within the 
networks are important in explaining policy outcomes: 
... the driving force of explanation, the independent variables, are not network 
characteristics per se but rather characteristics of components within the networks. These 
components explain both the nature of the network and the nature of the policy process. 
Truly general theory may be developed by concentrating upon those characteristics 
(Dowding, 1995, p. 137). 
Hence, any explanation of policy lies in the resources that various agents within a 
policy network possess and the way in which they use or can no longer use these resources. 
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Policy.networks only reflect the patterns of interaction and resource exchange between 
agents (Marsh, 1~98, p. 12). Furthermore, Dowding (1995, pp. 143-145) suggests that the 
bargaining model and game theory can be fruitfully applied to understand the nature of 
policy networks and policy outcomes. Policy can be explained by analysing the bargaining 
strategies and resource powers of various actors within networks. 'Policies emerge 
through power struggles of different interests, both within zero-sum and variable-sum 
contexts'. 
Perhaps the central problem of Dowding's approach to policy networks is that when 
explaining policy it privileges agents, including their preferences, resources, 
decision-making schemes and actions, over structure and assumes these agents' 
preferences. In other words, it plays down the characteristics of policy networks whilst 
overemphasising the characteristics of agents within the networks. However: 'although 
structures don't exist independent of agents, neither can they be reduced', as Dowding 
implies: 'to the preferences and actions of agents'. Although the structure of networks 
does not determine policy outcomes, it is important because it affects: 'the process of 
bargaining, who bargains and what is bargained over' (Marsh and Smith, 1996, p. 7). 
To overcome the dichotomy between structure and agents and to provide a more 
comprehensive understanding of policy, Marsh and Smith (2000) have recently developed 
a dialectical approach to network analysis. In their usage, a dialectical relationship is: 'an 
interactive relationship between two variables in which each affects the' other in a 
continuing iterative process' (Marsh and Smith, 2000, p. 5). For them, 'any approach 
.\ 
which stresses exclusively either structure or agency has severe limitations' Therefore, 
their approach concentrates on the dialectical relationship between the structures and 
agents within policy networks in order to explain policy. 
On the one hand, networks are structures that constrain and facilitate agents and then 
affect policy outcomes. They argue that (Marsh and Smith, 2000, p. 6): 
Networks involve the institutionalization of beliefs, values, cultures and particular forms 
of behaviour. They are organisations which shape attitudes and behaviour ... They simplify 
the policy process by limiting actions, problems and solutions. Networks define roles and 
responses. In doing so they are not neutral, but, like other political institutions and 
processes, they both reflect past power distributions and conflicts and shape present 
political outcomes'. 
On the other hand, the structure of networks does not determine policy outcomes. 
Outcomes also depend on the actions of strategically calculating agents. Although the 
agents do not control the structural context within a policy network, they do interpret that 
context, and this interpretation mediates the effect of the structural context on policy 
outcomes. Moreover, the agents 'can, and do, negotiate and renegotiate network 
structures' in order to advance their interests. Therefore, any explanation of policy and its 
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change needs to analyse the dialectical relationship between the role of agents and the 
structural context within policy networks (Marsh and Smith, 2000, pp. 6-7). 
However, it needs re-emphasising that the major aim of this thesis is to examine 
whether or not policy networks affected policy outcomes and policy change in Hong 
Kong during the colonial transition rather than to offer a comprehensive understanding of 
this change. Hence, although the relationship is dialectical and intertwined, it is necessary 
to isolate the characteristics of networks from other variables like agents, so that I can 
deal with the central question ofthis thesis. In other words, this thesis focuses on the first 
part of the dialectical relationship between structure and agents, i.e. the effects of policy 
networks as structures on policy outcomes. It will examine the extent to which the 
structure within networks privileged certain interests and affected policy in Hong Kong. 
To put it another way, this thesis investigates the structural power of networks. In addition, 
it will also analyse whether the nature/ types of networks were important or not. 
Apart from the dialectical relationship between the structure of networks and the 
agents within them, Marsh and Smith's dialectical model also emphasises the interactive 
relationship between networks and the context within which they operate. The following 
part will discuss this dialectical relationship between networks and context, and how it 
may re-conceptualise policy change in Hong Kong during the transition. 
4. Political Change, Networks and Policy 
Chapter 1 highlighted that the processes of decolonisation and democratisation in 
Hong Kong put pressure on the policy networks to change. This section will consider the 
impact that the policy networks might have had on the course of policy change when they 
were subject to increasing challenge as a result of the changes in Hong Kong's political 
environment. How did the networks interact with Hong Kong's political environment? 
What did this interaction mean for the trajectory of change in policy? 
As we have seen in Chapter 2, the political explanations of change primarily focus 
on macro-level factors like the political reform and the transfer of Hong Kong to China. 
They see policy change occurring as a result of these changes in Hong Kong's political 
environment. However, such explanations of change are too simplistic and highly 
voluntaristic. They exaggerate the degree of contextual changes and overemphasise their 
impact on policy change. They pay little attention to the structure of policy-making like 
policy networks within which the Chinese authorities and the newly elected politicians 
have operated. Therefore, they have difficulty in dealing with the subtleties of policy 
change and cannot explain why change occurred in particular policy areas but not others. 
The policy network theory offers a more sophisticated view of policy change. 
Marsh and Rhodes' (1992a; 1992b) model and, especially, Marsh and Smith's (2000) 
dialectical approach to policy networks recognise the role of both networks and context in 
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the course of policy change. When trying to explain policy change, they do not entirely 
concentrate on the contextual factors. Rather, they stress the interactive relationship 
between networks and the broader context within which they are located. Through this 
interactive relationship, highly integrated policy networks are able to mediate the external 
pressures for change and then shape policy outcomes. 
Marsh and Rhodes (1992a; 1992b) suggest that both networks and context are 
important factors that affect policy change. On the one hand, they emphasise the role of 
context. The broader context within which networks operate is important because any 
substantial change in the context is likely to destabilise the networks, which may result in 
policy change. 'No network is ever wholly closed' and 'totally impervious to outside 
forces' (Marsh and Rhodes, 1992a, p. 195). Based on a range of case studies in Britain, 
Marsh and Rhodes have identified four broad categories of exogenous or 
network-environment change that have a major impact on policy networks and policy 
change. First, economic changes, such as the change in the economic cycle, are an 
important source of instability in networks and policy. Second, political factors like party 
ideology can provide initiatives for challenging the existing policy networks and policy. 
To put this into the context of Hong Kong, the political explanations of change are right to 
an extent. The politics of decolonisation and democratisation was one of the significant 
... 
factors that affected policy change in Hong Kong. In the third broad category is 
knowledge/ information. Any change in the knowledge/ information about a particular 
issue can be the catalyst of policy change. Finally, the developments within institutions 
like the European Community can create new threats and possibilities for various 
.. networks (Marsh and Rhodes, 1992a, pp. 193-195; 1992b, pp. 257-259). 
On the other hand, policy networks are also important. Marsh and Rhodes agree 
with Stones (1992) who emphasises that 'the analysis of change cannot be reduced to a 
simple environmental stimulus - policy network response model'. Policy networks are 
part of the process of change. Whilst there are growing challenges to a particular network 
and its policies, the participants 'in the network shape and construct their ''world'', 
choosing whether or not, and how, to respond' (Marsh and Rhodes, 1992a, p. 195). 
Certainly, exogenous or network-environment changes often result in policy change, both 
in the shape of networks and in policy outcomes. Yet the existence ofa policy network or, 
particularly, a closed and cohesive policy community frequently 'acts as a major 
constraint upon the degree of policy change'. A range of case studies in Britain indicates 
that 'the policy networks have been very successful in resisting policy changes'. Policy 
changes, for example, in health and dietary education and regulations on nutritional and 
fat-content labelling were minimised. In· short, 'policy networks foster incr~mental 
outcomes, thereby favouring the status-quo or the existing balance of interests in the 
network' (Marsh and Rhodes, 1992a, pp. 197-198). 
Although Marsh and Rhodes are less forthcoming on the way in which networks 
affect policy change, the basic outline of their view is clear. It is suggested that policy 
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change is associated with network change. Marsh and Rhodes (1992b, p. 257) argue that: 
... most (network) change is explained in terms of factors exogenous to the network, 
although the extent and speed of the change is clearly influenced by the network's capacity 
to minimise the effect of such change (quoted in Marsh, 1998, p. 11). 
Obviously, highly integrated policy communities have a greater ability than loose issue 
networks to minimise the effect of contextual change. Therefore, if the 
network-environment changes that leads to growing challenges to the networks, policy 
continuity will be the likeliest outcome of tight networks, whereas policy discontinuity 
will be more likely' in weaker networks. The implication of all this is that in order to 
understand and explain policy change, we need to understand and explain how the 
networks react to the changes in their environments (Marsh and Smith, 1996, p. 15; 
Marsh, 1998, p. 11). 
Marsh and Smith's (2000) dialectical approach to policy networks is clearer about 
the interactive relationship between networks and context. In order fully to understand 
how policy changes, we need to move beyond the distinction between exogenous (context) 
and endogenous (network) factors, and recognise that 'there is a dialectical relationship 
between the network and the broader context within which it located' (Marsh and Smith, 
2000, p. 7). By the 'dialectical relationship' they mean that there is an interactive 
relationship between the network and the context in which each affects the other in a 
continuing iterative process, and this interactive process affects the course of policy 
change. If the dialectical relationship is unravelled, two closely related dimensions can be 
identified. 
First, changes in the network-environment can have a major impact on networks 
and the interests and policies that are seen as important. In fact, most network change 
results from the changes in the network-environment which may undermine the 
certainties and values within pa.r:ticular networks. Like Marsh and Rhodes (1992a; 1992b), 
Marsh and Smith (2000, p. 8) argue that political, economic,. ideological and 
knowledge-based changes are important factors that create new issues and challenges to 
the existing policy networks. To these four categories of exogenous change is added 
, 
another important external constraint on networks: other networks. These are a 
significant part of the context within which a network operates, and 'this aspect of the 
. context has a clear impact on the operation of the network, upon change in the network 
and upon policy outcomes'. Moreover, the relationship between sectoral and sub-sectoral 
networks is also important. 
Overall, changes in the network-environment are important in the course of policy 
change because they 'can affect the resources, interests and relationships of the actors 
within networks'. They may give rise to a number of new issues and political forces that 
threaten the consensus and ideology within the networks. These exogenous factors can 
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also produce tensions and conflicts that may either substantially weaken or destroy the 
networks. As the networks become weaker or even break down, they no longer have the 
ability to control the policy arenas and agendas. This makes it easier for opposition 
groups to penetrate the networks and raise new issues and alternative solutions in the 
policy process. In this situation, ,the development of new policies is th~ likely outcome. In 
short, 'networks are often faced by very strong external uncertainties and that does affect 
network structure, network interactions and policy outcomes' (Marsh and Smith, 2000, p. 
8). 
However, such exogenous changes do not determine policy change. The networks 
are equally significant in the course of policy change. This is the second dimension of the 
. dialectical relationship between networks and context. The networks affect policy change 
because the extent and speed of change is clearly influenced by the networks' capacity to 
mediate, and often minimise, the effect of contextual changes. Marsh and Smith (2000, p. . 
9) argue that: 
All such exogenous change is mediated through the understanding of agents and 
interpreted in the context of the structures, rules! norms and interpersonal relationships 
within the network. So, it is important to re-emphasize that any simple distinction between 
endogenous and exogenous factors is misleading. 
Hence, the external changes do not have an effect independent of the networks. The 
networks can mediate the effect of contextual changes and then affect the degree and pace 
of policy change. 
Although Marsh and Smith's dialectical model recognises that networks may have 
the ability to mediate or minimise the effect of contextual changes, it does not go into 
details about how the networks manage to pull it off. Nevertheless, this aspect of network 
analysis is elaborated in Smith's (1993, pp. 76-98; pp. 230-233) earlier work. There are 
three major ways in which networks can withstand the external pressures for change. First, 
if the contextual change occurs in a policy area where a tight policy network exists, the 
network may have the ability to move new issues and demands off the agenda and prevent 
opposition groups from accessing the policy process. Second, the activities of opposition 
groups may lead to new issues being raised on the systematic agenda. These are 'issues 
, . 
subject to widespread general political debate'. The opposition groups may even seize on 
the contextual change and make enough noise to compel the network to launch a 
consultation exercise on a particular issue. Yet this does not mean that these issues 
become part of the institutional agenda, which requires the serious consideration of 
decision-makers and further actions. After a period of general debate and consultation, 
the momentum to change the existing policy will lapse (Smith, 1993, p. 89). This scenario 
is more likely than an outright rejection of change. 
The third possibility is that the actors within the network may recognise the external 
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pressures for change and follow the strategy of damage limitation. They take new issues 
on board and make superficial changes in policy to indemnify the network against 
increasing challenges. As a sop to the opposition, some groups may be allowed to 
penetrate the outer circle of the network and propel forward some changes in policy. 
However, this does not mean a breakdown in the network. Rather, these groups have to 
abide by the rules of the game set by the key actors within the core of the network, and 
they cannot exert a continuous influence on policy. Consequently, policy change is likely 
to be tardy and limited (Smith, 1993, p. 90). 
In addition, the nature ofnetworks must be included in the analysis of how networks 
mediate the effect of contextual changes and influence policy change. As Smith (1993, p. 
98) argues, the ability of a network to withstand the external pressures for change depends 
greatly on the nature of the network. A policy network: 'can survive a great deal of 
pressure for change if it contains a very few actors with a strong consensus and has a high 
degree of control over the implementation process'. Therefore, in the fa~e of contextual 
change, a tightly integrated policy network tends to produce policy continuity. On the 
other hand, if there are a large number of actors who have a weak consensus, the external 
. pressures can create internal tensions and politicise the policy arena. This then leads to 
substantial changes in the network and policy . 
. The notion of dialectical relationship can be used to reconceptualise policy change 
in Hong Kong. In ~rder fully to understand the trajectory ~f change in Hong Kong during 
the colonial transition, we need to recognise the role of both context and networks. 
However, as the role of context has been thoroughly analysed in other studies, this thesis 
focuses on how the networks affected policy change. The argument of this thesis is that 
the relationship between the political transformation in Hong Kong, including the 
processes of decolonisation and democratisation, and the pre-existing policy networks 
was dialectical. The networks were as important as the changes in Hong Kong's political 
environment in the course of policy change. Whilst these exogenous changes created new 
issues and political forces that threatened the networks and their policies, these challenges 
were mediated by networks that might have had the ability to minimise the contextual 
effect. If the challenges occurred in areas where the networks were able to minimise the 
external pressures for change, the degree of policy change tended to be smaller than 
anticipated. 
In addition, this thesis argues that the speed and extent of policy change in Hong 
Kong depended on the nature/ types of networks, and thus policy change varied from 
sector to sector. A tight network had a greater ability to survive the contextual changes, 
and thus minimal and superficial changes in policy were the likeliest outcome. On the . 
other hand, substantial changes in policy were likely to happen in areas where the 
networks were rather loose and weak. In other words, different nature/ types of networks 
had different impacts on the course of policy change, even though these networks were 
subject to similar exogenous pressures, resulting from the changes in Hong Kong's 
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political environment. Hence, it is significant to examine the role of networks in the 
course of policy change. 
5. Propositions 
With the consideration of how the policy network theory supplements the 
traditional approaches, it is possible to develop a' number of propositions about 
policy-making and policy change in Hong Kong, which are illustrated in figure 3.1: 
Government! Group Relations 
1. Although it might be asymmetric, the relationship between the Hong Kong 
government and integrated groups in policy-making was one of mutual dependence 
and resource exchange. The government, or sections of it, needed the assistance of 
groups in the development and implementation of policy. In order to gain this 
assistance, the government exchanged access to the policy process for cooperation 
and thus established policy networks. 
2. The nature of government! group relations, or the types of policy networks, varied 
across policy areas and sub-sectors. This was due to the differences in the groups 
involved, the interests of various actors within the government, the nature of policy, 
the degree of consensus and the institutional arrangements available. 
Networks and Policy Outcomes 
3. The structure of policy networks affected policy outcomes. Within a network there 
was the mechanism for exclusion. The network also privileged certain issues and 
solutions over others within the policy process. In doing so, it ensured that the 
interests ofthe dominant actors within the networks were served. 
Political Change, Networks and Policy 
4. The nature/ types of networks were vital in understanding how policy changed in 
Hong Kong during the colonial transition, because the relationship between the 
changes in Hong Kong's political environment "and the pre-existing policy networks 
was dialectical. Whilst the processes of decolonisation and democratisation 
precipitated and strengthened the external pressures for change, the pace and degree 
of policy change were influenced by the nature/ types of policy networks. 
Consequently, the grand theories of change that primarily focus on the contextual 
factors are insufficient, and the external pressures for change were likely to produce 
Chapter 3 Government. Groups and Policy Networks 52 
various outcomes in different policy arenas. 
Figure 3.1 Policy-making, Networks and Policy Change in Hong Kong 
Context 
The Politics of 
decolonisation 
• New problems and 
issues 
• The influence of China 
on the local affairs in 
Hong Kong 
6. Conclusion 
Policy Networks 
Government actors 
I 
Group actors 
I 
Policy Outcomes 
Continuity/ Change 
Context 
The Politics of 
democratisation 
• New problems and issues 
• Political re-structuring and 
the rise of newly-elected 
politicians 
The nature of a network 
1. The number of participants 
2. The frequency of interaction 
3. Continuity 
4. The degree of consensus 
S. The nature of relationship and 
interaction 
6. The structure of integrated 
groups 
7. The distribution of power , 
The traditional approaches to policy analysis in Hong Kong have focussed o~ macro 
factors, such as the nature of the Hong Kong state and its broader political environment. 
However, they neglect variations across areas of policy, and they have difficulty in 
dealing with the subtleties'ofpolicy-making and policy change in Hong Kong during the 
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transition. This chapter has argued that t~e policy network theory can provide a more 
sophisticated approach to policy analysis in the context of Hong Kong. It can supplement 
the traditional approaches and reconceptualise policy-making and policy change in Hong 
Kong in three important aspects of policy analysis: government! group relations in 
policy-making; how policy was made; and how policy was changed. 
The policy network approach demonstrates that government! group relations in 
policy-making in Hong Kong might not have been of deference and supplication but of 
mutual dependence and resource exchange. Despite the fact that in the 
executive-dominated system of Hong Kong the relations were likely to be asymmetric, 
the government still needed the assistance and support of particular groups in the 
development and implementation of policy. In order to gain their support, the government 
established networks and resources had to be exchanged. If mutual dependence 
developed between the government and groups in policy-making and a cohesive network 
was created, policy was made through negotiations, and thus power was not a zero-sum in 
networks. The policy network approach also demonstrates that the nature of government! 
group relations, or the types of networks, might vary from policy sector to policy sector in 
Hong Kong. This was due to the differences in the groups involved, the interests of 
various actors within the government, the nature of policy, the degree of consensus, and 
the institutional arrangements available. 
This chapter suggests that policy networks were a significant factor affecting policy 
outcomes in Hong Kong. The policy network approach emphasises the concept of 
structural power. It demonstrates that in Hong Kong particular groups might be able to 
influence policy not because they had more resources but because their interests and ideas 
were built into the structure of policy-making. Within a policy network the structure was 
a set of rules, procedures, values, consensus and institutions, which privileged certain 
groups, issues and policy options over others. As a result, in particular areas the 
government's policies constantly favoured the interests of certain groups. However, 
policy might vary from sector to sector and from time to time. The notion of policy 
network allows analysis of these variations. It suggests that various patterns of policy 
outcomes were the consequences of different nature of government! group relations or 
policy networks. Where a policy community existed, it was likely that policy was stable 
and reflected the goals of the key actors within the community. On the other hand, issue 
networks meant that the potential policy outcomes tended to be more varied. In other 
words, policy communities and issue networks in Hong Kong might have had different 
impacts on policy contents. 
In addition, this chapter suggests that policy networks were also an important 
variable in affecting the trajectory of policy change in Hong Kong during the colonial 
transition. This chapter has not denied the importance of political factors in changing 
policy networks and policy outcomes. Indeed, Chapters 1 and 2 have demonstrated that 
the changes in Hong Kong's political environment were vital in understanding policy 
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change because they gave rise to new issues and political forces that increasingly 
challenged the pre-existing networks and policy. Nevertheless, policy change differed 
across sectors. The new issues and political forces did not occur in a vacuum. Policy 
change did not happen independently of policy networks. The dialectical approach to 
policy networks demonstrates that in order fully to understand policy change in Hong 
Kong, we need to recognise the role of both context and networks. In particular areas or 
sub-sectors the relationship between the contextual changes and policy networks might 
be dialectical or interactive. Whilst the contextual changes created new issues and 
political forces that threatened the networks and their policies, these challenges were 
mediated by networks that might have had the ability to minimise the effect of contextual 
changes. If the challenges occurred in areas where the networks were able to minimise the 
external pressures for change, the degree of policy change tended to be smaller than 
expected . 
. . Hence, in accounting for policy change, it is essential to examine the nature of 
government! group relations or the types of policy networks. The speed and extent of 
policy change in Hong Kong depended on the types of networks, and thus policy change 
varied from sector to sector. A tight network had the greater ability to weather the 
contextual changes, and thus marginal changes in policy were the likeliest outcome. On 
the other hand, substantial changes in policy were likely to happen in areas where the 
networks were rather loose and weak. In short, the types of networks had an important 
impact on the course of policy change, even though these networks were subject to 
similar exogenous pressures resulting from the changes in Hong Kong's political 
environment. All in all, this chapter suggests that policy networks, in which the 
government agencies and groups exchanged resources, were an important factor that 
affected policy outcomes and policy change in Hong Kong during the transition. The next, 
chapter will examine how this research is designed to evaluate the truth or otherwise of 
these propositions. 
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'In the previous chapters I have argued that the traditional theoretical approac~es to 
policy-making in Hong Kong has difficulty in explaining policy outcomes and policy 
change in Hong Kong during the colonial transition. Therefore, this thesis seeks to 
respond to such explanatory limitations by examining the causal relationship between 
networks and policy in the context of Hong Kong. The last chapte~ sugges'ted that policy 
networks have affected policy outcomes and policy change, and that different nature/ 
types of networks were important in explaining various patterns of policy change. Clearly, 
though, explanation is not a straightforward process. As Sayer (1995, p. 232) indicates, 
'difficultie~ arise from an interplay between the nature of the object of study, on one hand, 
, 
and our aims, expectations and methods on the other'. Hence, in this chapter particular 
attention is paid to the research methods to ensure that they fit the nature of research 
issues under investigation. 
This chapter is concerned with both describing and justifying the methods that are 
employed to address the research issues and theoretical propositions outlined in the last 
chapter. It will be argued that, given the nature of research issues, a comparative case 
study approach based on qualitative methods will be of considerab1e importance in terms 
of developing the extent to which policy networks have affected policy outcomes and, 
particularly, policy change in Hong Kong. This chapter will begin by describing the 
overall research design of this thesis. It will then justify the use of intensive case studies 
and discuss how the cases are selected. Finally it will examine how the research is 
conducted and highlight some problems with the case studies. 
1. Research Issues and Research Design 
, 
In order to explain how policy was made and changed in Hong Kong, this thesis 
focuses on two causal processes. First, it examines if the structures of policy networks: by 
privileging certain groups, issues and solutions over others, affected the behaviour of 
policy-makers and then had a significant impact on policy outcomes. Second, it 
concentrates on the dialectical relationship between networks and context in explaining 
the course of policy change. It investigates whether or not networks of varying natures/ 
types had different abilities to mediate the effect of exogenous change, leading to 
variations in the trajectory of policy alteration (see Chapter 3). Obviously, this theoretical 
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framework is complicated as it involves a variety of variables like networks, government, 
groups, issues, policy options, co~text; policy outcomes and the degree of policy change. 
To this complexity is added the fact that this thesis not only examines a simple and 
uni-dimensional relationship but also dwells on the dialecticaV interactive relationship 
between networks and context. 
The complexity and subtlety of these causal processes requires an intensive research 
design. That is a research design which analyses a limited number of cases exhaustively 
in terms of history, network-environment, networks, the policy process and policy 
contents. In this thesis there are two broad case studies, which concentrate on the 
curriculum policy on civic education and manpower policy in Hong Kong from the 1970s. 
. Here emphasis is placed on examining qualitative rather than quantitative factors. In 
doing so, the importance of context and structure rather than the observable variables like 
resources and individuals' behaviour is incorporated into the explanation of policy. 
A case study approach contrasts with an extensive research design based on surveys . 
. 
Generally speaking? there are two types of survey research. One type examines a limited 
number of properties associated with a wide range of cases, and the other investigates a 
wide range of properties associated with many cases. In the former instance, the utility of 
the explanation would be limited because of the possibility of overlooking variables and 
relations that are important in developing a model of explanation. In other words, it would 
only examine a snapshot of a political picture. In the second instance, as a result of many 
cases and a wide range of variables to be examined, it would be difficult to identify truly 
causal relations (Sayer, 1992, pp. 241-242). By focusing on a large number of cases and 
properties, a correlation among many variables may be found. However, this relationship 
may not be causal, and thus inevitably requires intensive case studies to verify its validity 
(Smith, 1993, p. 25). An extensive research design is, therefore, better placed to) 
generalise research findings but less useful than a case study approach in this thesis that 
aims at developing an in-depth explanation of policy outcomes and policy change. 
The research methods used to conduct case studies in this thesis are critical 
literature review, documentary study, archival study and semi-structured interviews. 
Semi-structured interviews are used to enhance the level of direct contact between the 
researcher and interviewees. This close contact allows the researcher to probe and, where 
necessary, ask the respondents to clarify points of interest. It also allows the researcher to 
follow· up new issues that had not previously been identified. Moreover, as the 
respondents are able to respond to open-ended questions in their own words, the 
researcher has greater access to their interpretation of events and the level of significance 
that they attach to these events (Bryman, 1988, pp. 95-96; May, 1997, pp. 111-112). All of 
this indicates that the semi-structured interviews provide the researcher with a better 
instrument for addressing the complex 'how' and 'why' questions raised in this research. 
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2. The Justification for Using Case Studies 
For a number of reasons, a comparative case study approach is considered an 
appropriate strategy for this research. First, it fits the objective of this thesis, which 
attempts to examine if policy networks affected policy outcomes and policy change in 
Hong Kong. The problem of generalisation has been taken into account when conducting 
the case studies in this research. Case study research has often been criticised for its lack 
of representativeness and generalizability to a wider population (Robson, 1993, p. 168; 
Burton, 2000, pp. 224-225). As Bryman (1988, p. 88) points out, 'for many people, this 
reliance on a single case poses a problem of how far it is possible to generalise the results 
of such research'. Obviously, two cases are not sufficient to fonn a general picture of how 
policy was made and changed in Hong Kong from the .1980s. 
However, it is important to emphasise that the objective of this thesis is not to make 
generalisations about a wider population. Rather, a limited number of cases are studied in 
detail so as to illustrate that in Hong Kong policy networks affected policy outcomes and 
that, in order to understand how and why policy was changed, we need to appreciate the 
dialectical relationship between policy networks and context. Therefore, the focus here is 
on the operation 'of policy network theory that postulates the causal relationships between 
networks and policy rather than on the issue of statistical generalisation. In other words, 
this thesis is concerned with 'the generalizability of cases to theoretical 'propositions 
rather than to popUlations or universes' (Bryman, 1988, p. 90). To evaluate the truth or 
otherwise ?fthe propositions outlined in the last chapter, this thesis takes two case studies 
in Hong Kong. 
, ' 
Second, a comparative case study approach fits the nature of questi(:>Ds being 
addressed within this thesis. Yin (1994, p. 9) argues that a case study is an appropriate 
research strategy where 'a "how" or ''why'' question is being asked about a contemporary 
set of events over which the investigator has little or no control'. The research questions 
and theoretical propositions within this thesis are directly concerned with 'how' and 
'why' policy was made and changed in particular areas in Hong Kong. In addition, the 
government! group relations and the course of policy change in Hong Kong during the 
colonial transition represent fairly contemporary phenomena over which the researcher 
has no control. This nature of research issues means that case studies are essential. Third, 
a case study approach is important because it allows the researcher to incorporate the 
contextual factors, including the broader political context of Hong Kong and the context 
within which policy was made, into the analysis of policy. For these reasons, this thesis 
will address the research questions and theoretical propositions outlined in the last 
chapter through the use of case studies. 
An in-depth comparison of two cases serves two major purposes in this thesis. First, 
comparative case studies allow the researcher to examine whether or not policy networks 
" 
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in Hong Kong have affected policy outcomes and policy change. As Marsh (1998, p. 15) 
argues, comparative case studies are 'essential in order to establish both the effect of 
networks and, more specifically, the relative effect of networks and context, on outcomes'. 
This thesis will compare the decision-making processes (networks) and policy outcomes 
(and change) in different policy areas in a single country (Hong Kong) over the same 
period. Using this comparative analysis it is possible to hold at least some elements of the 
context constant, so that any evidence of different network structures and different policy 
outcomes would suggest that the networks did actually influence the course of policy 
change in Hong Kong. Second, an in-depth analysis of two cases provides a test for the 
transferability of policy network theory. As indicated in the last chapter, the policy 
network theory developed in the United States, Britain and Europe, and so far case studies 
have been primarily confined to policy-making in liberal democracies. A comparison of 
two cases allows the researcher to explore the extent to which the notion of policy. 
network offers a better understanding of interest group intermediation and policy-making 
in the undemocratic administrative state of Hong Kong. Therefore, a conclusion can be 
reached with regard to the transferability of policy network theory. 
Whilst the use of comparative case studies offers the potential for a more robust 
investigation, it is necessary to select cases that provide useful and systematic 
comparisons in terms of examining whether or not policy networks affected policy 
outcomes and policy change. The following section will examine how and why the two 
cases in this thesis have been selected. 
3. Selection of Cases 
The lack of published material on policy networks in Hong Kong meant that it was 
necessary to conduct basic documentary and archival researches prior to selecting two 
cases. The aim of these initial documentary and archival researches into policy-making in 
Hong Kong was to guide the selection of cases for further investigation. In order to select 
these cases, it was essential to identify the policy areas in which networks have existed. 
The literature on policy networks indicates that networks normally develop where the 
government wants to achieve particular goals and needs to exchange resources with 
groups (Smith, 1993, p. 56). Therefore, the initial documentary and archival researches 
targeted those policy areas that were most important to' the Hong Kong government, such 
as education, economy, labour, social welfare, transportation and housing. They 
examined whether policy networks have existed and the characteristics of those networks. 
Consequently, two case studies were taken, which were civic education policy and 
manpower policy. 
In order to draw any systematic and worthwhile comparisons, it is essential to have 
a clear understanding of why each case has been selected. Given the concern with policy 
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networks and change, it is necessary to select cases where policy networks have existed 
and were subject to increasing challenges as a result of Hong Kong's colonial transition .. 
Whilst these similarities between cases are prerequisite for selection, it is also important 
to select cases that are markedly ~ifferent in terms of the nature/ types of policy networks 
involved. The juxtaposition of contextual commonality and differences in networks 
enables the researcher to establish the effect of networks on policy.change. By holding the 
contextual factors constant, it is possible to comment, with a greater degree of certainty, 
on the extent to which the form and speed of policy change were greatly affected by the 
nature/ types of policy networks. Marsh and Rhodes' typology (1992a; 1992b) was used 
as a benchmark for identifying different policy networks in the cases initially investigated. 
Hence, a number of dimensions concerning the network structures were considered in the 
selection of cases. They were membership, continuity, the degree of consensus, the nature 
of interaction and the distribution of power. 
Following these criteria, civic education policy and manpower policy in Hong Kong 
have been selected for detailed investigation. It is significant to provide a brief 
description of each case so as to demonstrate why these cases were selected. The two 
cases were selected because they provide useful and systematic comparisons in terms of 
analysing the relative effect of networks on policy. There are a number of important 
similarities between the cases. In both cases there are policy networks that came into 
shape during the 1970s because the government intended to intervene in the curriculum 
on civic education and manpower management. Since then both networks have ' 
, dominated the policies. In addition, the processes of decolonisation and democratisation 
in Hong Kong had a major impact on both cases. They created new problems, such as 
economic restructuring, unemployment, political participation, national integration and 
the need for political education, and influenced the public attention that was paid to these 
problems. They also strengthened the groups and organisations that were opposed to the 
pre-existing policies. Consequently, in the 1980s and 1990s, both cases became 
politically charged and the two networks were increasingly confronted with external 
pressures for change. Due to these similarities, it is feasible to hold the major contextual 
factors constant in this research. 
Despite these similarities in history and network-environment, there are a number 
of significant differences between the two networks, which will be discussed in Chapters 
5, 6, 7 and 8. In short, the' manpower policy network was significantly weaker in terms of 
integration and organisation than the curriculum policy network. These differences 
between the two cases in network structures, coupled with the similarities in 
network-environment, allow the researcher to examine whether or not the nature/ types of 
policy networks affected how policy ha~ changed in Hong Kong. 
In addition, the two cases were selected because this selection covers two policy 
domains with different nature. Manpower management or labour'is a broad policy area, 
whereas civic education is a narrower policy sub-sector. Manpower policy is traditionally 
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regarded by Hong Kong's political scientists as an area where economic groups playa 
key role. On the other hand, civic education is a professional area not closely associated 
with business interests. Given these differences, the comparative case studies provide a 
more robust testing of the policy network theory and the theoretical propositions outlined 
in the last chapter, which suggested that the government! group relations are based on 
resource exchange and tend to vary from sector to sector. Finally, there is another reason 
for the two cases being selected for detailed analysis. During the initial contacts, some 
key actors inside and outside the networks were willing to participate in interviews. 
Consequently, this thesis took the case studies of civic education policy and manpower 
policy in Hong Kong. The remaining sections will examine how the case studies were 
conducted and the problems with the case studies. 
4. Conducting Case Studies 
Generally a case study involves a degree of flexibility and exploration. Yet this does 
not mean that an unstructured approach to research is adopted. The case studies in this 
thesis are informed by the policy network theory and, particularly, the theoretical 
propositions outlined in the last chapter. The case studies begin by examining the 
historical background of the curriculum policy network and the manpower policy 
network. The discussion then turns to the nature of the two networks and examines how. 
they affected policy outcomes. Following this phase of research, the case studies 
investigate the changes in Hong Kong's political environment from the 1980s and the 
course of policy change in civic education and manpower management. Here the focus is 
on how the macro-level factors affected the networks and, especially, how the networks 
mediated the effect of contextual factors and then influenced policy change .. 
As Yin (1994, pp. 91-92) indicates, case studies can draw on more than one source 
of data and the use of these multiple sources of data can improve the construct validity 
through a process of triangulation. Therefore, in order to enhance the validity of research 
findings, the following sources of data were used in each case study: 
• Documentary evidence (including newspaper articles, journal articles, letters, 
minutes and official publications produced by the government agencies and groups or 
organisations involved in policy-making); 
• Archival evidence and; 
• Semi-structured interviews with the key actors inside and outside the policy 
. networks. 
Documentary and archival evidence was gathered through a number of institutions. 
They were university libraries (Sheffield, Leeds and Hong Kong), the Public Reqords 
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Office of the Hong Kong Government, the Education and Manpower Bureau (EMB), the 
Education Department, the Federation of Education Workers (FEW) and the Committee 
on the Promotion of Civic Education (CPCE). With the passing of the Open Information 
Act in Hong Kong, it became easier for researchers to access the government documents 
and archives. Documentary information was also obtained from interviewees 
immediately after interviews were conducted. 
Interviews were the other important method of data collection in each case study 
because there were problems with the documentary and archival evidence. Official 
secrecy meant that a great deal of government documents and archives such as the 
minutes of the Curriculum Development Committee! Council (CDC)'s meetings still 
remained confidential. As a result of poor record keeping, some government documents 
and archives could not be retrieved. In spite of the fact. that an increasing number of 
government documents and archives have been put into the public domain, they rarely 
showed the full·picture of how and why policy was made. Rather, they tend to either brag 
about what the government has done for the people or demonstrate that the government 
acted in consultation with all interests. This gap in information needed to be filled by 
other sources of data that included newspaper articles, journal articles and publications 
produced by integrated groups and organisations. Interviews, therefore, were the other 
important means of identifying the nature of networks and how policy was made. They 
.. offered insights into the policy processes that were not available in documents or archives. 
The data provided from interviews was also used to verify the data from other sources. 
Prior to commencing interviews, the documentary and archival evidence relating to 
the policy network and its policy in each case was examined. In addition, a critical review 
of relevant literature was also carried out. This information helped the researcher to 
identify the key persons to be interviewed. They provided an important guide to those 
questions that were to be put forward in interviews. Furthermore, the documentary and 
archival evidence, where possible, was used as a means of corroborating information 
provided from semi-structured interviews. 
After the reviews of documentary and archival evidence, the interview schedules 
were written up and a trip to Hong Kong was arranged. Letters were sent out to the key 
actors inside and outside the curriculum policy network and the manpower policy 
network. These letters outlined the broad aims of the research and asked for permission to 
conduct interviews as part of the case studies. Two weeks after each letter was sent out, 
the potential respondents were contacted by emails in order to ascertain whether or not 
they were willing to participate in the case studies. Once each respondent had agreed to 
participate, a date, time and a venue were arranged for conducting the interview. 
Consequently, 17 respondents, including senior civil servants and leaders of insider and 
outsider groups, agreed to give interviews that were conducted from September to 
November 2002. 
Semi-structured interviews were used in the two case studies. This was because 
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they allowed interviewees to respond to questions on their own tenns whilst allowing 
data to be collected in an ordered way. In the semi-structured interviews, the researcher 
basically followed the interview schedules and brought up specific issues for discussion. 
The researcher, where necessary. also probed on specific questions and asked the 
interviewees to elaborate on key points. In addition, the use of semi-structured interviews 
allowed for the identification of issues that had not previously been identified in the 
preceding documentary and literature reviews (Robson. 1993. pp. 237-240). Where 
interviewees indicated that they were willing to afford as much time as necessary. 
interviews lasted longer than an hour. In most instances. however, interviews were 
limited to 60 minutes. 
5. Problems Encountered with the Case Studies 
To evaluate the validity or otherwise of the theoretical propositions outlined in the 
last chapter. the case studies of Hong Kong's civic education policy and manpower policy 
from the 1970s were conducted. Although these case studies were important in 
developing how policy networks influenced policy outcomes and policy change in Hong 
Kong. there were a number of problems. Firstly, as most of the writers on policy-making 
in Hong Kong have concentrated on macro-level factors. such as the nature of Hong 
Kong state. the distribution of power and the political system. there was a shortage of 
literature on the subtleties of policy process in Hong Kong. This meant that the researcher 
almost had to start the case studies from scratch. Consequently, they took longer to 
complete than had been expected. 
Secondly, despite the careful selection of the two cases, each case is, to a certain 
degree, unique in tenns of its context. Although both the curriculum and the manpower 
policy networks were subject to similar challenges stemming from the processes of 
decolonisation and democratisation in Hong Kong, the combination of these exogenous 
pressures slightly varied. The Chinese authorities did not participate as actively in Hong 
Kong's manpower policy as in its curriculum policy on civic education. This difference 
meant that the manpower policy network was likely to be under less pressure for change 
than the curriculum policy network, and thus the case studies might not compare like with 
like. However, given the analytic purpose of this thesis, there is a way around this 
methodological problem of uniqueness. The major purpose is to establish whether or not 
policy change in Hong Kong depended on the nature! types of policy networks. Ifpolicy 
change in civic education, where the network was stronger and confronted with more 
ferocious attack, proved to be tardy and less substantial than the changes in manpower 
policy, it would be reasonable to argue that policy networks had a major impact on the 
course of policy change. Any evidence of a greater intensity of external pressures 
associated with less change would only indicate that the nature! types of policy networks 
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were important in affecting policy change. 
Finally, it is obvious that two cases are not sufficient to generalise how policy 
networks have affected policy outcomes and policy change in Hong Kong. Here it is 
important to point out that only through more case studies can the utility of policy 
network theory be fully established in the context of Hong Kong. Nevertheless, the case 
studies of civic education policy and manpower policy did provide a rich source of data 
from which the research issues in this thesis could be addressed. 
6. Conclusion 
This chapter has described the methods that are employed to deal with the research 
issues and theoretical propositions outlined in the last chapter. To assess the truth or 
otherwise of these propositions, this thesis takes two case studies. The case studies are 
curr,iculum policy on civic education and manpower policy in Hong Kong. These cases 
provide useful and systematic comparisons because there are significant similarities 
between the two cases in network-environment and differences in network structures. In 
addition, the case studies cover two policy domains with different nature. Therefore, they 
provide a more robust testing of the theoretical propositions which suggested that the 
government! group relations were based on resource exchange and tended to vary from 
sector to sector. Multiple sources of data, including documentary evidence, archival 
evidence and semi-structured interviews, are used to conduct the case studies and 
enhance the accuracy of research findings through the process of triangulation. 
It is clear from this chapter that, given the nature of research issues, comparative 
case studies are a favourable approach to the research. First, the complexity of the 
theoretical framework, which involves a range of variables and a dialectical relationship 
between networks and context, requires in-depth case studies. Second, comparative case 
studies fit the objective of this thesis, which is concerned with the generalizability of 
cases to the theoretical propositions outlined in the last chapter. Third, comparative case 
studies fit the nature of 'how' and 'why' questions being addressed within the thesis. 
Despite their usefulness, there are a number of methodological problems with the 
. case studies. However, this chapter has demonstrated that these problems do not militate 
against the importance of this research. The use of a limited number of case studies has 
often been criticised for their lack of representativeness and generalizability to a wider 
population or world. Yet the objective of this research is to illustrate that in Hong Kong 
policy networks did exist and have influenced policy outcomes and policy change rather 
than to make statistical generalisations. Besides, despite the careful selection of cases, 
. each case is~ to a certain degree, unique in terms of its context. However, given the' 
analytic purpose of the thesis, this methodological problem of uniqueness is not 
fundamental. Any evidence of a stronger network associated with more external 
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pressures and less change would indicate that the nature/ types of policy networks 
significantly affected policy change. 
The remainder of the thesis is concerned with the case studies of civic education 
policy and manpower policy in Hong Kong. It will examine the nature of policy networks 
and the impact they had on policy outcomes and policy change. 
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Th!s chapter will examine the development of the government policy on civic 
education in Hong Kong during the post-war period. It wiU also study how a 
well-integrated, highly institutionalised and closed policy network developed and 
succeeded in curriculum policy from the 1970s. The curriculum policy network was a 
professional network, which included the Education Department of the Hong Kong 
government and the mainstream teaching profession in Hong Kong, that is, the 
representatives of colleges of education, school bodies, school head associations and 
teachers' unions. Although the number of participants in the network was relatively large, 
they were united by the shared concerns and values in the teaching profession. The 
curriculum policy network was distinctive in terms of its development and its nature. 
According to Marsh and Rhodes' typology (1992a; 1992b), it can be regarded as a stable 
policy community. This chapter will also demonstrate that, since the early 1970s, the 
policy network has been important to curriculum policy-making in Hong Kong. As a 
consequence, civic education was marginalised in school curricula. 
The chapter will begin by defining the concept of civic education, which is 
politically centred. In the second section, it will examine why civic education was such a 
major controversial issue in Hong Kong during the post-war period. This section is 
important because it is unusual for governments and pressure groups in other countries to 
make civic education an issue. However, the anti-colonial political education and the 
precarious circumstances of Hong Kong's colonial regime, in which civic education in 
schools was perceived to be detrimental to the government, meant that the Educatio!l 
Department had to intervene in civic education. This indicates that the historical-political 
conditions of Hong Kong had an impact on civic education policy. 
In terms of pressure group influence, professional groups such as teaching experts 
and schools are always seen to be in a stronger position than the majority of groups 
because they have, through their professional knowledge, a resource that is not available 
to other groups. Moreover, the educational groups were particularly significant in Hong 
Kong because they were responsible for the provision of most schooling. However, in the 
. ~. 
third section, I shall argue that the curriculum policy network did not develop as a result 
of the intrinsic power of the teaching profession. Rather, it was created because the bitter 
controyersy over civic education meant that the government had to intervene in school 
curricula. The Education Department failed in its initial attempts to influence school 
curricula. In order to extend government intervention in school curricula, the cooperation 
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of the teaching profession was perceived as essential. Therefore, in the early 1970s the 
teaching profession was co-opted into the process of curriculum making and the network 
developed. In other words, it was not until the government wished to influence school 
curricula that the network was created. 
In the fourth section, I shall outline the nature ofthe curriculum policy netWork. The 
network was distinctive because it was close to the policy community end of the 
continuum. There were four major components central to the network. First, although it 
contained a relatively large number of participants, it was stable and had a high degree of 
continuity. This was because within the network there was a clear state-led view of 
edu~ation and a single decision-making centre provided by the Education Department. 
Second, contrary to cooptive arrangements, within the network there was the structure of 
resource inter-dependence, negotiation and mutual advantage, which contributed to the 
stability of the network. Third, the network was highly integrated. There was a strong 
consensus between the Education Department and the teaching profession within the 
network on a centralised curriculum system and the apolitical and academic nature of the 
curriculum. Fourth, access to the network was highly restricted. There was a conscious 
exclusion of groups that were opposed to the consensus. The consensus on the parameters 
of school curricula acted as an effective means of exclusion. In addition, the network was 
highly institutionalised, which provided it with a further means of excluding opposition 
groups from the network. 
Finally, this chapter will go on to examine how the curriculum policy network 
affected the curriculum policy on civic education. It will argue that the network was 
significant in explaining why civic education was deliberately and consistently neglected 
on the academic-oriented curriculum, despite pressures to the contrary. First, the network, 
through the mechanisms of consensus building and resource exchange, enhanced the 
government's ability to influence curricula in schools. As its infrastructural power 
increased, the Education Department achieved uniformity of sch~ol curriculum. In the 
1970s, it succeeded in formulating and implementing a common core curriculum without 
a great deal of difficulty and political disruption. Second, there was general agreement 
between the Education Department and the teaching profession within the network on the 
apolitical and academic nature of the curriculum. Therefore, the network defined what 
was included in the curriculum. Third, radical groups, such as the groups representing 
pro-China schools and social interests opposed to this consensus, were thrown out of the 
policy process, and thus the ne~ork was impervious to their challenges. Consequently, 
the common core curriculum was markedly apolitical, and civic education was 
deliberately marginalised. 
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1. What is Civic Education? 
Any consideration of the development of civic education in Hong Kong requires a 
clarification of what ought to be included in civic education, or education for citizenship. 
However, Carr (1991) argued that 'citizenship' is a controversial concept and, therefore, 
there is no unambiguous account of civic education (Carr~ 1991, p. 373). To tackle this 
problem, Porter (1996), one of the pioneers of UK civic education (Lee; 1987, p. 244), 
argued' that the education for citizenship must comprise three basic and essential. 
constituents: citizenship as 'status', citizenship as 'volition', and citizenship as 
'competence' (Porter, 1996, p. 3). 
• Education for 'citizenship as status' - it is important for pupils to understand the 
relat,ionships between the individual and the state, which are conferred by the state 
and defined by law. Moreover, pupils should be aware of their national identity' 
(Porter, 1996, pp. 3-4). 
• Education for 'citizenship as volition' - civic education should develop among pupils 
. 'feelings of identity, a sense of togetherness, of belonging to a community, of 
belonging to a geographic region, of sharing a common culture and a history, feelings 
of respect, approval, loyalty, pride and honour'. It also includes the development of ' a 
. sense of responsibility and obligation1 (porter, 1996, p. 4). 
• Education for 'citizenship as competence' - one of the important dimensions of civic 
education is to develop among pupils the political literacy and a shared set of 
dispositions so that they can be 'active, involved and effective citizens'. In other 
words, pupils should have a basic understanding of 'the structure of power, of how 
resources are distributed and how the affairs of an institution are normally conducted', 
and they have the competence to consider 'possible alternative arrangements for 
organizing society, making decisions and settling disputes' (porter, 1996, pp. 5-6). It 
was argued that this element of civic education must be given prominence, otherwise 
civic education would be fruitless and could easily become the training of docile and 
compliant subjects (Porter, 1996, p. 8). 
Therefore, it is important to note that the c~ncept of civic education is politically 
centered, as it concerns the pupils' understanding of, attitudes towards, and coinpetence 
in the political life within a state. Porter's definition of civic education is adopted for 
\ empirical purpose. The three dimensions help in understanding the development of civic 
education in Hong Kong from the post-war period. Within the three dimensions, it is 
possible to consider what was included or, more importantly, missed in the government 
policy on civic education. However, civic education might not be a politically-charged 
issue for governments and groups in other countries. In this regard, the next section will 
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examine why civic education was so vital in the context of Hong Kong. 
2. The Historical-Political Conditions of Hong Kong and the 
Controversy over Civic Education 
Civic education was a controversial and significant issue in Hong Kong in the 
post-war period because the government regarded civic education as a potential threat to 
the legitimacy and stability of British colonial rul~ in Hong Kong. Moreover, it was 
associated with the intere~t of Chinese authorities, be they the Kuomintang (KMT) I 
Chinese Nationalist Party or the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), in pursuing 
anti-colonial propaganda through schooling in the territory (Morris and Chan, 1997, p. 
101). Hong Kong, as a tiny British col~ny, was distinctive because it had a strong state, 
China, as its closest neighbour. This meant that political, social or economic events in 
China frequently threatened the stability of the colonial regime in Hong Kong. In addition, 
there was a strong cultural link between Hong Kong and China, with over 97 percent of 
Hong Kong residents being Chinese. Despite one and a half centuries of colonial rule, the 
local Chinese culture was largely intact (Tse, 1997, p. 4). This delicate posi'tion of Hbng 
Kong led to the government to be concerned over China's interest in Hong Kong's civic 
education. This unease galvanjsed the government into intervening in school curricula, 
and aimed at squeezing civic education out of school curricula. 
Immediately after the Second World War, the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) was 
active in running schools and promoting political education in Hong Kong. The 
nationalistic and anti-colonial tone of the KMT's political education led to the wariness of 
the colonial government towards their activities. It was estimated that in the 1940s and 
1950s, the KMT had some 35 private schools under its influence in Hong Kong (Morris 
and Sweeting, 1991, pp. 252-253). These schools endeavoured to 'hold ceremonies on 
Chinese national occasions, at which there is a ritual observance towards the picture of Dr. 
Sun, and "community" shouting of party "slogans".' Therefore, in 1946, the Acting 
Secretary for Chinese Affairs and other officials in Hong Kong expressed unease at the 
interference in Hong Kong schools by the KMT. The Secretary commented that 'the 
Kuomintang has always put the education of Chinese youth in its political tenets, which 
are, of course, those of its founder, Dr. Sun Vat Sen, in the forefront of its programme of 
propaganda' (Morris and Sweeting, 1991, p. 251). In response to the KMT's political 
education in schools in Hong Kong, the Education Department of Hong Kong required 
amendments to sections ofKMT-sponsored History, Civics and Geography textbooks in 
1948. Subsequently, the threat from the activities of the KMT in local schools gradually 
diminished along with the growing success of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 
China. The CCP's activities in schooling in Hong Kong presented the government with a 
more urgent need to control and de-politicize education (Morris and Sweeting, 1991, p. 
. . . 
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254) . 
. In the late 1940s and 1950s, the fleeing of people from the political turmoil in China 
to Hong Kong created massive social demands for the extension of schoo.ling 
opportunities. Due to the shortage of school places, trade unionists of leftist persuasion 
established a number of workers' children's schools in Hong Kong. As a consequence, 
Hong Kong saw the rise of so-called patriotic, leftist or pro-China schools (Morris and 
Chan, 1997, p. 102). What distinguished these schools was that they traditionally 
supported the Beijing government and had the strongest links with the Chinese authorities 
and schools in mainland China (Postiglione, 1992, p. 35). Under the sponsorship of the 
CCP, they did not represent Hong Kong's colonial status in a favourable light in their 
curricula, which was regarded by the Hong Kong government as a detriment to the 
legitimacy and stability of the colonial regime. 
With the success of the CCP in the Chinese Civil War and the intensity of the Cold 
War, the Hong Kong Government increasingly felt a sense of its own insecurity and was 
especially concerned about the activities of the CCP in local schools (Morris and 
Sweeting, 1991, p. 254). At the end of 1948, the Governor, Sir Alexander Grantham, 
warned of the insidious dangers of political education in schools, stating that: 
... there are those, and to my mind they are the most evil, who wish to use schools as a 
means of propaganda and poison the minds of their young pupils with their particular 
political dogma or creed of the most undesirable kind ... This deforming and twisting of the 
youthful mind is most wicked and the Hong Kong Government will tolerate no political 
propaganda in schools (South China Morning Post, 16 December 1948). 
In order to curb the Communist anti-colonial education in schools, the Director of 
Education amended the Education Ordinance that provided him with the power to refuse 
the registration of any school teacher, de-register a registered teacher and close any school. 
With the new legislation, the Education Department took direct action to suppress the 
Communist anti-colonial education in schools. For example, it closed some leftist schools 
and de-registered some teachers linked to the pro-China schools. When schools were 
closed, government schools were quickly constructed in the vicinity as substitutes (Morris, 
1997, pp. 331-332). The Commll:I1ist political propaganda in schools also meant that the 
Education Department had to intervene in scho~l curricula. In the 1950s it adopted a new 
approach to curriculum matters, by drawing up model syllabuses that were highly 
apolitical in nature for use in schools. The intention was to use these syllabuses to counter 
the anti-colonial education in schools (Morris and Sweeting, 1991, p. 258). The next 
section will examine how government intervention in school curricula eventually led to 
the development of a curriculum policy network in Hong Kong. 
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3. The Development of the Curriculum Policy Network 
In spite of the fact that the Education Department, with the amended legislation and 
the model syllabuses, made some progress in controlling and depoliticising school 
curricula, it became increasingly evident in the 1960s that the initial interventions were 
insufficient. This meant that the Education Department had to strengthen its influence over 
school curricula. In order to develop and implement a centralised curriculum, the 
cooperation ofteacher educators, schools, principals and teachers was essential. Therefore, 
they were incorporated into the process of curriculum making, and a curriculum policy 
network developed. In other words, this curriculum policy network was created, not 
because of the intrinsic power of the teaching profession, but because the colonial nature 
of Hong Kong and the anti-colonial political education in schools meant that the 
. government had to assert its influence on school curricula. 
The initial interventions of the Education Department in school education sutTered 
several setbacks. First, although the Education Department devised model syllabuses for 
use in schools, in reality it had limited influence over school curricula. These model 
.~ 
syllabuses were not compulsory and, thus, their implementation depended heavily on the 
decisions of school bodies and individual schools. The Annual Report for 1952 - 53 
elaborated that: 
It has been made clear that it is not the intention to compel schools to follow these 
syllabuses; schools may use them if they wish, but are free to make any reasonable 
modifications to meet their own particular needs (Education Department, 1953; cited in 
Morris and Sweeting, 1991, p. 259). 
In fact, a large number of schools were not willing to follow the model syllabuses. 
The expansion of public schooling in the 1950s and 60s was largely through the work of 
non-government schools. These non-government schools were established either by the 
missionary groups that fled the politi<::al uncertainties in China to Hong Kong or by other 
school bodies (Education & Manpower Branch and Education Department, 1991, p. 11). 
Although these schools were not as hostile to the colonial regime as the KMT's or CCP's 
schools were, they were unwilling to follow the model syllabuses because they insisted on 
the freedom to teach their beliefs on their own curricula. This placed limits on the 
government's influence on school curricula. The Education Department saw it as a 
loophole for pupils to be exposed to materials that might be viewed by the government as 
sensitive or controversial (Morris, Kan and Morris, 2001, pp. 167-168). 
The second setback to the government's initial interventions was the continued 
political education in pro-China schools in the 1950s and 60s. Although the Education 
Department succeeded in closing some pro-China schools sponsored by the CCP, it 
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became evident that public opinion and the media in Hong Kong were against a direct and 
wholesale attack on these schools (Morris and Sweeting, .1991, p. 256). Moreover, the 
British Secretary of State for the Colonies was concerned with the possible damage to the 
international image of Hong Kong, if the Director of Education launched comprehensive 
sanctions against these pro-China schools in the territory (Morris and Sweeting, 1991, p. 
255). As a consequence, many pro-China schools survived the initial government 
interventions. They rejected the model syllabuses offered by the Education Department . 
(Postiglione, 1992, p. 9; Morris and Sweeting, 1991, p. 257). Perhaps the most direct blow 
to the government occurred in the mid-1960s, when anti-colonial riots that paralleled the 
Cultural Revolution in the People's Republic of China (PRC) broke out in Hong Kong. A 
large number of staff and students in these schools took part in the civil disturbances. 
Hence, the government criticised them for being involved in political indoctrination 
(Morris and Sweeting, 1991, p. 257). 
According to Morris and Chan (1997, p. 103), the civil disturbances inHong Kong in 
the mid-1960s were a blunt warning to the Education Department of the insufficiency of 
its initial control over school education. They underlined 'Hong Kong's sensitivity to 
events in the PRC, the tenuous legitimacy of the colonial government and the substantial 
gulfbetween the government and the populace'. Therefore, the Education Department had 
to strengthen its influence on school curricula. During the early 1970s, it decided to unify 
, curricula that were adopted in all sorts of schools by identifying and formulating a 
common core curriculum, which was equivalent to the national curriculum in other 
countries (Education Department, 1975, p. 8). Furthermore, by formulating the common 
core curriculum, the Education Department wanted to depoliticise education and foster a 
curriculum that primarily concentrated on the· academic needs of students (Morris and 
Chan, 1997, p. 103; Education Department, 1972, p. 17). 
In order to strengthen its influence on school curricula without excessive difficulty 
and political disruption, the cooperation of schools and teaching experts was essential. 
Therefore, the Education Department allowed'them access to the regular process of 
curriculum making (Morris, 1995, p. 92). In this sense, the curriculum policy network was 
state-centred. The cooperation of the teaching profession was important for a number of 
reasons. First, the formulation and regular revisions of a common core curriculum for all 
primary and secondary levels were an enormous educational project, particularly under 
the circumstances where few educational systems in the world have matched the rate of 
growth of educational provision in Hong Kong. The Education Department perc~ived that 
the involvement of the teaching profession in curriculum making was important to the 
development of a well-balanced and high-quality curriculum plan (Morris, 1990, p. 2). 
Second, the cooperation of the teaching profession was essential because it would 
avoid political disruption. As most schools in Hong Kong were privately operated and 
these non-government schools traditionally had a high degree of autonomy in setting their 
own curricula, the government needed the cooperation of non-government schools, 
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principals and teachers in implementing a uniform curriculum across different sectors of 
schools (McClelland, 1991, p. 109). The government's initiative to enact a common core 
curriculum meant that schools had to relinquish part of their inherent autonomy in 
curriculum matters. In order to acquire their support, the Education Department had to 
offer the teaching profession, not only from government schools but also from 
, non-government sector, an access to the policy process (Morris, McClelland and Wong, 
1997, p. 31). Consequently, a policy network in curriculum was created in the early 1970s. 
Curriculum making became more complex, with the teaching profession entering into the 
policy process (Postiglione, 1992, p. 13). 
The curriculum policy network was a professional network, which encompassed the 
Education Department and the mainstream teaching profession. The teaching experts 
who were incorporated into the curriculum-making process were the mainstream as 
opposed to the groups representing pro-China schools. They were the representatives of 
teacher educators, school authorities, principals and teachers. Colleges of education, 
school bodies (Hong Kong Private Schools Association, Catholic Board of Education, 
Hong Kong Prevocational Schools Council, Hong Kong Subsidized Secondary Schools 
Council, Vocational Training Council), school head associations (Association of 
Principals of Government Secondary School, Hong Kong Aided Secondary School 
Vice-Principals Association etc.) and the two largest teachers' unions (Hong Kong 
Professional Teachers Union, Hong Kong Aided School Teachers' Association) 
nominated the representatives ofteacher educators, schools, principals and teachers to the 
curriculum policy network (Cheng, 1983, pp. 134-145). Their nominations needed 
. confirmation by the Education Department. On the other hand, the Director of Education 
might directly appoint the members who could represent the teaching profession to the 
government (Cheng, 1983, p. 104). Ostensibly, the representatives were appointed in a 
personal capacity. This was because, as argued by a curriculum officer, it would damage 
the neutral image of curriculum making if the Education Department named the teaching 
.. experts as representing particular groups (interview with a senior curriculum officer). 
However, in fact, they performed the role of channelling the views of the teaching 
profession into the process of curriculum making (Cheng, 1983, p. 109). 
So far, I have argued that the curriculum policy network that covered the Education 
Department and the teaching profession developed because the colonial nature of Hong 
Kong and the anti-colonial education in schools galvanised the government into 
intervening in school curricula. In order to develop curriculum policy, the Education 
Department created the network with the teaching professiot;1. The next section will 
examine the nature and characteristics of this network. 
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4. The Nature of the Curriculum Policy Network 
The curriculum policy network that covered the Education Department and the 
teaching profession was distinctive. Generally speaking, it was stable and highly 
integrated. T~ere was, regular interaction between participants and a high level of 
exclusion. According to Marsh and Rhodes' typology (1992a; 1992b), it can be regarded 
as a stable policy community. Central to the network were four major components, which 
, will be discussed below. 
4.1 Number of Participants and Single Decision-making Centre 
Unlike typical policy communities, the curriculum policy network contained a 
relatively large number of participants. Through nominations by the recognised 
educational groups and organisations, about thirty teaching experts were provided with 
access to the network (McClelland, 1991, p. 112). These teaching experts represented a 
variety of organisations, including colleges of education, schools, school head 
associations and teachers' unions. 
Nevertheless, the network was stable and had a high degree of continuity because 
there was a clear state-led view of education. It has been shown that in the post-war period, 
the Hong Kong government as a whole saw civic education as detrimental to the 
legitimacy and stability of the colonial regime. This apprehension was sharpened by the 
anti-colonial political education in pro-China schools. There was clear agreement within 
the government over the direction of curriculum policy. The government agencies, such as 
the Governor and the Secretary for Chinese Affairs that were able to affect the curriculum 
policy, agreed with the Department of Education that it was politically expedient to 
intervene in school curricula and marginalise civic education (Sweeting, 1989; South 
China Morning Post, 16 December 1948). In these circumstances, other government 
agencies were unlikely to encroach onto the turf of the curriculum policy network. 
Therefore, the network had a high degree of stability and continuity. ' 
In addition, the network was stable because there was a single decision-making 
centre provided by the Education Department. Although within the network there was a 
relatively large number of participants, the Education Department was able to provide 
policy leadership. The Education Department could influence the teaching experts in 
, curriculum-making by careful control of the agenda, careful selection of members and, 
sometimes, ignoring recommendations which are not consistent with the government's 
view (Morris, 1995, p. 100). In other words, the Education Department was significant in ' 
setting agendas and initiating policy within the 'network. Interaction between the 
Education Department and the teaching experts in the network was highly institutionalised. 
The senior civil servants from the Education Department normally chaired the meetings 
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with the teaching experts, whilst the Advisory Inspectorate Division of the Education 
Department was the secretariat. This allowed the Education Department considerable 
influence over agenda-setting and policy-initiation (CDC, 1993, p. 2). Changes often 
emanated from the Education Department and were responses to problems identified by 
, . 
the education officials who 'played the key role in both the identification of a problem and 
the selection of a solution', As a result, the Education Department was unlikely to be 
captured by various interests within the network. Moreover, with the Education 
Department providing policy leadership, the large number of participants neither 
destabilised the network nor resulted in policy inertia or policy mess. 
4.2 Mutual Dependence and Positive-Sum Game 
The single decision-making centre demonstrates that the relationship between the 
Education Department and the teaching profession within the policy process was 
asymmetric. It was the Education Department which created the routine relationship and 
considerably influenced th~ j educational agenda and policy proposals. However, it is 
important to note that the network relationship between the Education Department and the 
teaching profession was essentially different from cooptive arrangements. This was the 
case for a number of reasons. 
First, the relationship was not one of dependence and deference. Rather, it was 
characterised by the structure of mutual dependence and resource exchange. As we have 
seen, the teaching profession needed access to the curriculum-making process to defend its 
interests and values. On the other hand, it was difficult, if not impossible, for the 
Education Department to formulate and implement a common curriculum without the 
cooperation of schools, teachers and teacher educators. The government needed their 
professional skills and information in the development and regular revisions of the 
common curriculum. Perhaps more importantly, as most schools in Hong Kong were 
non-government schools over which the Education Department could not exercise direct 
control, it was essential for the Education Department to seek their support for the 
common curriculum in order to avoid policy dislocation and political reverberation. 
Second, in the Education Department and teaching profession relationship power is a 
positive-sum. In order to gain the support of the integrated teaching representatives, the 
government had to accord them legitimacy and power in the policy process. In fact, the 
teaching experts played more than a token role in making and revising curriculum plans. 
Despite the fact that an outright rejection of government's proposals was herculean, there 
were norms within the network enabling the teaching experts to affect curriculum policy 
by modifying the proposals put before them. According to an ex-member of the network, 
there was a reciprocal understanding within the network that: 
The Education Department had the responsibility to take mto account our opinions to 
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revise original curriculum plans. After doing so, the revised curriculum plans had to go 
through the discussion once again. It was necessary for the Education Departm~nt to 
. . 
implement a curriculum proposal with the consent of the integrated teaching experts in the 
network. Generally speaking, the Education Department had. to follow the 
recommendations made by the incorporated teaching experts. If the educational officials 
genuinely thought that our recommendations were inappropriate or impractical, they 
needed to return to the committee and give a detailed explanation (interview with an 
ex-member of the CDC). 
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These nonns shaped the interaction between the Education Department and the 
teaching profession within the network. There was frequent and regular interaction 
between the Education Department and the teaching profession. It was difficult for the 
Education Department to completely ignore or reject the policy recommendations made 
by the teaching profession in the policy process. Hence, contrary to the arrangements of 
cooption, the Education Department and teaching profession relationship was not a 
zero-sum, with the latter sacrificing entire power to the fonner. Instead, the influence of 
the teaching profession, which deri~ed from the structure of resource inter-dependence, 
was secured. In this situation, curriculum policy still reflected the goals ofthe educational 
officials. However, their goals were modified by their relationship with the teaching 
profession (Morris, McClelland and Wong, 1997, pp. 35-39). 
Third, the structure of the relationship, through the inclusion and exclusion of certain 
issues and groups, served the interests and demands of both parties, which will be 
discussed later. All of this demonstrates that, unlike cooption, the network relationship 
between the Education Department and the teaching profession was one of resource 
inter-dependence, negotiation and mutual advantage. 
Although the nonns within the network enabled the teaching experts to modify the 
government's cutriculum proposals, it did not bring about many disputes in curriculum 
making during the 1970s. This was because within the network there was a strong 
consensus between the teaching profession and the Education Department on the system 
and parameters of school curriculum, which I shall examine in the next part. 
4.3 The Consensus and Integration of the Network 
The relatively large number of participants did not lead to the perpetual conflicts 
over curriculum policy within the network. The integration of the network was achieved 
by the consensus between the Education Department and the teaching profession on the 
system and parameters of school curriculum. First, there was clear agreement within the 
network on a cc;:ntralised system of curriculum. The teaching profession agreed with the 
Education Department that a common core curriculum made by the Education Department 
in close consultation with the teaching profession should be imposed on all types of 
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schools (interview with a senior curriculum officer). 
As discussed above, the Education Department in the 1960s and the 1970s pursued 
the uniformity of school curricula. The government drive to devise a common course of 
education was certain to dilute the non-government schools' traditional autonomy in 
designing, adjusting and implementing their own curricula. Nevertheless, the Education 
Department managed to reach a consensus with the teaching profession. This consensus 
was an outcome of compromise in which the government controlled which subjects were 
available on the common core curriculum. It also determined the content of school 
·subjects and the textbooks used. On the other hand, 'schools were allowed to decide which 
subjects were selected, the time devoted to them, the nature of the informal and spiritual 
curriculum, and the selection of pupils' (Morris, Kan and Morris, 2001, p. 167). In other 
words, under the consensus the teaching profession gave up part of their inherent 
autonomy in curriculum matters in return for being allowed to retain their right to select 
subjects available and the language of instruction. 
Second, within the network there was also a strong consensus on the direction and 
parameters of school curriculum. Both the Education Department and the teaching experts 
believed that school curricula should be apolitical and academic-oriented. It has been 
argued that the historical-political conditions of Hong Kong were delicate and peculiar 
because Hong Kong did not have the prospect of attaining political independence and was 
sensitive to politics in China (Morris and Marsh, 1992, p. 258). Hence, the government, in 
general, and the Education Department, in particular, wanted to ensure 'that the Hong 
Kong government's own status was not threatened, that a society which comprised mainly 
refugees from China could focus on their own economic advancement, and that the 
political leaders of the People's Republic of China were not embarrassed by the activities 
in Hong Kong of groups sympathetic to the Guomindang (KMT)' (Sweeting, 1995, p. 244). 
In effect, the Education Department 'placed a premium on the conscious pursuit of a 
school curriculum which strived to avoid political issues'. 
Likewise, the mainstream teaching profession supported the apolitical and academic 
orientation of the school curriculum. It is interesting in this case that the consensus 
. between the Education Department and the teaching profession on the direction and 
parameters of school curriculum had already. emerged before the policy network 
developed in the early 1970s. In the 1940s, the heads of schools expressed their support for 
avoiding sensitive political issues in schools because of their concern about communist 
activities and, particularly, its political propaganda in Hong Kong. They were aware that 
'schools were targeted by teachers and / or students planted in them ''with a definite aim in 
view'''. In a confidential meeting called by the Education Department officials, although 
. some school heads felt sympathy for a new Chinese Government, they held that 'the 
mental regimentation, the imposition of political tests, and the exploitation of immature 
minds must offend us all as educators' (Morris and Sweeting, 1991, pp. 256-257). The 
common anxiety about the communist polit~cal education stimulated an initial consensus 
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between the Education Department and the teaching profession on avoiding political 
. issues in the curriculum. 
The rapidly growing modem sector of the Hong Kong economy from the mid-1960s, 
to which educational qualifications served as the primary source of access, and the elitist 
education system reinforced the consensus on apolitical and academic-oriented education. 
Here, the term 'academic' refers to the study that was: 'geared to the goals of tertiary 
education' and its content was: 'derived from the conventional academic disciplines', such 
as English, Chinese, Mathematics and Science (Morris and Marsh, 1992, pp. 254-255). In 
the 1960s, the rapid industrialisation of Hong Kong placed the territory in the forefront of 
the Asian economies. As the economy grew, educational qualifications ensured access to . 
well-paid employment: 'in a transient society where mobility was based on achieved 
rather than ascribed criteria'. This: 'placed a premium on the selective and allocative role 
of schooling' (Morris and Chan, 1997, p. 104). 
However, the education system was exceptionally elitist and examination driven 
(Morris, McClelland and Wong, 1997, p. 33). Entry to secondary schools was managed 
through a publicly examined academic aptitUde test. Accordingly, the highest achievers 
were assigned to popular schools. The transition from form 3 to form 4 at the end of 
compulsory schooling was managed through a Junior Secondary Education Assessment 
System. At this juncture, 70 percent of pupils obtained subsidised places in form 4, and 
many left schools (McClelland, 1991, p. 111). At the end of form 5, pupils sat for the 
all-important Hong Kong Certificate of Education Examination (HKCEE), which 
. . 
determined who could enter ·the sixth form. Likewise, pupils at the end of form 7 took the 
Hong Kong Advanced Level Examination (A-Level). For every 1,000 pupils who entered 
primary schools in 1968,660 took the HKCEE in 1978, 130 entered the sixth form, and 22 
went to local universities (Morris, McClelland and Wong, 1997, p. 33). 
The highly elitist and examination driven school system brought about immense 
pressure from parents and students on schools to pursue an essentially academic~oriented 
curriculum, or so-called high-status knowledge, because it was directly linked to the 
access to the elitist school system, matriculation requirements and employment 
opportunities. Civic education, which did not enhance the pupils' opportunities for higher 
education and better employment, was generally neglected (Morris and Marsh, 1992, p. 
256). Under these circumstances, schools were drawn towards stressing primarily the 
importance of academic knowledge for pupils, regardless oftheir academic ability or civic 
and cultural needs. Whether or not this emphasis on academic knowledge fitted well with 
their professional judgement did not matter. This was because they strongly believed that 
it was their duty to prepare pupils for higher education and well-paid employment. 
Moreover, they were well aware that: 'their school's reputation and, hence, its ability to 
recruit high-band pupils, [was] more intimately associated with its examination results 
than with other measures of success', such "as effectively transmitting social and political 
knowledge and values (McClelland, 1991, p. 119). Consequently, the teaching profession 
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generally supported the government's plan to depoliticise the common core curriculum. 
In addition, colleges of education and other tertiary institutions in Hong Kong were 
. content with the apolitical, academic and abstract nature of the school curriculum, 
especially at senior secondary levels. To boost their academic reputations domestically 
and internationally, they focused on the performances of pupils in traditional academic 
disciplines in their matriculation requirements. By doing so, they could also maximise the 
academic standard and prospect of success in higher education of their intake. A senior 
curriculum officer argued that: 'the tertiary institutions had to consider their own interests 
and, thus, were not supportive of any progressive move to introduce political, social or 
cultural knowledge into the curriculum for matriculation' (interview with a senior 
curriculum officer). 
The consensus on an apolitical and academic-oriented curriculum united not only the 
curriculum policy network but also .the teaching profession as a whole. As there was an 
absence of conflict over the direction and parameters of curriculum policy, the large 
number of participants from the teaching profession did not destabilise the policy network. 
A member of the network pointed out that on many curriculum matters the teaching 
experts in the network were united, because: 'there were shared concerns and values in the 
local educational community' (interview with a member of the CDC). A senior curriculum 
officer also argued that: 'although the organisation of many educational groups was loose, 
schools and the teaching experts were united by the shared interests and values of the 
profession' (interview with a senior curriculum officer). In short, within the network there 
was a clear and firm consensus that privileged a centralised system of curriculum and 
apolitical and academic-oriented curriculum policy. In doing so it ensured that the~r 
interests and ideas were served. 
Moreover, this consensus also had the support of the general public because it fitted 
the political culture of the Chinese society in Hong Kong. In other words, the network was 
quite successful in winning what Gramsci called 'a war of position' (Gramsci, 1971, p. 
235). As Morris and Chan (1997, p. 103) argued, the de-politicising strategies employed 
. by the government was reinforced by: 'the character of Hong Kong Chinese', which they 
portrayed as: 'utilitarian, materialistic and family-oriented'. On the political culture of 
Hong Kong Chinese, Leung (1996, p. 13) elaborated: 
As refugees, mostly from pre-modem rural parts of China, who had arrived seeking a safe 
haven in a borrowed time and place, the population's traditional apathy was reinforced by 
their quest for stability and quick material gains in the Colony .. .It bred an attitude of 
indifference and aloofness to society, resulting in low civic consciousness and low social· 
participation. 
This widespread political apathy in society led to the public support for the minimal role of 
politics and maximum role of conventional academic disciplines in schooling (Morris and 
Chapter S The Politics of Civic Education in Hong Kong (before 1984) 79 
Chan, 1997, p. 104). 
4.4 The Isolation and Institutionalisation of the Network 
The curriculum policy network was also distinctive because it had a high degree of 
isolation from the educational groups that were radical in their demands and from other 
social and political interests. Although there was a large number of participants in the 
network, it did not include diametrically opposed interests. Access to the 
curriculum-making process was highly restricted to the educational organisations that 
shared the consensus on the system and parameters of school curriculum. The consensus 
between the Education Department and the mainstream teaching profession acted as an 
important means of exclusion. Any groups that did not share the consensus on the 
apolitical and academic tenor of curriculum were automatically thrown out of the domain 
of curriculum making. The leader of an educational group representing pro-China schools 
argued: 
I think that we cannot use the term' depoliticisation' to capture the characteristics of the 
. mechanism of curriculum making in Hong Kong. Quite the opposite, the mechanism was 
markedly ridden by political motives. Obviously the government did not want our politics 
to be present in the mechanism. Since we were a pro-China educational group, the ; 
government did not invite us to participate in the process of curriculum making. Hence, 
the traditional view of the curriculum-making mechanism as 'depoliticised' should be 
changed in the light of the government's exclusion of the pro-China groups from the 
process of decision-making (interview with the leader of an educational pressure group). 
The pro-China groups in Hong Kong were not the only ones to be excluded from the 
curriculum policy network. Groups like the Education Action Group, which frequently 
challenged the deliberate neglect of civic education in schools, alerted the suspicions of 
educational officials and so could not access the process of curriculum making (Sweeting, 
1997, p. 30). Moreover, political and social interests also could not access the professional 
network (Cheng, 1983, pp. 134-145). 
The curriculum policy network also had an institutional basis that provided a further 
means of exclusion. In 1972, the Education Department established the Curriculum 
Development Committee (CDC), which was central to the network and the process of , 
curriculum making. It institutionalised the professional nature of the network and the 
privileged position of teaching experts in curriculum decision-making. According to the 
rules of the CDC, members involved in the detailed curriculum planning and compilation 
o~ syllabuses consisted of: 'principals and teachers from all types of school, both 
government and non-government, university and college of education lecturers, members 
of the Examinations Division and inspectors of schools' (Education Department, 1975, p. 
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6). Membership of this institution ensured access to the network, and thus the CDC 
provided the network covering the Education Department and the teaching profession with 
an institutional cover. Consequently, it was easy for the curriculum· policy network to 
exclude groups that did not belong to the category of teaching profession. 
In addition, the institution of the CDC ensured frequent interaction between the 
Education Department and the teaching profession in curriculum making. In the past, the 
Education Department did occasionally consult with teacher educators, principals and 
teachers on curriculum issues, but the consultation was neither regular nor guaranteed 
(Morris and Sweeting, 1991, pp. 56-57). However, the CDC transformed this amorphous 
pattern of consultation. A member of the network told me that as enjoined by the rules of. 
the CDC, all of the government's curriculum proposals had to go through the meetings 
with the representatives of the teaching profession before they were finalised. There was 
no occasion on which the Education Department implemented a curriculum proposal 
without consulting with and gaining the support of teaching experts in the CDC (interview 
with a member of the CDC). 
So far, it has been argued that the network covering the Education Department and 
. the teaching profession in the area of curriculum policy was distinctive in a variety of 
dimensions. First, it was stable, because there was a clear state-led view of education and a 
single decision-making centre provided by the Education Department. Second, the' 
network was highly integrated, because there was a strong consensus between the 
Education Department and the teaching profession on a centralised curriculum system and 
apolitical and academic-oriented curriculum policy. This consensus united not only the 
network but also the education community as a whole. Third, despite the large number of 
participants, there was a high degree of exclusion. The network· did not include 
diametrically opposed interests. Rather, access to the network was highly restricted to the 
educational groups and organisations that accepted the consensus on the system and 
parameters of curriculum. The consensus and .the institution of CDC acted as effective 
means of exclusion. In short, the network can be seen as a stable policy community. The 
next section will 'examine how it affected the curriculum policy on civic education from 
the 1970s. 
5. The Impact of the Network on Civic Education Policy 
This section will argue that the curriculum policy network significantly. affected the 
curriculum policy on civic education from the 1970s. It influenced the curriculum policy 
through the mechanisms of consensus building and resource exchange that substantially 
enhanced the government's ability to intervene in school curricula. Therefore, a common 
core curriculum was implemented across different sectors of schools without a great deal 
of difficulty and political disruption. Moreover, the network defined the parameters of 
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school curriculum and constantly excluded the groups that challenged the apolitical and 
academic-oriented orientation of curriculum policy. As a result, civic education was 
deliberately and consistently neglected in the common curriculum. 
Firstly, the network was important in shaping the curriculum policy on civic 
education because it affected the government's ability to intervene in school curricula. By 
establishing the mechanisms of consensus building and resource exchange, the network 
increased the infrastructural power of the government and provided it with a means to 
influence the curricula that were actually adopted in schools. On the one hand, 
non-government schools traditionally had a high degree of autonomy in designing and 
selecting their own curricula, which constrained the government's influence on curriculum 
matters (Morris, Kan and Morris, 2001, p. 167). Therefore, the government's initial 
attempts to manipulate school curricula by offering model syllabuses were not successful. 
In order to develop a curriculum policy, the cooperation of the teaching profession was 
essential. On the other hand, the Education Department dominated the curriculum 
decision-making at the central level. It drew up and disseminated, but could not ensure the 
implementation of, model syllabuses in schools (Morris and Sweeting, 1991, p. 258). In 
other words, both the Education Department and the teaching profession possessed 
significant resources for curriculum development. 
As the curriculum policy network was created in the early 1970s, the mechanisms of 
mutual dependence and resource exchange developed between the teaching profession and 
the Education Department. The Education Department allowed the representatives of the 
teaching profession ~ privileged position in curriculum making and to retain their 
decisions on the combination of subjects available, teaching timetable, the nature of 
informal curriculum and the language of instruction. In return, the Education Department 
. ' 
gained their support for a centralised curriculum system. The teaching profession agreed 
to relinquish part of their traditional autonomy in curriculum matters and approved of a 
common core curriculum, under which the Education Department controlled subjects 
available and their content (Morris, Kan and Morris, 2001, p. 167). In terms of curriculum 
development, Morris and 'Marsh (1992, p. 253) described the result as 'a compromise 
between a laissez-faire system and one that is centrally controlled'. 
This structure of resource exchange was important because it increased the 
infrastructural power of the government in curriculum matters. It cleared the way for the 
Education Department to directly intervene in school curricula. It was a major step 
towards the uniformity of school curricula. With the support of the mainstream teaching 
profession, the Education Department was able to propel forward its agenda for a common 
curriculum smoothly, which accorded the Education Department strong influence over 
curriculum issues. For example, in the common curriculum (Education Department, 
1971): 
'No instruction may be given by any school except in accordance with a syllabus approved 
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by the Director.' [Education Regulations, 1971, S92 (1)] 
'No person shall use any document for instruction in a class in any school unless 
particulars of the title, author and publisher of the document and such other particulars of 
the document as the Director may require have been furnished to the Director not less than 
fourteen days previously.' [Education Regulations, 1971, S92(1)] 
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Therefore, the network allowed: 'those in power to control the fonnal curriculum' and 
provided: 'a means for working towards unifonnity of provision and for protecting 
schools from the demands of various pressure groups' (Morris and Marsh, 1992, p. 258). 
The network also increased the infrastructural power of the government because it 
legitimised the common core curriculum. The issue of legitimacy was particularly 
significant for the government of Hong Kong, due to the fact that the colonial status of 
Hong Kong contributed to a built-in legitimacy crisis in the Hong Kong polity (Cheng, 
1992, p. 98). Moreover, a legitimacy problem also arose from the non-democratic nature 
of Hong Kong Government. The government was: 'in a state oflegitimacy deficit because 
it [did] not possess the necessary legitimacy which would otherwise come forth through 
election' (Cheng, 1992, p. 99). Lack of legitimacy created difficulties for tIle Education 
Department in making and, particularly, in implementing its curriculum policy. Teacher 
educators, schools, principals and teachers: 'carry with them an inherent suspicion of 
government and an opposition to its policies~ (postiglione, 1992, p. 13). To avoid this 
legitimacy deficit and political disruption, it was important for the Education Department 
to secure popular support in curriculum making. 
The curriculum policy network provided a mechanism for resoUrce exchange in 
tenns of legitimacy between the Education Department and the teaching profession. On 
the one hand, the teaching experts and the organisations they represented. gained: 
'legitimacy for being involved in the policymaking process' (Cheng, 1992, p. 101). The 
network also provided the teaching representatives with a chance to voice their concern 
within the mechanism of curriculum making. In return: 'having the chance to be heard by 
government increases the satisfaction of groups, which thereby yields a threshold level of 
legitimacy to the government policies' (postiglione, 1992, p. 13). By incorporating the 
representatives of the teaching profession into the network, the legitimacy of 
curriculum-making process at large and curriculum policy in particular was greatly 
enhanced. Given .that, the Education Department was better placed to defend and sell its 
curriculum policy to schools and the wider ~ducational community. 
Within the network, curriculum policy was made through negotiations. The 
representatives of the teaching profession involved in the process of curriculum making 
could then assist in implementation. In fact, they helped the Education Department to 
defend and sell the agreed policies to s~hools and the educational community. A member 
of the network pointed out that the integrated teaching experts had the responsibility to 
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defend in public the curriculum policies that were made within the network (interview 
with a member ofthe CDC). Normally, the teaching experts realised their responsibility by 
explaining the logic and pinpointing the strengths of official syllabuses or other 
curriculum innovations in conferences, seminars and workshops organised by the 
Education Department and attended by principals or teachers. This made it easier for the 
Education Department to muster support for its curriculum policy. 
Consequently, with the increase in the government's infrastructural power in terms 
of influence and political support, the Education Department by the mid-1970s managed 
to formulate and implement an official curriculum across different sectors of schools 
without a great deal of difficulty or political repercussion. In 1974, the Education 
Department published the White Paper on Secondary Education and introduced a 
common curriculum. A document of the Curriculum Development Council (CDC) stated 
that: 
In the development of the junior secondary curriculum, one milestone was the introduction 
of the concept of a common-core curriculum. The 1974 White Paper 'Secondary 
Education in Hong Kong over the Next Decade' recommended, inter alia, that all children 
should follow a common course of general education throughout the nine years of free and 
compulsory education (CDC, 1993, p. 3). 
Subsequently, the common curriculum was extended to the whole secondary education . 
. By the mid-1970s the vast majority of schools adopted the recommended syllabuses 
made by the network and their associated textbooks (McClelhmd, 1991, p. 114). 
The new system of common curriculum also brought the teaching activities at 
pro-China secondary schools under the government's supervision. As almost all 
schools followed .the common course of curriculum, the pro-China schools found 
themselves in an awkward predicament. It was difficult for them to compete with other 
schools in recruiting students and ensuring their students' access to higher education. 
Thus, the Education Department, together with stronger legal powers, eventually 
forced these schools, that had previously rejected the model syllabuses, to join the 
scheme of common curriculum in the 1970s (Postiglione, 1992, p. 9). 
Secondly, the curriculum policy network was important in the development of 
curriculum policy on civic education beaause its shared views defined what 
knowledge ought to be included in school curricula. Perhaps more importantly, the 
consensus between the Education Department and the teaching profession on the 
apolitical and academic tenor of curriculum defined what knowledge was to be 
marginalised or excluded from schooling. In other words, the network greatly affected 
the curriculum policy on civic education by shaping the agenda within the 
curriculum-making process. Therefore, when the curriculum policy was made, it was 
not simply the result of a rational assessment of available options. Rather, it reflected 
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the values and consensus within the network. 
It has been shown that within the network there was clear agreement between the 
Education Department and the mainstream teaching profession on the direction and 
parameters of curriculum policy. They had a strong consensus on curriculum policy, 
which was dedicated to the dissemination of academic and abstract knowledge in 
schools. Meanwhile, the Education Department and the teaching profession regarded 
civic education as either a threat or a triviality that needed to be avoided in schools. 
Under this consensus, any knowledge that was academic-oriented was regarded as 
legitimate knowledge that warranted the consideration of being infused into the 
. teaching and learning in schools. By the same token, civic education that did not fall 
into this category of legitimate knowledge was neglected in the curriculum-making 
process. As the Education Department and the teaching profession were integrated and 
united around the principle of an apolitical and academic-oriented curriculum, they 
were able to dominate the agenda. 
84 
/ Therefore, from the 1970s the curriculum-makers pursued an apolitical and 
academic-oriented curriculum in the policy process. They focused on the conventional 
academic disciplines such as English, Chinese, Mathematics and Science' when 
making and reviewing the curriculum policy. They emphasised the importance of 
'providing pupils with access to the basic disciplines of learning' (Morris, Kan and 
Morris, 2001, p. 167). On the other hand, until the mid-1980s, 'political education was 
never stated as an explicit educational objective in any official educational document'. 
The issue of civic education was consciously excluded from the agenda. The 
Education Department and the teaching profession were 'sensitive to and suspicious of 
political issues in education and tried to put them under control through the control of 
the subjects offered and the content and treatment of topics within the formal 
curriculum' (Tse, 1997, pp. 7-8). 
~ summary, influenced by the consensus within the network, the 
curriculum-making process was 'not neutral. Rather, it privileged academic-oriented 
knowledge and excluded the issue of student's civic and cultural needs from the 
agenda. In doing so, it ensured that the interests and ideas of the key actors within the. 
network were served. By privileging academic-oriented knowledge and depoliticising 
the common core curriculum, the Education Department was able to fill the loopholes 
for pupils to be exposed to materials that might be viewed by the government as 
sensitive or controversial. For the teaching profession, it meant that they could eschew 
sensitive political discussion in schools and concentrate on the teaching of high-status 
knowledge that was intimately associated with public examinations and schools' 
reputations. 
Consequently, until the mid-1980s, the academic and apolitical orientation of 
curriculum was strong at both the primary and secondary levels (Morris, Kan and 
Morris, 2001, p. 167). Civic education was deliberately and consistently overlooked. 
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The curriculum was depoliticised to the extent that 'for a long time pupils studied very 
little about modem China and political issues' (Morris, 1995, p. 97). Pupils' ~xposure 
to political topics involved 'at most a description of the structure and functions of 
Government Departments and of the means by which they tackled various social 
problems' (Morris and Sweeting, 1991, p. 260). The only reference to the People's 
Republic of China (PRC) was in the context of identifying Hong Kong's geographical 
neighbours. The curriculum policy was biased against civic education; it 'alienated the 
students from their indigenous nationality and local politics and cultivated them as 
"subjects" rather than "citizens'" (Tsang, 1994; quoted in Tse, 1997, p. 8) . 
. Finally, the network affecte~ the curriculum policy on civic education by 
excluding groups opposed to the curriculum policy that constantly shunned civic 
education. It has been argued in the previous section that access to the curriculum 
policy network was highly restricted. The groups such as the Federation of Education 
Workers (FEW) ~hat represented pro-China schools, the Education Action Group 
(EAG) and other social and political interests could not access the network, because 
they did not abide by the consensus on school curriculum within the network. The 
institution of Curriculum Development Committee (CDC) provided the professional 
network with a further means of exclusion. Although these groups were excluded from 
the network, they continued to advocate civic education in schools. In the 1970s they 
mobilised a number of social campaigns in order to muster support for civic education. 
However, as they had to work outside the network, their voice of concern was easily 
marginalised in the curriculum-making process. Therefore, they failed to pose any 
significant challenge to the network and its curriculum policy on civic education 
(interview with the leader of an educational pressure group). 
Consequently, the network covering the Education Department and the 
mainstream teaching profession dominated the curriculum policy in Hong Kong from 
. the early 1970s. The existence of the network explains why the curriculum policy was 
bias,ed towards the teaching of conventional academic disciplines, whilst the advocacy 
of civic education was consistently unheeded. 
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However, since the mid-1980s the network has been under increasing attack because 
of the processes of decolonisation and democratisation in Hong Kong. The next chapter 
will examine the impact of these changes in Hqng Kong's political environment. It will 
focus on how the network mediated the effect of hostile circumstances and affected the 
trajectory of change in civic education policy. 
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Chapter Six 
The Politics of Civic Education in Hong Kong: 
Curriculum Policy Network and Colonial Transition 
Chapter 2 demonstrated that an argument commonly used to explain policy change 
in Hong Kong during the transition concentrates on a number of macro-level factors. 
Despite the importance of network-environment, this chapter will show that the 
curriculum policy network, because of its structural strength, was equally significant. Its" 
structural advantages, notably its institutional structur~, resource inter-dependence and 
strong consensus, enabled it to survive the processes of decolonisation and 
democratisation, which precipitated mounting political pressure for change in civic 
education policy. In the 1980s and 1990s, the network largely remained intact, closed and 
highly integrated. Its survival meant that it had the ability to mediate growing political 
pressure and to influence the extent and speed of policy change. Despite the fact that the 
agenda changed to some extent, it still controlled the decision-making process. Therefore, 
little change has occurred in the ap,?litical and academic-oriented curriculum against 
pressure to the contrary. 
This chapter will be divided into two parts; the first will focus on civic education 
policy in the 1980s and the second on the curriculum policy for post-1997 civic education. 
The two periods are different in terms of the intensity of pressure for change and its 
impact on policy. The chapter will begin by examining why the first wave of pressure 
occurred in the 1980s and look at how the network minimised this pressure by following 
a strategy of damage limitation. It will then focus on the increasingly immense pressure in 
the 1990s, in which more domestic groups and the Chinese authorities participated. It will 
argue that the mounting political pressure led to a complicated picture of policymaking. 
On the one hand, the network became looser and the agenda changed to a greater extent. 
On the other hand, as the network was structurally strong, it changed although not 
dramatically; there was still a high degree of exclusion and integration. By securing 
control over the further reforms, it managed to limit the extent of policy change. 
Consequently, the 1996 reforms did not involve an overhaul of the apolitical and 
academic tenor of the ~urriculum. Rather, they showed more signs of continuity than 
change. 
Part I 
1. Colonial Transition and Challenges to the Curriculum 
Policy Network in the 1980s 
In the 1980s, the curriculum policy network covering the" Education Department 
, ' 
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and mainstream educational groups and organisations was subject to increasing challenge. 
This chapter will begin by examining why the challenge occurred and how it affected the 
policy network. In the last chapter, it was demonstrated that the network was embedded in 
the historical-political conditions of Hong Kong from the 1950s, which meant that the 
government had to centralise and depoliticise school curricula in order to avoid 
anti-colonial political education in schools. However, the political conditions of Hong 
Kong have changed dramatically since the signing of the Sino-British Joint Agreement in 
1984. This section will argue that the increasing challenge to the network was a 
consequence of the changes in Hong Kong's political environment. These contextual 
changes made it difficult for the network to evade the issue of civic education in schools. 
, Two closely related political changes took place in Hong Kong from 1984, and both 
had a significant bearing on the change in civic education. The first political change was 
the promulgation of the Sino-British Joint Agreement in 1984, whic~ decided that Hong 
Kong would be returned to China in July 1997 and brought Hong Kong into a period l)f 
decolonisation (Lee, 1999, p. 314). The transitional period leading up to the change of 
flags in Hong Kong was set at nearly 13 years (Bray, 1997, p. 13). Immediately after the 
signing of the Sino-British Joint Agreement, the Hong Kong Government announced the 
political reform for the development of representative government, which was the second 
major political change in Hong Kong during the colonial transition. 
In November 1984, the Hong Kong Government published a White Paper, The 
Further Development of Representative Government in Hong Kong. The primary 
objective ofthe paper was 'to develop progressively a system of government the authority 
for which is firmly rooted in Hong Kong, which is able to represent authoritatively the 
views of the people of Hong Kong, and which is more directly accountable to the people 
of Hong Kong' (Hong Kong Government, 1984, p. 3). To achieve this objective, th~ 
Government introduced elements of electoral representation into the Legislative Council 
that in the past had been completely dominated by appointees (Hong Kong Government, 
1984, p. 14; Wong, 1988, p. 84). 
The en~ of colonialism and the development of a representative system affected the 
curriculum policy network and its curriculum policy in a number of ways. First, they 
"lessened the importance of avoiding threats to the legitimacy of colonial rule in education. 
Historically, the Education Department, in close consultation with the representatives of 
the teaching profession, pursued an apolitical common curriculum that was marked by 
'an avoidance of general political issues and of any attempt to develop a clear sense of 
local or Chinese national identity' (Morris and Sweeting, 1991, p. 265). However, the 
concern to avoid threats to the legitimacy became less critical for the colonial government 
from the early 1980s, when 'it became clear that Hong Kong would cease to be a British 
colony' (Morris and Chan, 1997, p. 101). 
Second, the processes of decolonisation and democratisation affected the change in 
civic education because they gave rise to new problems to which the network did not have 
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available solutions. With the designated return of Hong Kong to China, the preparation of 
pupils for the change in national identity became a pressing educational issue during the 
colonial transition (Tse, 1997, pp. 3-4). Likewise, the development of a representative 
system made it compelling for Hong Kong to foster politically literate, responsible and 
participative citizens, who were able to adapt to the new political conditions of Hong 
Kong (Ting, 1987, p. 12). The leader of an educational pressure group in Hong Kong 
argued that: 
During the colonial transition, the Hong Kong government made public its plan to return 
power to people in the territory. However, as people in Hong Kong had long been under 
the colonial governance, they generally lacked a sense of electoral participation. To . 
achieve the steady development of a representative system in Hong Kong, it was necessary 
for the government to arouse the political literacy and awareness among the public 
(interview with the leader of an educational pressure group). 
Therefore, the White Paper on the development of representative government pointed out 
the need to promote civic education in society in general, and in schools in particular. It 
was stated that 'arrangements should be made for the people of Hong Kong to be 
educated more effectively and comprehensively in political and constitutional matters so 
that they will be able to understand better all the implications and complexities of 
proposals for the development of the representative system of government in Hong Kong' 
(Hong Kong Government, 1984, p. 12). 
However, the established agenda within the network did not provide a solution to 
the new educational problems facing the government and society. The apolitical and 
academic-oriented curriculum policy could hardly be reconciled with the need to promote 
politically enlightened citizens. The traditional school curriculum focussed on 'avoiding 
political and social issues and the contemporary aspects of pupils' culture'. Consequently, 
'until the mid 1980s pupils who left school had very little awareness of political and 
social issues' and a weak sense of national identity (Morris, 1995, p. 127; Lee, 1999, p. 
327). In the face of the vast gap between the new educational problems and the traditional 
school curriculum, there was an upsurge of interest in,and concern for, changing the 
traditional policy on civic education in the 1980s (Morris, 1990, p. 93). 
Third, the change of sovereignty and the process of democratisation influenced the 
change in common curriculum by bringing the issue of civic education into sharper focus. 
In other words, it affected the attention paid to civic education that became a major issue 
in Hong Kong during the colonial transition. The changes in Hong Kong's political 
environment precipitated politicisation at the societal level, and led to the creation of 
. groups interested in using civic education to shape political culture in Hong Kong in a bid 
to influence the course of political transition (Bray and Lee, 2001, p. 4). As Sweeting 
(1997, pp. 31-32) argued, the 1980s and the 1990s was: 'a period when real politik 
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seemed of greater relevance to education policy making than any resort to educational 
principles. It was a period which witnessed the increasing politicisation and polarisation 
of educational discourse'. 
Therefore, in the 1980s civic education was not only an 'issue that concerned the 
groups representing pro:-China schools in Hong Kong. Rather, there were three categories 
of groups that challenged the traditional nature of common curriculum. The first category 
included political groups, among which the Meeting Point was the most active during the 
1980s. Educational pressure groups, such as the Hong Kong Federation of Education 
Workers (FEW), the Hong Kong Professional Teachers Union (PTU) and the Education 
Action Group (EAG), were in the second category. Lastly, community groups like the 
Association of Community Organisations (ACO), the Hong Kong Association of 
Christianity (HKAC) and the Hong Kong Affairs Society (HKAS) also called for 
curriculum change. 
Many of the groups that supported change were intent on using civic education to 
. influence the course of colonial transition by shaping the political culture and civic society 
in Hong Kong. For instance, the FEW, which represented pro-China schools in Hong 
Kong, believed that national integration was pivotal to the political and economic 
prospects of China· and Hong Kong. Thus, it called on the government to strengthen civic 
education in order to nourish nationalistic consciousness among the young generation 
(Deng, 1984). Likewise, due to its passionate support for the return of Hong Kong to 
China, the Meeting Point called for nationalistic education to nourish the concepts of state 
and Chinese identity among pupils (Singtao Daily News, 24 August 1985). In addition, 
there were groups like the HKAS that championed the development of a democratic 
system in Hong Kong. Therefore, they argued that the bulk of civic education should be 
focussed on pupils' political competence and their understanding of human rights, . 
responsibilities and the democratic systems (Hua Qiao Ri Bao, 15 September 1984; 
Mingpao, 17 September 1985). 
Since civic education urgently needed to be in place before the sovereignty handover, 
a range of groups including the EAU the FEW, the HKAC, the Meeting Point and the 
HKAS unanimously called for the formulation of a mandatory civic education syllabus in 
schools (Mingpao, 30 November 1984; Deng, 1984; Singtao, 24 August 1985; Mingpao, 
23 October 1985). Not only did the groups call for curriculum change, they also. 
challenged the network covering the Education Department and the teaching profession 
directly. A coalition of fourteen groups, including the PTU, FEW, EAU Meeting Point and 
HKAC, issued a joint statement in 1984, which made a request for a second curriculum 
network, a co-ordinating committee, charged with the deve'lopment of civic education. 
According to their plan, the co-ordinating committee would channel a wider range of 
interests, besides the representatives of the teaching profession, into the domain of 
curriculum decision- making. By doing so, they intended to access the domain and execute 
their planned changes (Wen WeiPo, 16 September 1984). 
Chapter 6 The Politics of Civic Education in Hong Kong: Curriculum Policy Network and C?lonial Transition 90 
Generally, these groups in the 1980s adopted pressure group tactics in campaigning 
for change. They issued statements and reports on civic education, publicised their policy 
proposals through media, arranged press conferences to increase public pressure on the 
government, and met the representatives of the Education Department and teaching 
profession to press for change (Mingpao, 30 November 1984; Deng, 1984; Wen Wei Po, 
16 September 1985; Mingpao, 17 September 1985; Singtao, 24 August 1985). Through 
these efforts, they had some success in widening discussions in society of any desirable 
changes to the established curriculum. 
So far, I have argued that in the 1980s the curriculum policy network was under 
increasing pressure for change because of the processes .of. decolonisation and 
democratisation in Hong Kong. The colonial transition lessened government anxiety about 
political education in schools. It created new problems that the network had difficulty in 
solving. It also created a number of groups interested in using civic education to influence 
political culture and then the course of political trans"ition in Hong Kong. Consequently, 
civic education became a major issue once again in Hong Kong during the colonial 
transition. However, faced by the' increasing political pressure, the curriculum policy 
network largely remained intact in the 1980s. The next section will examine how it 
survived the changes in Hong Kong's political environment. 
2. The Maintenance of the Curriculum Policy Network 
This section will examine the maintenance of the curriculum policy network 
covering the Education Department and the mainstream teaching profession. It will argue 
that, despite the growing political pressure, the network managed to survive the changes in 
Hong Kong's political environment and remained stable, independent, highly integrated 
and closed in the 1980s. The stability and integration ofthe network were due to a number 
of structural factors in the relationship between the government and the teaching 
profession: independence of the Governor; institutionalisation; resource dependence; 
isolation from other networks; and strong consensus. These structural advantages meant 
that the network had the ability to withstand external pressure and remain intact. As a 
result, unlike the manpower policy network (which will be discussed in detail in Chapter 
8), it was in a stronger position to affect the course of policy change. 
2.1 Independence of the' Governor and a Single Decision-making Centre 
The first structural factor which achieved the stability and integration of the 
. curriculum policy network was that it contained only one powerful actor at the executive 
level. The Education Department, which provided the educational groups and 
organisations with an access point, held the initiative in curriculum policy-making. 
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Institutionally speaking, the network was independent of other government actors 
including the Governor, as its policy decisions did not have to go through the Governor or 
other government agencies for final approval (interview with a senior curriculum officer). 
Therefore, as long as there was agreement be~een the Education Department and the 
teaching profession within the network on the parameters of curriculum, the potential for 
rapid politicisation of the policy arena was very small. 
Of course, ifthe highly resourced Governor drew on his power, he had the authority 
to change the network and its policy agenda on civic education. Actually, in the mid-1980s 
Governor Wilson recognised: 'the need for the public to be educated more effectively in 
order to cope with the implications arising from proposals for developing the local system 
of government' (Wong, 1988, p. 111). Yet he was not directly involved in making 
curriculum policy on civic educatio~. Although he suggested that civic education could be 
pursued both through the formal and informal curricula in schools, 'these ideas were 
general an,d n'ot clearly defined'. Therefore, the network covering the Education 
Department and the teaching profession was, in effect, given a great deal of room to 
manoeuvre (interview with a senior curriculum officer). 
The Governor did not intervene in curriculum policy on civic education because he 
believed that the curriculum-makers had already come up with some fundamental ideas on 
how to promote civic education: It was necessary for the general public and, especially, the 
curriculum-makers to have enough space to thrash out the whole issue (FEW, November 
1984). Perhaps more importantly, the Governor and the government as a whole intended 
to maintain a low profile on the issue of civic education in order to avoid the accusation of 
political indoctrination (South China Morning Post, 4 October 1985). Therefore, the 
Governor and other government actors distanced themselves from the domain of 
curriculum decision-making. They did not challenge the central role played by the 
Education Department in the policy process. As power remained in the Education 
Department, the curriculum policy network that was created and supported by the 
educational officials neither collapsed nor disintegrated in the face of increasing pressure 
for change. 
2.2 Institutionalisation, Resource Dependence and Exclusion 
The other structural factor which achieved the stability and integration of the 
curriculum policy network was that, central to the network, there was a high degree of 
institutionalisation and resource dependence. Although a number of groups interested in 
civic education pressurised the government to· allow them access to the domain of 
curriculum decision-making, the network managed to preserve its exclusive nature. It was 
protected by the institutional arrangements of the Curricul~m Development Committee/ 
Council (CDC). Moreover, the Education Department did not open itself to other interests 
besides the teaching profession because it had to rely on teacher educators, schools and 
Chapter 6 The Politics of Civic Education in Hong Kong: Curriculum Policy Network and Colonial Transition 92 
teachers in implementing the curriculum policy on civic education. As a consequence, the 
groups opposed to the apolitical and academic tenor of curriculum could not access the 
process of curriculum decision-making. 
The last chapter (section 4.3) demonstrated that the curriculum policy network was 
highly institutionalised. The institution of the CDC was central to the network and the 
process of curriculum making. In the face of exogenous pressure, it provided the network 
with an institut~onal cover by stating clearly the privileged position of the teaching 
profession in the policy process (Education Department, 1975, p. 6). Membership of the 
CDC ensured that the representatives of teacher educators, schools and teachers had 
access to the network. By the same token, as the groups interested in civic education were 
not members of the CDC, they could not penetrate the domain of curriculum making. 
Unless the institutional arrangements of curriculum making changed, it was difficult for 
these excluded groups to break into the network. 
However, during the 1980s and the 1990s, neither the Secretary for Education and 
Manpower nor the Director of Education considered a major change to the institution of 
. CDC. They did not initiate a change to the institution of CDC so as to open the domain of 
curriculum decision-making to the groups outside the teaching profession. In the 
Education Commission's report, they argued that 'we fully agree and are pleased to note 
that there is considerable teacher participation in curriculum development'. It is important 
to provide the teaching representatives with sufficient opportunities to advise on: 
'curriculum development at all levels, plan and produce recommended syllabuses and 
ensue that textbooks and other related materials are appropriate for the local syllabuses' 
(Education Commission, 1984, p. 60). These efforts were considered as key to success in 
curriculum development and thus should continue (Education Commission, 1984, p. 61). 
A coalition of groups, including the PTU, the FEW, the EAG, the HKAC and the 
Meeting Point, strove to persuade' the Education Department to create a new 
decision-making centre that would supplant the established network and give them a say 
in the curriculum policy on civic education. However, the Education Department did not 
set up a new policy ne~ork in charge of civic education in schools. It did not open itself to 
other interests besides the teaching profession. On civic education it still insisted that the 
representatives of the teaching profession were the major interlocutors in the policy 
process (Hong Kong Legislative Council, 8 November 1984, p. 307). It did not change the 
network and relinquish its support for the teaching profession because it had to rely on 
schools, teachers and teacher educators in implementing the curriculum policy on civic 
education. The last c~apter demonstrated that schools had a high degree of autonomy in 
deciding: 'upon the range of subjects to be offered' (McClelland, 1991, p. 116). Moreover, 
teachers were allowed to adjust the teaching methods and therefore: 'curriculum 
development relies heavily on the performance and good work of teachers in the 
classroom' (Education Department, 1976, p.6). In short, schools: 'exercised a great deal of 
autonomy as long as they avoided any inputs which might be viewed as subversive' 
Chapter 6 The Politics of Civic Education in Hong Kong: Curriculum Policy Network and Colonial Transition 93 
(Morris, Kan and Morris, 2001, p. 167). 
The autonomy of schools in the selection of subjects, teaching methods and infonnal 
curriculum meant that it was difficult for the Education Department to impose any 
curriculum changes on schools without consultation with the teaching profession. When 
the Education Department responded to a perceived need for civic education by 
introducing a change to the curriculum, there was no requirement on schools to adopt it 
(McClelland, 1991, p. 117). Therefore, a fonner Director of Education believed that 'as 
with all educational plans and programmes, full consultation with and co-operation from 
heads of schools [was] essential to their success' (Hong Kong Legislative Council, 25 July 
1984, p. 1283). Likewise, the training of teachers for civic education was also important, 
but it was under the influence of teacher educators. To 'ensure that both in-service, 
pre-service, and indeed retraining programmes [ were] structured to reflect this new 
emphasis', the Education Department was aware of 'the importance of discussions with 
the colleges of education and other teacher training institutions' (Hong Kong Legislative 
Council, 25 July 1984, p. 1283). 
As the curriculum policy network was protected by the high level of institutional 
support and the structure of resource dependence, the opposition groups were unable to 
penetrate the network in the 1980s. There was only one exception; the PTU, which 
frequently challenged the government's policy on civic education and 'never lost its 
culture as a protest group', traditionally had representation in the mechanism of 
curriculum decision-making (Sweeting, 1997, p. 32). This was most likely because it was 
. one of the largest teachers' unions in Hong Kong. However, its views on civic education 
were marginalised within the network. A teaching representative in the network argued 
that: 'their views on civic education were in a minority within the curriculum committee 
and, therefore, rarely made a real impact on the curriculum decisions' (interview with a 
member of the CDC). 
2.3 Isolation from Other Networks and the Absence of Horizontal 
Conflicts 
The curriculum policy network was not open to change also due to the fact that it was 
not subject to horizontal challenge from other policy networks. Conflicts can often occur 
over territory as new problems arise and different policy networks contest responsibility 
for particular policy arenas. In many cases horizontal conflicts can destabilise a policy 
network and result in a change in decision-makers. However, the curriculum policy 
network was isolated from other networks that co~ld possibly threaten its influence on 
civic education in schools. Therefore, it managed to remain closed and intact in the 1980s. 
There was a potential territorial battle between the curriculum policy network 
centred around the Education Department and a newly-established network centred 
around the District Administration Department over the issue of civic education in schools. 
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The Committee on the Promotion of Civic Education (CPCE) was an institutional . 
arrangement for a policy network covering government departments (centred around the 
District Administration Department), legislators and a number of pressure groups 
(Express News, 15 May 1986). The CPCE could have posed a challenge to the curriculum 
policy network and its decisions on civic education for two major reasons. First, the policy 
responsibility ofthe CPCE and that of the curriculum policy network initially overlapped. 
According to its document, the CPCE was: 'to encourage all sectors of the community to 
,actively promote civic awareness and responsibility and to participate in associated 
activities, and to provide necessary guidelines and support for this' (CPCE, 1986, p. 3). ' 
Schools were one of the major sectors of the community and, therefore, their decisions 
might encroach on the turf of the curriculum policy network. Second, the CPCE 
incorporated representatives from a wider spectrum of the society. A number of 
pro-curriculum change groups like the FEW that had no access to the curriculum policy 
network were represented in the CPCE. Therefore, the policy recommendations made by 
the CPCE were more progressive (CPCE, 1989a, p. 3). 
However, this potentially horizontal challenge did not materialise. Rather, the 
curriculum policy network had a high degree of isolation from the CPCE. Between the two 
networks there was a consensus that clearly separated their policy domains ,and 
responsibilities. This consensus grew quickly in the mid-1980s when the government 
planned to earmark a large sum of money for the promotion of civic education in Hong 
Kong. As their policy domains initially overlapped, the networks were likely to scramble 
for the available funding and contest responsibility for the promotion of civic education. In 
order to avoid this problem, the Education Department (curriculum policy network) and 
the District Administration Department (CPCE) agreed to clarify.their policy domains 
respectively, and thus a consensus began to take shape. 
According to the consensus, the curriculum policy network was responsible for the 
policy on civic education within the school system. On the other hand, the District 
Administration Department, in consultation with the representatives in the CPCE, could 
not intervene in the teaching activities in schools (interview with a member of the CDC). 
Instead, the CPCE liaised with and assisted in the efforts of various community 
organisations in promoting good citizenship. It was: 'to study, discuss and ~ake proposals 
on the objectives and scope of civic education outside the sch,ool system' (CPCE, 1986, p. 
3). Consequently, the networks had separate financial sources and were independent of 
each other. The curriculum policy network was, therefore, impervious to the challenge 
from the other network (CPCE) that was also concerned with the issue of civic education 
(interview with a member of the CDC). 
2.4 Strong Consensus and Internal Integration 
The last chapter highlighted that in the 1970s the curriculum policy network was 
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consensual and very well integrated. There was a clear agreement between the Education 
Department and the mainstream teaching profession on the apolitical and academic 
orientation of common curriculum. In terms of resisting the external pressure for change, 
the network had the structural advantage and started from the position of strength. Despite 
the new problems and new groups voicing strong opinions on the issue of civic education, 
the network managed to maintain its consensus on the parameters of school curriculum. 
As a result, the exogenous pressure did not lead to internal tensions within the network, 
and the domain of curriculum making remained depoliticised in the 1980s. 
If civic education was to develop in Hong Kong, the consensus between the 
Education Department and the teaching profession within the network on an apolitical and 
academic-oriented curriculum had to change, because, as has been seen, civic education is 
politically defined and essentially non-academic in nature (Lee, 1987, p. 243). However, 
the political pressure resulting from the changes in Hong Kong's political environment did 
not break down the consensus within the network. In fact, the Education Department and 
the teaching profession responded to the pressure for change in similar ways. 
Although the survival of the colonial rule became a less critical issue in the 1980s, 
the Education Department did not abandon the apolitical and academic-oriented principle 
of curriculum making (Morris and Chan, 1997, p. 101). It clung to the established agenda 
because it wanted to minimise controversies in the process of curriculum decision-making. 
The educational decision-makers in Hong Kong could be characterised as having 
'bureaucratic-led inertia', which referred to the fact that the instinct of the educational 
decision-makers was 'to avoid change and conflict' (Morris, Kan and Chan, 2001, pp. 
169-170). However, civic education was a new issue that could 'generate one of the most 
controversial areas in education' (Lee and Sweeting, 2001, p. 1,01). Since the early 1980s: 
'the society has not yet arrived at any consensual vi~w on what the contents of civic 
education should be, and how it should be implemented' (Chen, 1996; cited in Lee and 
Sweeting, 2001, p. 113). The educational officials were also worried that the development 
of civic education in Hong Kong was viewed with considerable misgiving by the Chinese 
authorities, which in tum would make the transitional period more turbulent (interview 
with a senior curriculum officer; Bray, 1997, p. 17). To avoid being embroiled in the 
controversies, the Education Department wanted to play it safe. It did not favour a 
substantial change in the established agenda (Lee, 1987, p. 249). 
However, when confronted with ne~ problems and increasing pressure for change, 
the Education Department had to flirt with the need for curriculum change. It followed a 
strategy of damage limitation by accepting the need for certain changes at the margins 
without destroying the established structure of the common curriculum. It argued that: 
'within the existing curriculum, there [were] various subject areas in which civic 
education feature[d] in many ways'. Therefore, it was not necessary for the curriculum 
makers to consider an extensive change (Hong Kong Legislative Council, 2S July 1984, 
. pp. 1283-1284). To encapsulate, the Education Department tended to take 'symbolic 
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action', which served to demonstrate its concern for civic education rather than really 
change the nature of curriculum (Morris and Chan, 1997, p. 101). 
The response of the teaching profession to the external pressure for change was 
similar to that of the Education Department. Principles and teachers wanted to limit 
damage to the established structure of the cOmn1on curriculum. Morris (1997, p. 331) 
argued that the apolitical and academic nature of curriculum: 'has been incorporated, 
reproduced and internalised... to the extent that it has achieved a "taken for granted" 
status'. Therefore, 'in some ways education [might] act as a vehicle for resistance for 
decolonisation' (Bray, 1997, p. 19). Schools, principals and teachers took for granted the 
apolitical and academic orientation of education, which was reinforced by the elitist 
school system, the resulting parental pressure and keen competitions between schools. 
As discussed in the last chapter, the sc~ool system in Hong Kong was extraordinarily 
elitist, which changed little in the 1980s, and there was a strong link between educational 
qualifications and lifetime earnings (McClelland, 1991, p. 335). Access to each level of 
schooling and to different quality schools was determined by pupils' performance in 
internal and, particularly, public examinations that were organised around traditional 
academic disciplines (Morris, 1997, p. 334). Parental pressure was: 'overwhelmingly for 
schools offering an academically oriented set of subjects' (McClelland,.,1991, p. 116). 
Overall, parents exerted an indirect but powerful influence on the school curriculum 
(Morris, 1995, p. 101). Mor~over, 'schools saw themselves as competing with other 
schools' and the key determinant of their success was their pupils' academic achievements 
in the high-status SUbjects. Any schools that decided to opt out of this cycle of competition 
and provide a diversified curriculum including civic education would suffer from 
compounded problems. For example, its status would drop. More importantly, 'parental 
choice [would] ensure that it [recruited] students of ever lower levels of academic 
achievement and a greater proportion of students with behavioural problems' (Morris and 
Chan, 1997, p. 106). To avoid these problems, the teaching profession, like the Education 
Department, was not hospitable to any substantial changes to the status quo. Additionally, 
it did not want change because of its conservative political culture. It wanted to keep 
controversial political and social topics out of schools and classrooms (Tse, 1997, p. 20). 
-Despite their scepticism towards civic education, the educational organisations were 
aware that they had to accept some demands for curriculum change because of the 
processes of decolonisation and democratisation. Thus, like the Education Department, 
they adopted a new approach. Their position was not to directly confront the demand for 
civic education, but they attempted to minimise change. They obfuscated civic education 
with apolitical moral education. In doing so, they were able to avoid sensitive issues, such -
as democracy, political participation and national identity. in the civic education 
programmes (interview with the leader of a community group; Lee, 1999, pp. 324-327). 
Likewise, they rejected the proposal for a mandatory civic education syllabus that would 
compromise their autonomy in determining when and how civic education should be 
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promoted and what it should contain. In other words: 'they wanted to limit damage to the 
established curriculum by keeping a firm grip on how to implement civic education' 
(interview with the leader of a community group). 
Hence, despite the increasing political pressure, the curriculum policy network 
managed to maintain its consensus on the apolitical and academic-oriented principle of 
curriculum making. There was also agreement between the Education Department and the 
teaching profession on how to deal with the demands for curriculum change. The changes 
in Hong Kong's political environment did not lead to the breakdown of the consensus and 
a politicisation of the policy arena. As a consequence, internal divisions did not develop 
within the network, which continued to be highly integrated and consensual during the 
colonial transition. In addition to the institutional arrangements, the consensus and internal 
integration acted as a further means of exclusion. By maintaining agreement on the 
apolitical and academic orientation of curriculum, groups which might destabilise the 
network by raising new issues and suggesting alternative solutions were automatically 
exCluded. A member of the network pointed out that: 
Our institute did not consider a change to the membership ofthe Curriculum Development 
Committee/ Council (CDC). Furthermore, according to my contact with other members, 
they did not think that it was necessary to consider the question about whether or not the 
CDC should be representative of different interests in society. In fact, the CDC was not an 
institution that should involve political and social interests besides educational 
organisations. Our job was simply curriculum development. It was not our task to strike a 
balance between various interests (interview with a member of the CDC). 
It is apparent from the above discussion that the curriculum policy network was 
important in the development of civic education policy in Hong Kong during the transition 
because it had a number of structural advantages which enabled it to survive the contextual 
uncertainty. The network· covering the Education Department and educational 
organisations was independent ofthe Governor, other government actors and other policy 
networks. Therefore, power did not gravitate away from the network. There was a high 
level of institutional support and the structure of resource dependence, which meant that it 
was difficult for outsider groups, including a range of political and social interests, to 
penetrate the network. Moreover, the network was protected by the fact that the Education 
Department and the teaching profession managed to maintain their consensus on the 
parameters of common curriculum. As a result, the external pressure for change did not 
create internal divisions within the network. The consensus also acted as a further means 
of exclusion. Consequently, the network remained stable, highly integrated, independent 
and closed in the 19805. 
Having already shown why th~ curriculum policy network was in a stronger position 
to resist change, the next section will now examine how the maintenance of the network 
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actually affected policy outcomes. 
3 Explaining Policy Outcomes: Minor Changes at the Margins 
This section will demonstrate that the curriculum policy network significantly 
affected the course of policy change on civic education. It managed to survive the 
processes of decolonisation and democratisation, and largely remained intact and closed in 
the 1980s. As a result, it was strong enough to mediate the growing political influence by 
coopting certain pressures for curriculum change and excluding other radical demands. 
Consequently, change in the apolitical and academic-oriented curriculum policy did not 
occur easily. The external pressure was minimised ~o the extent that only minor changes at 
. the margins were possible. 
Nevertheless, it would be wrong to say that nothing changed in civic education 
policy. In fact, within the policy network the agenda changed, in that civic education 
became more important. The development of a representative system made an impact on 
the agenda. A senior curriculum officer pointed out that: 
The political reforms not only had policy implications for the legislative and 
administrative systems, but also affected the curriculum decision-making. The White 
Paper on representative government was a cross-departmental document, to which every 
related governm~nt agency, including our Education Department, needed to respond 
accordingly. By suggesting the role of the school system in the promotion of civic 
education, the White Paper was effectively a binding document on the Education 
Department (interview with a senior curriculum officer). 
To a lesser extent, the challenge from a constellation of domestic groups also influenced 
the agenda. As an increasing number of political, community and educational pressure 
groups drummed up support for curriculum change, their pressure was felt within the 
Education Department (Hong Kong Legislative Council, 2 May 1984, pp. 920-921). As a 
fonner Director of Education admitted in the mid-1980s, the Education Department: 'fully 
accept[ed] that there [was] growing public interest in the extent to which schools [were] 
. preparing students for the future' (Hong Kong Legislative Council, 25 July 1984, p. 1282). 
This concern filtered down through the Education Department hierarchy and became the 
concern of teaching representatives within the network. Therefore, curriculum change to 
strengthen civic education became a pressing issue for the network to deal with in the 
1980s. 
Although the curriculum policy network was certainly impinge4 on by the changes 
in Hong Kong's political environment, it retained its influence on curriculum policy. The 
network was important because it was the one which made the decisions on curriculum 
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reform. The network had, to a certain extent, lost control over the agenda. Yet it still 
controlled the decision-making process and, in that sense, the network did not become any 
more open. The network was independent of the Governor and other policy networks. It 
was highly integrated and protected by the institution of the CDC. The opposition groups 
could not penetrate the domain of curriculum making, and the policy-makers remained the 
same. Therefore, the network had the ability to dominate the reform agenda. In reforming 
the curriculum policy on civic education, it did its best to limit damage to the apolitical and 
academic tenor of common curriculum. In spite of the fact that it no longer could ignore 
the issue of civic education, it controlled the scope and speed of policy change. 
The curriculum policy network affected the course of policy change in three major 
ways. First, it accepted superficial changes at the margins, thereby diluting the exogenous 
pressure for curriculum change. In reaction to the external pressure, the network in the 
mid-1980s drew up guidelines on how to promote civic education in schools (Wong, 1988, 
pp. 112-113). The guidelines suggested the permeation approach t~ the implementation of 
civic education in schools. According to the approach, schools were recommended to 
infuse the elements of civic education into 'both the formal and informal curriculum and 
the ethos of the school or the hidden curriculum' (CDC, 1985, p. 5). However, the 
implementation of the guidelines was voluntary and integrating civic education into the 
established curriculum was a matter for schools to decide (interview with a member of the . 
CDC). Therefore, whilst the guidelines allowed the curriculum makers to claim that there 
were policy measures in place to deal with the poverty of civic education, they were 
unlikely to threaten the established structure of curricula. 
Likewise, the network accepted the need for civic education. However, civic 
education is a multi-faceted concept (highlighted in the last chapter). The network seized 
on this ambiguity and twisted political-oriented civic education into the teaching of public 
and private morality. In doing so, it was able to limit damage to the apolitical orientation of 
school curriculum, whilst not directly confronting the demand for curriculum change. For 
the Education Department, the prime function of civic education had to be helping pupils 
to acquire a sense of moral and social values. They included: 'respect for others and for 
their views and beliefs' and 'appreciation of the world's cultural heritage' (Hong Kong 
Legislative Council, 2 May 1984, pp. 920-921). Likewise: 'the representatives of teacher 
. educators and schools also placed emphasis on the moral dimension of civic education in 
reforming the curriculum, rather than its political aspect' (interview with a member of the 
CDC). Consequently, the civic education programmes contained in the guidelines were 
biased towards moral education, which was to 'develop "desirable qualities in people" so 
that members of society could establish and maintain good relationships with one another' 
(Lee, 1987, p. 246). To some extent, this indicates a change, as the curriculum became less 
academic and more diversified. However, the curriculum did not change in a way that was 
intended to develop an understanding of, attitudes towards and competence in the political 
life in Hong Kong among pupils. 
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Second, the network prevented policy change by excluding threats to the dominant 
interests within the network. This demonstrates the importance, within the network, of its 
agreement on the parameters of curriculum policy. Within the network the Education 
Department and the teaching profession had a clear consensus on the apolitical and 
academic-oriented principle of curriculum making. Although they had to accept the need 
for certain changes within the established curriculum, they wanted to limit change by , 
allowing individual schools to determine how civic education should be promoted and 
what it should contain. Any alternative solutions that seriously clashed with this consensus 
\ 
were automatically excluded from the policy process. 
For example, a number of pressure groups suggested that the Education Department 
needed to formulate a mandatory civic education syllabus. If this proposal were accepted, 
it would have caused a substantial change in the established curriculum, as there would 
have been compUlsion on schools to implement a common programme on civic education 
devised by the Education Departm,ent. However, it bumped against the consensus. A 
former teaching representative in the network pointed out that: 
We rarely considered the issue of civic education within the Curriculum Development 
Committee. Only when the Education Department suggested the need for curriculum 
change and consulted our opinions did we start the relating discussion. We seldom raised 
the issue, and I could not see that the educational organisations had much interest in the 
promotion of civic education at all. We gave our support to the government's policy on 
civic education on the grounds that it only ambiguously recommended civic education 
being permeated in the formal and informal curricula, and this ambiguity gave schools 
, 
much room to decide how to implement it. We did not consent to the imposition of a single 
approach on schools that would reduce our space to manoeuvre (interview with a member 
of the CDC). 
Therefore, the proposal was defined by the network as infeasible and as such was excluded 
from the policy process. In accounting for its inaction, the Education Department argued 
that there was no compulsory subj ect under the existing curriculum system. In <;>ther words, 
the Education Department did not have the capability to impose civic education as a 
mandatory subject on schools (CPCE, 1989b, p. 7). 
Additionally, a range of political, community and educational pressure groups 
intended to use civic education to shape the political culture in society at the juncture of 
political transition. The consequence ofthis posture was that they proposed a radical plan 
for the reform of the apolitical and academic-oriented curriculum. They saw civic 
. education as education for political competence and attitudes rather than for private and 
public morality. Yet this proposal met with opposition because it harmed the interests and 
ideas within the network. Both the Education Department and educational organisations 
defended their position on moral education and discredited the proposal by defining it as 
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extreme. Eventually, many political topics were withheld from the reform agenda 
(interview with the leader of a community grOUp). 
Since the network's overall tack involved the acceptance of minor changes at the 
margins and the exclusion of radical plans for curriculum reform, the changes in the 
curriculum policy on civic education were cosmetic in the 1980s. The formulation of a set 
of guidelines had a limited impact on school curricula. The main features of apolitical.and 
academic-oriented curricula were still in place, as the promotion of civic education on a 
voluntary basis easily led to the consequence that the guidelines were not implemented at 
school level, where civic education was: 'crowded out in the formal and informal 
curriculums'. Even though the guidelines were carried out in some schools that were 
enthusiastic over the promotion of civic education: 'what [was] transmitted in schools 
[was] still a kind of apolitical culture', as the government's policy privileged the teaching 
of private and public morality. In short, despite the processes of decolonisation and 
democratisation, the status of civic education in schools: 'showed striking continuity with 
the past' (Tse, 1997, p. 28). 
Third, the network affected the course of policy change by excluding groups that 
were opposed to the dominant interests and ideas within the network from the policy 
process. The water-downed version of curriculum reform unleashed a great deal of 
criticism from the political, community and educational pressure groups interested in civic 
education. For instance, the Hong Kong Affairs Society (HKAS) opposed the permeation 
approach and argued that 'civic education should be made a separate and compulsory 
subject in schools and not just a topic for discussion when it [arose] in other subjects'. It 
also criticised the direction of civic education and maintained that not enough emphasis 
was placed on the nurturing of national and ethnic consciousness (South China Morning 
Post, 5 October 1985). On this basis, a range of groups, such as the HKAS, the FEW, the 
PTU, the Hok Yau Club (HYC) and the Meeting Point, urged the Education Department to 
review the civic education guidelines almost immediately after the document was issued 
in 1985. However, these groups could not access the curriculum policy network. By 
excluding them from the domain of curriculum decision-making through the institutional 
structure and consensus, the network marginalised their influence in the policy process. 
One of their leaders admitted that: 
We could 'only adopt the pressure group tactics to promote civic education because we had 
not accessed the established mechanism of curriculum making ... We acted in accordance 
with our capabilities, in the ways of meeting informally with the educational officials, 
. -. 
stating clearly our positions and trying our best to convince them that it was necessary to 
revise the guidelines in order to strengthen national, patriotic and democratic education in 
schools. However, as our group was not inside the mechanism of decision-making, it was 
difficult to ensure that the curriculum makers would consider our views seriously 
(interview with the leader of an educational pressure group). 
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The opposition groups not only failed in their attempts to change the contents of civic 
education, they also could not compel the curriculum makers to re-consider the need for a 
mandatory civic education syllabus: 
We also emphasised the importance of a mandatory civic education subject throughout 
and, actually, we met the curriculum-makers informally to thrash out this issue. Their 
response was that they were as equally concerned about civic education as we were, and 
that was it. We could not see any concrete plan or promise (interview with the leader of an 
educational pressure group). 
The exclusion of issues and groups demanding change explains why the reform ensured 
the continuation rather than the opening up of the established curriculum. Consequently, 
the changes in the established curriculum to promote civic education were minimal in the 
1980s, and further reform was procrastinated over. 
In the 1980s, the Education Department and the teaching profession policy network 
was safe. However, it did not convince outsider groups that it had a potent policy in place 
to prepare pupils for the transition of Hong Kong to China. Pressure for further reform did 
_ not fall away. In the 1990s, due to the development of representative government and the 
change of sovereignty, the groups gained in political strength and mustered more support 
for civic education. Added to the domestic pressure was the challenge to the network from 
the Chinese authorities. Therefore, the pressure for change in the 1990s was different to 
that in the past, in terms of intensity and influence. The second part of this chapter will 
examine the survival of the network in these hostile circumstances and the impact the 
network had on the trajectory of policy change. It will begin by analysing how the changes 
in Hong Kong's political environment in the 1990s intensified the pressure for further 
reform. 
Part II 
4 Political Transition. and Resurgent Pressure for 
Post-Colonial Civic Education Policy in the 1990s 
Compared with the 1980s, the immediate years before the transfer of power in 1997 
saw the growth in influence of the pressure for curriculum change, as the development of a 
representative system deepened and the change of sovereignty in Hong Kong drew closer. 
In other words, the network was confronted with increasing attacks because of the changes 
in Hong Kong's political environment. The macro-level factors affected the curriculum 
policy network and its decisions on civic education in a number of ways. 
Firstly, the contextual factors led to further poli~icisation at the societal level, which 
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increased the level of attention that was paid to the poverty of civic education. In the 1990s, 
the representative system in Hong Kong developed to a greater degree, with the majority 
of the Legislative Council being open to direct and indirect elections. The development of 
representative government triggered the establishment of pressure groups that were 
concerned about the colonial transition, and transformed ~hese groups into well-organised 
political parties. It also changed the political climate in Hong Kong from: 'one that was 
depoliticised to one that was politically sensitised' (Lee, 1999, pp. 314-315). The change 
in Hong Kong's political climate was also due to the imminence of sovereignty transfer, 
which resulted in rising concern among Hong Kong people about their political future 
. after 1997. As a result of further politicisation at the societal level, there were increasing 
interests in Hong Kong that centred round the government's preparation for the handover, 
in areas such as civic education. In other words, the politicised climate within the society: 
'served to magnify and accelerate the range of forces and interests which attempt[ed] to 
define the nature of the school curriculum' (Morris, 1992, p. 119). 
Secondly, as argued before, the processes of decolonisation and democratisation in 
the 1980s created a number of problems that were at odds with the established agenda 
within the policy network. During the 1990s, these problems once again gained magnitude, 
. . 
as it became clear that the diluted version of curriculum reform was inadequate in 
preparing pupils for the imminent political transition. The 1985 civic education guidelines 
recommended a permeation approach to the promotion of civic education in schools. 
Conspicuously, this approach suffered 'a major problem as the implementation of a policy 
which is every individual teacher's responsibility can easily become no-one's 
responsibility' (Morris and Chan, 1997, p. 107). The guidelines had very limited impact on 
the implemented curricula that remained apolitical and academic in nature (Morris, 1995, 
p. 100). Civic education, though urgently needed, was easily marginalised from the 
implemented curricula. 
As a result of the discrepancy between the policy-makers' rhetoric and policy 
outcomes, an increasing number of groups were involved in pressurising the network for 
further reform in the 1990s. Some of them had already participated in the 1980s, such as 
the Federation of Education Workers (FEW), the Professional Teachers' Union (PTU) and 
the Education Action Group (EAG). Others were new to this campaign, such as 
community groups like the Hong Kong Christian Institute (HKCI) and the Justice and 
Peace Commission of the Hong Kong Catholic Diocese (JPC); human rights groups like 
Amnesty International Hong Kong (AIHK); educational pressure groups like the 
Education Convergence (EC); and newly-established political groups like the Democratic 
Party (DP) and the Democratic Alliance for the Betterment of Hong Kong (DAB). 
There was a clear thread connecting the past and new interests in civic education in 
the 1980s and 90s respectively. Like the past interests, the pro-curriculum change groups 
were concerned about the political future of Hong Kong, and sought to use civic education 
to influence the political culture and society after 1997 (Bray and Lee, 2001, p. 4; Lee and 
.. 
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Sweeting, 2001, p. 102}. For instance, the FEW, and the EC saw that the future of Hong 
Kong lay in the convergence and identification with mainland China. They made the 
criticism that: 'the old guidelines did not mention any concept of country or nationalism at 
all' (FEW, 10 January 1996, p. 3). They called on the Education Department to review the 
1985 guidelines and to focus on the concepts of state and nation instead of private and 
public'morality (Wen Wei Po, 17 June 1995: Education Convergence, 1995, pp. 5-6). In 
addition, groups like the Democratic Party were anxious about the future of democracy in 
Hong Kong. For them, one of the keys to the success of democratisation in Hong Kong 
was the promotion of democratic and liberal education in schools (Hong Kong Legislative 
Council, 22 May 1996, pp. 152-153; Morris, 1992, p. 123). Regarding th~ best way 
forward, they argued that the Education Department had to introduce mandatory civic 
education, be it an independent or an integrated subject, into the common curriculum 
(Singtao, 4 April 1995; Wen Wei Po, 17 June 1995). 
The development of post-1997 civic education cannot be fully understood without 
considering the roles that the Chinese authorities played in the immediate years around the 
handover. Unlike the course of change in the 1980s, the campaign for further reform was 
primarily local, but it was also closely related to the Chinese authorities. It is hardly 
surprising that the Chinese government showed a keen interest in Hong Kong's 
post-colonial civic education, because it traditionally treated civic education as a strategic 
area for political stability and power in mainland China (Morris and Marsh, 1992, p. 253;· 
Lee, 2001, p. 201). However, in contrast to its policies in mainland China, it showed little 
desire to conduct communist ideological education in Hong Kong after 1997. Instead, it 
called for 'change in the curriculum to reflect Chinese sovereignty in Hong Kong' and to 
strengthen 'the preparation of the re-defined Chinese citizenry of Hong Kong' (Lee and 
Sweeting, 2001, p. 107). Like the domestic groups, it became increasingly concerned with 
the issue of civic education in Hong Kong when presented with evidence that the 
Education Department and the teaching profession policy network had difficulty in 
. solving the poverty of civic education. It argued that: 'there should be more lessons about 
the state and national identity in Hong Kong's foundation education' (Wen Wei Po, 26 
September 1994). It also demanded the formulation of a mandatory civic education subject 
in primary and secondary schools (Ta Kung Pao, 13 September 1994). 
Taken together, the contextual factors in Hong Kong, notably the deepening political 
reforms and the imminent change of sovereignty, had a significant impact on the 
curriculum policy network by affecting the interests of the Chinese authorities and 
domestic groups, which called for policy change on two major fronts. They realised the 
necessity of revising the 1985 guidelines and tried to reorientate the watered-down version 
. of civic education towards political education. Moreover, they proposed a mandatory civic 
education syllabus so that the implementation of civic education in schools would be 
. guaranteed. 
Finally, the changes in Hong Kong's political environment affected not· only the 
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interests but also the relative power of the political forces opposed to the established 
agenda within the network. Due to the further development of a representative system in 
Hong Kong, the pro-curriculum change groups had far greater strength in putting the 
Education Department under pressure in the 1990s. Groups that championed further 
curriculum refonn were no longer outsiders. Rather, the DP, the DAB, the FEW and the 
. 
PTU managed to penetrate the enlarged political arena through elections to the Legislative 
Council (Hong Kong Legislative Council, 11 October 1995, pp. 1-5). Of course, 
membership of the Legislative Council was not tantamount to accessing to the network in 
curriculum policy. However, they had more influence than in the past because, in addition 
to pressure group lobbying, they could draw on their political resources on the Legislative 
Council to affect policy change. They pressurised the Education Department by initiating 
debates and tabling motions on the Legislative Council (Hong Kong Legislative Council, 
22 May 1996). They also provided other groups, such as the HKCI, the JPC and the AIHK, 
that operated outside the political arena with alternative access points to the government 
(interview with the leader of a community group). 
With this enhanced political strength, the local campaign for curriculum change was 
not so readily neglected as it was in the 19805. In fact, the groups exerted a great deal of 
pressure on the upper echelon of the Education Department. This pressure filtered down 
the administrative hierarchy and, eventually, became the concern of curriculum-makers. 
Hence, in 1995, the network reversed its refusal to have further curriculum refonn and 
announced a review of the 1985 guidelines. As the leader of a community group argued: 
The Curriculum Development Council was persistently dismissive of the idea, but, all ofa 
sudden, it changed its attitudes in 1995 ... According to my reading, the change in attitudes 
among the curriculum-makers was a consequence of the pressure from the upper echelon 
ofthe Education Department. But why did the top-ranking educational officials require the 
curriculum-makers to consider a change to the civic education guidelines? They did so 
because they encountered massive pressure from the Legislative Council (interview with 
the leader ofa community group). 
Compared with the domestic groups, the Chinese authorities made an even greater 
impact on the network. The influence they had on Hong Kong policy substantially 
increased in the 1990s, as a result of another macro-level factor, the transition of Hong 
Kong to China. Hong Kong's reintegration with China rather than a transition to 
independent sovereignty meant that 'another form of dependency and external control' 
developed in the territory. The transition of Hong Kong was not 'one of decolonisation so 
much as recolonisation' (Bray, 1997, p. 12). Therefore, the Chinese government was 
influential in changing the curriculum policy on civic education in Hong Kong if it 
wielded its power. It influenced the curriculum policy network through its official arms 
that managed Hong Kong matters, notably the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office 
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(HKMAO), the Hong Kong New China News Agency (NCNA), the Preliminary Working 
Committee (PWC) and the local representatives of the National People's Congress (NPC). 
In putting Hong Kong's curriculum-makers under pressure, the PWC, which was an 
agency established to tender advice to the Chinese government, issued an official 
statement in 1994. In the statement, it averred that: 'nationalistic and patriotic education 
had 1?een under-emphasised in Hong Kong'. Thus, it demanded the government to 
strengthen civic education by focussing on nationalism and patriotism and on Chinese 
History as well as the Basic Law (Ta Kung Pao, 13 September 1994). 
China's intervention meant that the curriculum policy network had little choice but 
to accept the need for further change. The curriculum-makers had to consider the political 
pressure from China in deciding whether or not to change the 1985 guidelines. Initially 
their position was to reject the proposals for further reform in the early 1990s. However, 
they realised that if they maintained this position they would lose their initiative, because 
the pressure from the Chinese authorities would only become stronger after 1997. As a 
former member ofthe network admitted: 
We felt that if we did not review the guidelines before the handover, we were likely to be 
forced to do so after 1,997 by the new government under the Chinese sovereignty. This 
likelihood gave rise to a worry that we might not have enough space to manoeuvre after 
1997, so that we could not devise a balanced, academic-sounding and inclusive civic 
education policy. In weighing the advantages of responding to increasing pressure against 
the uncertainty involved, we decided to launch a review and fonnulate a new set of 
guidelines in the middle of the 1990s' (interview with a member of the CDC). 
Consequently, the Education Department, with the concerns of the Chinese government in 
mind, set up an ad hoc working group to review the civic education guidelines in the 
. " 
mid-1990s (Lee and Sweeting, 2001, p. 107). 
In summary, due to the deepening political reforms and the change of sovereignty, 
the pressure to further reform the curriculum policy on civic education became immense 
in the 1990s. There was an increasing number of groups campaigning for change, and 
these groups had more influence than in the 1980s. To the mounting domestic pressure was 
added the challenge to the curriculum policy network from the Chinese authorities. 
China's intervention meant that it was better for the network to promptly accept demands 
for greater change than postponing action until after 1997. There was widespread 
recognition of the need for further reform within the network. In the face of this pressure, 
the network became weaker. The next section will examine how the network weathered 
the vicissitudes of its circumstances in Hong Kong. 
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Political 
This section will examine the extent to which the curriculum policy network 
covering the Education Department and the teaching profession survived the pressure for 
change in the 1990s and how it managed to achieve it. It will argue that, on the one hand, 
the political pressure was so immense that the network was inevitably weakened. The 
Education Department had to give access to a number of groups opposed to the established 
curriculum, and the Chinese authorities had great influence on the policy-makers. On the 
other hand, the network had not collapsed in the 1990s, although it had to operate within 
hostile circumstances. There were some changes in the network, but it did not change 
dramatically. It managed to survive the mounting political pressure because of its strong 
institutional structure and clear agreement on curriculum policy. It was also saved by its 
. . 
constitutional and international contexts that hobbled the influence of the Chinese 
government on Hong Kong. As a result, the domain of curriculum making split into a core 
and a periphery. Whilst the pro-curriculum change groups managed to penetrate the 
periphery, the core, which contained the Education Department and the teaching 
profession, con~inued to be closed and consensual. It still controlled the decision-making 
process. Thus far it has not turned into an open political network. 
5.1 Weakened Curriculum Policy Network 
The curriculum policy in Hong Kong in the mid:-1990s saw some change in its 
network. The network containing the Education Department and educational organisations 
was weakened, as it could no longer preserve its exclusive nature in the face of mounting 
pressure for curriculum change. 
Groups that were motivated by political ideologies and opposed to the apolitical and 
academic-oriented curriculum managed to penetrate the curriculum policy network. In 
1995, the Education Department set up an ad hoc working group charged with the 
responsibility to review the old civic education guidelines, ~d a number of groups such as 
the FEW, the EC, the HKCI and the DP that were previously excluded were represented 
within the ad hoc committee (Education Department, 1997, p. 9). Through the ad hoc 
committee, the Education Department gave the pro-curriculum change groups access to 
the domain of curriculum making (Mingpao, 20 March 1995). 
The reason why the Education Department opened the curriculum policy network 
was a combination of the increased political strength of pro-change groups and 
government desire to have a new set of guidelines that could transit across 1997 without 
disturbance. The primacy.of this objective was evident in a 1996 policy document. For 
example, it was argued that the new guidelines were designed for use in schools that 
encountered: 'the transition to the twenty first century' and 'the resumption of the exercise 
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of sovereignty by China over Hong Kong in 1997' (CDC, 1996, p. 1). By having a policy 
on civic education that could straddle 1997, the Education Department wanted to remove 
one of the factors of uncertainty which hung over Hong Kong during the colonial 
, transition. To enhance the possibility of achieving this goal, the Education Department had 
little choice but to allow access to the pro-curriculum change groups that had greater 
political strength to challenge its policy decisions. As a teaching representative within the 
network argued: 
The Education Department intentionally allowed these groups access to the ad hoc 
committee. It realised that if they were not represented and the new set of guidelines could 
not reflect their views and interests, it was very likely that they would challenge the new 
guidelines shortly afterwards. This would probably cramp the government's plan to have a 
policy that could last beyond 1997 and even into the twenty-first century (interview with a 
member of the CDC). 
The Education Department did not intend to run the risk at the juncture of sovereignty 
transfer, and so it allowed a number of opposition groups to have a formal role in 
reviewing the past policy on civic education. These groups did not share the established 
agenda within the network. They were opposed to the apolitical and academic-oriented 
principle in general and the moralised and non-compulsory features of the 1985 guidelines 
in particular. Their involvement in the policy process was bound to destabilise the 
network. 
The pressure from the Chinese authorities also weakened the Education Department 
and the teaching profession network in curriculum policy. As the Chinese government was 
increasingly concerned with Hong Kong's civic education and the Education Department 
wanted to have a policy that the new government after 1997 would follow, it was almost 
impossible for the network to remain impervious to the pressure from China. Within the 
network the curriculum-makers had to make civic education policy for the post-1997 
government under China's sovereignty. In order to secure smooth transition, they had to 
take more notice of the demands for change made by the Chinese authorities. One of the 
teaching representatives within the network illustrated that: 
We needed to consider whether or not the Chinese government would accept our 
guidelines, because of the unique position that we were in. It is usually the case that a 
post-colonial government snuffed out past policies on civic education and replaced them 
with a new direction, values and content. It happened to almost all former colonies. 
However, we were formulating the civic education guidelines for the post-1997 
government under China's sovereignty ... We did not want to see our guidelines 
overthrown by the new government under the pressure from the Chinese authorities 
shortly after 1997. In this situation, we fully understood the reality that it was important to 
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win China's blessing for our policy (interview with a member of the CDC) 
The need for securing China's support inevitably placed certain constraints on the 
curriculum policy network in ;Hong Kong. This does not mean that civic education policy 
had to be made formally acceptable to the Chinese government, given that China had 
promised Hong Kong a high degree of autonomy under the precept of 'one country, two 
systems'. Nevertheless, it was important for the network to avoid any overt criticisms 
from the Chinese government that were likely to create political uncertainty and 
controversy in Hong Kong. In this sense, the network covering the Education Department 
and the teaching profession was, to a certain extent, weakened. 
5.2 The 1\vo-Layer Network: Closed Core and Open Periphery 
In the mid-1990s, there was some change in the Education Department and the 
teaching profession policy network, with a number of diametrically opposed interests 
penetrating the domain of curriculum decision-making. To some extent, the network 
became more open. However, the network did not change dramatically. There was no 
general opening of the network to groups that were motivated by political ideologies and 
wanted to use civic education for political purposes. Although the network could not 
preserve its exclusive nature, this does not mean that there was no exclusion at all. But 
exclusion was not simple. The network split into two layers, with a core and a periphery or, 
in other words, a primary and secondary network. The core contained the Education 
Department and the representatives of educational organisations that continued to occupy 
a few central po~itions in the policy process. On the periphery were the opposition groups 
that were given access to the ad hoc committee. They had to abide by the rules set by the 
key actors within the primary network and had only tenuous involvement in the system 
(see figure 5.1). 
The distinction between the primary and secondary networks was clear. Although a 
number of opposition groups penetrated the periphery, they did not access the core of the 
network. The primary network was able to exclude the opposition groups because it was 
protected by its institutional structure. Central to the network was the institution of the 
Curriculum Development Council (its predecessor was the Curriculum Development 
Committee) (CDC).' As argued before, the institution stated clearly the privileged 
positions of teaching representatives in the heart of curriculum decision-making, thereby 
safeguarding the network that contained the Education Department and the teaching 
profession against the external pressure for change. This is not to say that nothing has 
changed in the institution of the CDC throughout the 1990s; there were some marginal 
changes. Yet none of them was targeted at enlarging the primary network to incorporate 
the political, social or educational pressure groups, or giving these groups institutionalised 
access to the domain of curriculum making (CDC, 1993, p.2; Education Department, 1993, 
Chapter 6 The Politics of Civic Education in Hong Kong: Curriculum Policy Network and Colonial Transition 
p. 117; CDC membership list, 1993-2000). 
Figure 6.1 Curriculum Policy Network in the Middle of 1990s 
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Therefore, although the opposition groups were given occasional access to the policy 
. process, they did not penetrate the primary network and have any continuous influence on 
policy (CDC, 1996, p. iii). As a member of the ad hoc committee argued: 
The representatives in the ad hoc committee were only consulted on the making of a new 
set of civic education guidelines. The task lasted for nearly a year, and then the ad hoc 
committee dissolved. Therefore, we did not have any lasting influence on policy 
(interview with a member of the ad hoc committee on the review of civic education 
guidelines). 
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Besides the institutional support, the primary network covering the Education D~partment 
and the teaching profession managed to exclude the opposition groups because there was a 
strong consensus on curriculum policy within the network. The consensus will be 
discussed later. Here it is important to point out that through the consensus, the groups 
opposed to the apolitical and academic-oriented principle of curriculum making were kept 
out of the primary network. In order to maintain the stability and professionalism of the 
policy arena, the key actors within the primary network did not consider opening the core 
to various interests in society (interview with a member of the CDC). Therefore, there was 
still a high degree of exclusion within the curriculum policy network. 
The existence of two layers meant that the curriculum policy network did not 
disintegrate in the 1990s. To some extent, the pro-curriculum change groups that 
penetrated the periphery destabilised and diluted the policy arena. However, as they did 
not access the core of decision-making, they did not debilitate the network. The structural 
distinction between the core and periphery limited their ability to undermine the 
established network covering the Education Department and the teaching profession in 
three major ways. First, the opposition interests did not have any lasting influence on 
policy. Second, they were not given a great deal of freedom on the periphery of the 
network. The core had its representatives in the secondary network, who were responsible 
for defending its interests and ideas in the policy process (interview with a member of the 
CDC). Third, in order to gain entry to the policy process, the pro-curriculum change 
groups had to accept the ,final decisions of the primary network. The ad hoc committee on 
the review of civic education policy, in which the pro-curriculum change groups were 
represented, was set up under the auspices of the CDC and accountable to it (Commercial 
Press, 22 October 1994). This meant that any new policy measures proposed by the ad hoc 
committee were for the purpose of consultation only, which needed to be finalised and 
approved by the key actors within the primary network (Singtao Daily News, 2 May 1995; 
interview with a member of the ad hoc committee). 
Hence, the curriculum policy network changed but not dramatically. In the 
mid-1990s it became more difficult to exclude the opposition groups from the domain of 
curriculum making. However, their penetration of the domain of curriculum making was 
not equal in effect to the disintegration and opening up of the whole network. There was 
still a high degree of exclusion, with the network splitting into a core and periphery. The 
opposition groups, though penetrating the periphery, did not access the core of the network. 
The primary network that contained the Education Department and the teaching 
profession was protected by its institutional structure and strong agreement on curriculum 
policy. Restrained by the structural characteristics, the opposition groups did not exert any 
continuous and substantial influence on policy. As a result, the network continued to be 
structurally intact, at least at the core of curriculum making. 
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5.3 Vertical Independence of the Chinese Authorities 
It cannot be denied that the Chinese government, which was increasingly concerned 
with the poverty of civic education in Hong Kong, had more influence on the curriculum 
policy network during' the 1990s than previously. Within' the network, the 
. curriculum-makers had to take on board some of the issues raised by the Chinese 
authorities in order to ensure that their curriculum policy on civic education would be used 
. after 1997. As a result, the Education Department and the teaching profession network was 
weakened, and the Chinese authorities seemed to be a significant factor in changing 
curriculum policy in Hong Kong. 
However, it is necessary to be specific in order to understand how the Chinese 
authorities actually influenced the network and the extent to which the network survived 
this pressure. In the 1990s the Chinese authorities did not use their power to break up the 
network. They did not take decisions themselves and impose their decisions on the 
network, nor did they change the institution that was responsible for making curriculum 
policy. Therefore, China's intervention did not lead to the collapse and disintegration of 
the network. The network still controlled the decision-making process, and in that sense, 
the network was independent of the Chinese authorities in charge of Hong Kong affairs. 
There were a number of domestic and international factors that constrained China's 
intention and ability to remove decision-making from the curriculum policy network. 
First, the Sino-British Joint Agreement stated in principle that Hong Kong would 
retain the pre-existing system of law and education and would enjoy the same rights and 
freedom after 1997 (Wong, 1988, pp. 64-65)~ The Chinese authorities were obliged to 
abide by this principle in dealing with Hong Kong's educational affairs, because the Joint 
Declaration was international in nature. The agreement was signed by the Prime Ministers 
of Britain and China, and it was registered at the United Nations in New York by both 
governments (Wong, 1988, p. 63). Second, Hong Kong's autonomy in educational 
policy-making was specifically built into the wording of the Basic Law, which was a de 
facto constitution for Hong Kong after 1997 and approved by the National People's 
Congress of China .. Article 136 of this legal document states that: 'on the basis of the 
previous educational system' the Hong Kong Government: 'shall, on its own, formulate 
policies on the development and improvement of education' (National People's Congress 
of the PRC, 1991). Third, the return of Hong Kong to China was a subject of massive 
international media scrutiny and scepticism. Thus, the Chinese authorities had to consider 
the political costs of attempting to intervene in Hong Kong's internal affairs. This was 
especially true, given that they were eage~ to demonstrate to the international community 
China's capacity to allow Hong Kong to operate in the ways spelt out in the Joint 
Declaration and the Basic Law (Morris, Kan and Morris, 2001, p. 166). 
With these domestic and international constraints, China's. intervention in Hong 
Kong's curriculum policy was normally confined to indirect influence and vocal threats. 
" 
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Despite the fact that the common curriculum in Hong Kong went through some important 
changes: 'almost none of these changes so far have been the result of overt direction from 
Beijing'. The Chinese government: 'cannot easily be said to have exercised control' (Bray, 
1997, p. 14). Moreover, it did not break up the network and heighten the issue of civic 
education to the Joint Liaison Group (JLG) that was established by Britain, China and 
Hong Kong to tackle disputable issues facing Hong Kong during the colonial transition. 
As the Chinese authorities did not try to control the process of curriculum-making in 
Hong Kong, the Education Department and the teaching profession policy network was 
largely independent. This does not signify that the network was a completely isolated 
entity from the influence of China. However, as long as the Chinese authorities were 
cautious about forcing change in Hong Kong's curriculum policy, the network was left 
'with much room to manoeuvre. In reforming the curriculum policy on civic education, it 
could incorporate certain changes and exclude others. This demonstrates the importance 
of the domestic and international contexts of Hong Kong. Besides the network's structural 
advantages, it was its international and constitutional contexts which allowed it to survive 
the mounting pressure for change. 
5.4 Strong Consensus and Integration at the Core 
The curriculum policy network covering the Education Department and the teaching 
profession was structurally strong because from the 1970s there was a firm consensus on 
, curriculum policy. This consensus was the other structural variable that enabled the 
network to largely remain intact in the 1990s. Although there was increased questioning of 
the apolitical and academic-oriented principle that the network followed, the Education 
Department and the teaching profession managed to maintain it. They also had clear 
agreement over the options for dealing with the demands for further curriculum change. 
Therefore, the external pressure stemming from the changes in Hong Kong's political 
environment did not cause a cleavage within the network during the 1990s. 
Although the political agenda has changed in that civic education became more 
important, the Education Department! teaching profession policy network did not waver in ' 
its support for the established curriculum. In its p~licy document, the Education 
Department continued to put emphasis on the apolitical and academic nature of the 
curriculum by stating that: 'schools should help students to build a strong foundation of 
literacy and numeracy'. In defending its position, it used the argument that: 'in a complex 
modem society, the skills of literacy and numeracy are the essential foundation for " 
developing individual potential and promoting social and economic development'. The 
teaching of established academic disciplines was 'therefore a prime responsibility of 
schools' (Education Department, 1992, p. 17). 
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Table 6.1 Political Conditions, Curriculum Policy Network and Policy Change: 
Before 1984 1984-1990 1991- 2000 
Political Tenuous legitimacy of colonial Sino-British Joint Declaration; the Further development of the representative 
Conditions rule; PRC's interest in Hong development of representative system; sovereignty handover; the rise in the 
Kong's civic education government; new educational power of the Chinese authorities and pro-
agendas curriculum change groups 
Memberships Inclusion: Inclusion: Core: 
of the policy Education Department; Education Department; representatives Education Department; representatives of 
network representatives of schools, of schools, principals, teachers schools, principals, teachers and teacher 
school head associations, and teacher educators educators 
teachers' unions and colleges of 
education 
Exclusion: Exclusion: Periphery (ad hoc basis): 
Representatives of pro-China Political groups; educational pressure The DP (political party); The FEW and the 
schools; educational pressure groups; community groups EC (educational pressure groups); the HKCI 
groups; political and social (community group) ; 
interests 
Exclusion: 
Human rights groups 
Institutions The institution of CDC provided The institution of CDC was intact Marginal changes to the institution of CDC, 
the network between the but not targeted at incorporating the political 
Education Department and and social interests into the network at the 
teaching profession with an core 
institutional cover 
Independence Vertical: Vertical: Vertical: 
Largely independ~t from the Largely independent from the The Chinese authorities exerted influence in 
Governor-in-Council Governor-in-Council indirect ways through their official arms in 
Hong Kong; largely independent of the 
Horizontal: Horizontal: Chinese authorities because they were 
Independent from other Independent from the CPCE that constrained by internal and international 
government agencies, such as could possibly challenge the network factors 
the Secretary for Chinese Affairs 
Horizontal: 
Independent from the CPCE 
Integration I Well integrated; strong consensus Well integrated; strong consensus on Core: , 
Consensus on the apolitical and academic the apolitical and academic nature of Fairly well integrated; long-standing 
nature of education; compromise curriculum; agreement on how to deal consensus on the nature and system of 
on the common core curriculum with the issue of civic education curriculum; but had to take into 
that allowed school's autonomy (damage limitation) consideration of some issues raised by the 
in curriculum matters Chinese authorities 
Periphery: 
The pro-curriculum change groups goi the 
issues of political education onto the agenda 
Rules of the The Education Department had State centered but the teaching The pro-curriculum change groups in the 
game influence over the membership profession could modify the periphery of the network must abide by the 
selection, agenda setting and government's curriculum rules of the game set by the educational 
policy initiation; the teaching proposals officers and teaching experts at the core; 
profession could modify the the rules of the game were biased towards 
government's curriculum the maintenance of the status quo and ' 
proposals limited the influence that the pro-curriculum 
change groups had 
, 
Policy outcome Civic education was deliberately Change: Change: 
I change ' overlooked on the curriculum First ever civic education guidelines Review of the old guidelines; more political 
topics in the guidelines 
, 
Continuity: Continuity: 
moralization of civic education; moralization was still the dominating 
the permeation approach; no fea,ture; the penneation approach; no 
mandatory subject on civic education mandatory subject on civic education 
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As argued before, the Education Department flinched from substantial change 
because it wanted to avoid being embroiled in political controversy in the process of 
curriculum making. Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, in the immediate years 
around the handover, the Hong Kong government as a whole, in the light of massive 
international media scrutiny and the importance of economic vibrancy, placed a premium 
on maintaining stability and diversity in the political, economic and social systems 
(Morris, Kan and Morris, 2001, p. 165). The Education Department, as part of the 
government committed to 'continuity rather than change, avoided pursuing radical 
decolonising policies and any direct attempt to promote the political ideology of CCP 
(Chinese Community Party) (Morris, Kan and Morris, 2001, pp. 175-179). Like the 
Education Department, schools and teachers in the 1990s took more notice of the need for 
civic education. Yet they did not want to abandon the established curriculum, which was 
reinforced by the 'educational ethos of longing for success in examination'. They treated 
'civic education as something unimportant or even dispensable' (Lee and Leung, 1999, pp: 
3-4). 
However, the pressure for further reform had reached a point where it was almost 
impossible to prevaricate. In response to.this immense pressure, there was clear agreement 
between the Education Department and the teaching profession within the network on 
what should be done. Both of them used the old strategy of damage limitation by twisting 
politically-oriented civic education into the teaching of personal and public morality. In, 
doing so, their interests and ideas were served. On the one hand, the Education 
Department could distance itself from the political controversy surrounding the concept of 
citizenship. On the oth~r hand, it could create a sense oftogetherness and identity based on 
a homogenous sense of Chinese culture, morality and values (Morris, Kan and Morris, 
2001, p. 177). For principals and teachers, students' discipline was: 'a more pressing 
problem than their attitudes towards and skills of participation'. The strategy of damage . 
. limitation allowed them to: 'emphasise the moral dimension but discard the political 
dimension of civic education' (Lee and Leung, 1999, p. 21). In addition, both the 
Education Department and the teaching profession wanted to limit damage by allowing 
individual schools to implement civic education policy on a voluntary basis. They argued 
that schools needed autonomy in curriculum matters for the quality of education 
(interview with a member of the CDC) 
The standpoint of the colleges of education on change was more subtle and 
complicated. One of their representatives in the curriculum policy network indicated that 
they were less fundamentally opposed to political education than were principals and 
teachers. To them, the concept of civic education could be politically defined. However, 
there was apprehension that the development of civic education could be easily 
manipulated by political forces and calculations in such a politicised environment of Hong 
Kong. As a result, they did not wish to abandon the established curriculum. They argued 
that political ed.ucation should not be an over-arching definition of civic education. Instead, 
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it represented only a component of education for citizenship. They emphasised the 
importance of personal! public morality, such as a sense of family, neighbourhood and 
social ethics, in order to combat the dangers of political indoctrination (interview with a 
member of the CDC). Therefore, their position was siinilar to that of the Education 
Department and schools. In response to growing political pressure, all of them accepted 
the need for further reform, but they wished to minimise the extent of change. Due to this 
consensus, during the 1990s, the network covering the Education Department and the 
teaching profession was still highly integrated. 
It is apparent from the above discussion that the relationship between the political 
transition in Hong Kong in the 1990s and the curriculum policy network was dialectical. 
, On the one hand, the political transition weakened the network, with a number of 
pro-change domestic groups penetrating the periphery and the Chinese authorities 
exerting colossal pressure on policymakers. On the other hand, the changing political 
environment did not undermine the network covering the Education Department and the 
teaching profession in curriculum policy. Faced with immense political pressure, the 
network changed but not dramatically. It survived the mounting pressure because it was 
protected by its institutional structure and strong consensus on curriculum policy. Its 
survival was also, to a certain extent, due to the domestic and international contexts within 
which it operated. Therefore, it managed to remain intact throughout the 1990s. There 
was still a high degree of exclusion, with political interests and pressure groups being kept 
out of the core of curriculum making. Power did not gravitate away from the network to 
the Chinese authorities. Schisms did not occur between the Education Department and the 
teaching profession. The politicised environment of Hong Kong in the immediate years 
around the handover did not lead to a politicisation of the policy arena. The final section of 
this chapter will examine how the survival of the network affected the further reform in 
. curriculum policy. 
6 Explaining Policy Outcomes: Continuities within Change 
The curriculum policy network, which weathered the hostile circumstances and 
largely remained intact in the 1990s, significantly ·affected the course of further reform in 
curriculum policy. It would be wrong to say that nothing changed in the political agenda 
and curriculum policy on civic education throughout the 1990s. In order to strengthen its 
position, the network had to accommodate certain demands for change. However, its 
survival meant that it had the ability to mediate the external pressure. Unlike the 
disintegrated manpower policy network (which will be discussed in Chapter 8); policy was 
still made within the confines of the closed network. It still controlled the decision-making 
process and followed a strategy of damage limitation. It resisted change by incorporating 
certain reforms and excluding others that would do substantial harm to the interests and 
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i'deas within the network. Moreover, it did not allow diametrically opposed interests access 
to the core of curriculum making, and thus marginalised the voices of opposition in the 
policy process. The upshot of all this was that change was limited. Although a new set of 
guidelines on civic education was issued in 1996, it did not involve an overhaul of the 
apolitical and academic-orientated common curriculum. Rather, it showed more signs of 
continuity'than change. 
Nevertheless, in the 1990s the policy agenda within the curriculum policy network 
changed to a larger extent than during the 1980s. It was no longer one of avoiding political 
education and emphasising established academic disciplines. New issues were on the 
agenda. This was because the network became looser, with a number of political and 
pressure groups that chainpioned curriculum change penetrating the domain of curriculum 
making. In order to reduce their pressure, these groups were consulted when the Education 
Department conducted a review of the 1985 civic education guidelines. Therefore, the 
network had less control over the agenda, and these groups managed, to raise some 
previously excluded issues onto the agenda. For example, in the ad hoc committee, they 
prompted the Education Department and the, teaching profession to accept that the civic 
education programme needed to include more political topics, such as democracy, human 
rights, rule oflaw, national identity and patriotism (interview with a member of the ad hoc 
committee). In addition, the curriculum-makers within the network had to incorporate the 
issue of patriotic education raised by the Chinese authorities, in order to ensure the 
continuation of their policy beyond the hand over. 
Consequently, further changes were made in the curriculum policy on civic 
education. In 1996, the curriculum policy network agreed on a plan for further reform and 
issued a new set of civic education guidelines. As opposed to the 1985 guidelines, the new 
guidelines showed signs' of politicisation, with more political topics associated with the 
development of representative government and the change of sovereignty being included 
in the civic education programme. In the new guidelines, the direction and content of civic 
education centred around five major parts, including family, neighbourhood, regional 
community (Hong Kong), state (China) and international community (CDC, 1996, pp. 
21-25). According to a teaching representative in the network, the sections on regional 
community and state were intended to locate and accommodate the demands for change 
made by the Chinese authorities and opposition groups (interview with a member of the 
CDC). The two parts contained a number of political topics that were seen as controversial 
in the past, such as national identity, sovereignty, political equality, po~itical freedom, 
plurality, democracy and human rights (CDC, 1996, pp. 12-25). It was argu~d that the new 
guidelines were the first government document that suggested patriotic education in Hong 
Kong (Express News, 25 November 1995). This alteration indicates that no policy 
network can be completely impervious to exogenous pressure for change,especially when 
the pressure is exacerbated by the changes in its political, social or economic context. 
However, the closed and highly integrated curriculum policy network, which 
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survived the processes of decolonisation and democratisation in Hong Kong, was not 
automatically open to change either. There have been changes but these were made 
because the curriculum-makers within the network realised that if some concessions were 
not made, the political pressure was likely to mount and force radical change upon them. 
Those most intimately involved in making curriculum policy had an interest in 
maintaining the apolitical and academic orientated common curriculum. Although the 
network lost some control over the agenda in the immediate years around the handover, it 
still controlled the process of curriculum decision-making. Clearly, any changes had to 
occur within the established network that encompassed the Education Department and the 
teaching profession, for them to rule out the most radical proposals for change. 
Despite the mounting political pressure, the network was able to control the 
decision-making process because of its structural characteristics. First, there was still a 
high degree of exclusion. Although a number of political and pressure groups penetrated 
the domain of curriculum making, they did not access its core. The Education Department 
and ~he teaching profession at the core had control over the reforms in curriculum policy 
by setting the 'rules of the game' that the opposition groups had to abide by in order to gain 
entry to the policy process. Through these 'rules of the game', the Education Department 
and educational organisations at the core dominated the main policy direction of the 
network as a whole. 
As argued before, one ofthe major demands for change was to make civic education 
a mandatory subject in schools. However, the rules restrained the pro-curriculum change 
groups in the ad hoc committee from raising and making a decision on this issue (CPCE, 
1995, p. 4; Mingpao, 18 February 1995). A Principal Assistant Director of Education who 
chaired the ad hoc cOlnmittee also pointed out that: 'the decision on whether or not civic 
education should become a mandatory subject exceed[ed] the ad hoc committee's terms of 
, reference' (Wen Wei Po, 22 March 1995). In addition, the groups on the periphery did not 
act in a vacuum; they had to base their policy proposals on the reports and documents 
compiled by the Education Department (interview with a senior curriculum officer; Hua 
Qiao Ri Bao, 6 January 1995). These reports, as argued by Morris (1990, p. 109), w,ere 
manipulated by the Education Department and 'primarily used to legitimate the 
Department's policy' . Since the reports were biased towards the maintenance of status quo, 
the rules effectively pre-ordained that 'the review must not lead to large-scale change in 
the established curriculum' (Wen Wei Po, 20 May 1995). 
Second, the Education Department and the teaching profession network had control 
over the reforms in 'civic education policy because the initiative in curriculum 
decision-making did not shift from the network to the Chinese authorities. Although the 
Chinese government increasingly accepted the argument that the curriculum policy on 
civic education needed strengthening in Hong Kong, its influence was confined to the 
pattern of vocal threats and indirect pressure. For example, in 1995 the cultural subgroup 
of the Preparatory Working Committee (PWC) established by the Chinese government 
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publicly issued their version of policy guidelines on Hong Kong's post-1997 CIVIC 
education. It attempted to affect the decisions made by the curriculum-makers in Hong 
Kong. But it made it clear that it had no intention of imposing any curriculum plans on 
Hong Kong (South China Morning Post, 11 October 1995; interview with the leader of an 
educational pressure group). Its best scenario was that through incessant pressurisation, 
the curriculum-makers in Hong Kong would automatically take account of its proposals 
for change. This is not to deny the importance of the Chinese authorities in changing civic 
education policy in Hong Kong in the 1990s. However, the influence of the Chinese 
government was indirect, which was inevitably mediated by the policy-makers in Hong 
Kong who acted on what tIiey themselves felt would be favoured by the authorities in 
Beijing (Bray, 1997, p. 14). Therefore, the curriculum policy network was actually left 
with a great deal of room to manoeuvre. 
In the 1990s, both the Education Department and schools wanted to maintain the 
apolitical and academic orientation of the common curriculum. By securing control over 
the reforms in curriculum policy, the Education Department! teaching profession network 
had the ability to resist change. It acknowledged that civic education needed strengthening 
in schools, as China resumed its sovereignty over Hong Kong. However, in reforming the 
curriculum policy on civic education, it tried to ensure that the further changes that were 
. introduced would do as little harm as possible to the established curriculum. In ,order to 
achieve this, it tended to accept minor changes at the margins and reject the most radical 
proposals for change raised by the Chinese authorities and domestic groups. 
For instance, the curriculum-makers within the network removed from the agenda 
one ofthe most important issues that the Chinese authorities and domestic groups raised in 
'the 1990s; civic education was synonymous with political education and which was 
concerned with nationalism, patriotism, human rights and democracy. Civic education 
needed to be focused on political topics that could prepare pupils for the changes in Hong 
Kong's political environment (Education Convergence, 1996, p. 5; Wen Wei Po, 26 
September 1994; Hong Kong Legislative Council, 22 May 1996, pp. 152-153). This 
proposal was particularly inimical to the interests and ideas of the Education Department 
and schools. Therefore, it was defined as extreme and, as such, was excluded from the 
policy process. In order to indemnify themselves against any criticisms, the 
curriculum-makers within the network argued that: 
Discussions on nationalism and patriotism in relation to the other locality contexts were 
more sensible and appropriate than campaigns to secure for them the major or even the 
, 
only part of civic education (Lee and Sweeting, 2001, p. 112). 
According to them, the other locality contexts included individuals, family, 
neighbourhood and social community. Consequently, although the new guidelines showed 
signs of politicisation, the Chinese authorities and domestic groups failed in their attempts 
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to make political education the central theme of government policy on civic education 
throughout the 1990s. 
Instead of strengthening political education, the network emphasised the importance 
of the teaching of personal and public morality. Although moral education was not 
something that the Chinese authorities and domestic groups disagreed on, it was not the 
focus of their concerns. By shaping politically-oriented civic education into moral 
education, the network could promote civic education in a way that was least harmful to 
the Education Department and the teaching profession. On the one hand, the introduction 
of moral education into schools meant that the common curriculum became less academic 
in nature. It enabled the network to reduce exogenous pressure by demonstrating its ability 
to recognise problems and adapt. On the other hand, the Education Department could 
avoid being involved in the vortex of political controversy, and the teaching profession 
could continue to keep politics out of schools. In other words, the network used the 
teaching of personal and public morality to dilute the political elements of civic education. 
Consequently, the importance of morality was asserted in the new policy on civic 
education, which suggested the concept of social citizenship. The concept of social 
citizenship denoted a range of social ethics and moral values, including honesty, 
individual courage, filial piety, respect among family members, caring parents, mutuality 
of neighbourhood and taking care of public facilities (CDC, 1996, Pl" 33-41). The focus 
on pupils' moral standards rather than their political awareness was a feature that 
underpinned the past and new school curriculum in general, and the past and new policies 
on civic education in particular. 
The other major continuity was the absence of a mandatory syllabus on civic 
education. Although by the late 1980s it was clear that the 1985 refonns had not had the 
desired effect, the curriculum-makers within the network still rejected calls for making 
civic education a mandatory subject in the common curriculum in the 1990s. Rather, they 
encouraged schools to promote civic education on a voluntary basis, and rendered support 
to schools by issuing a new set of non-binding curriculum guides in 1996 (CDC, 1996, p. 
3). According to a senior curriculum officer: 'the curriculum-makers still held the view 
that the use of curriculum guidelines was an appropriate and effective policy on civic 
education' (interview with a senior curriculum officer). They justified their decision by 
stressing the link between school autonomy and the quality of education. They argued 
tha~: 
We disapproved of the proposal for a mandatory subject because we had no intention of 
monopolising the approach to the promotion of civic education in schools. Instead, we 
wanted to encourage schools, in the light of their own missions, resources and pupils' civic 
needs, to develop their school-based approaches. We believed that this would contribute to 
the quality ofteaching (interview with a member of the CDC). 
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The decision might benefit the quality of education, but it also served the interests and 
ideas of the key actors within the network, who followed a strategy of damage limitation. 
It allowed the policy-makers to demonstrate that they had a policy in place to tackle the 
poverty of civic awareness among a young generation. Perhaps more importantly, there 
was no compulsion on schools to implement the guidelines. Therefore, schools still had 
the pretext for ignoring civic education and, particularly, political education in the 
common curriculum. 
, The Education Department and the teaching profession network also resisted change 
by marginalising the domestic groups that clamoured for a complete overhaul of the 
common curriculum. The groups did not accept the argument that the promotion of civic 
education on a voluntary basis was effective. Yet they were not in a position to change the 
policy. Despite having penetrated the mechanism of curriculum making, they had to abide 
by the rules set by the key actors at the core of the network. These rules did not allow them 
to introduce a mandatory civic education subject into the common curriculum (interview 
with a member of the ad hoc committee). As a result, their pressure had a limited impact 
on the policy. Their weakness in terms of pressure group influence was exacerbated by the 
fact that they did not exert a continuous influence on policy. The leader of a group that 
gained access to the periphery of the network argued that: 
For a number of groups, it became increasingly evident that the 1996 guidelines were 
inadequate as time passed. However, there was a lack of a mechanism to enable us with a 
particular interest in political education to have any lasting effect on policy (interview with 
a member of the ad hoc committee). 
To some extent, their participation in the policy process when the Education 
Department conducted a review of the 1985 guidelines affected the curriculum policy on 
civic education. Their views were reflected and a number of controversial political topics 
were introduced. However, the impact they had was ephemeral, which ended with the 
publication of the new guidelines in 1996. As a consequence: 'the recent policy 
re-manifested the signs of moralisation as a dominating feature of civic education' 
(interview with a member of the ad hoc committee). This is borne out by the current 
development in curriculum policy. In a 2001 curriculum document, Learning to Learn, 
'civic education' was renamed as 'moral and civic education' (CDC, 2001). 
Of course, the Chinese government could break up the network between the 
Education Department of Hong Kong and the local teaching profession and force its issues 
onto the agenda, in view of the fact that Hong Kong was no match for the Chinese 
government in terms of political power. However, the problem with this strategy was that 
the political costs could be very high. It has been argued that there were internal and 
international constraints for the Chinese authorities to intervene in the educational 
policy-making in Hong Kong. The constraints included the Sino-British Joint Declaration, 
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the Basic Law, and the massive international media scrutiny of the sovereignty transfer. 
If the Chinese government decided to change the' curriculum policy network in Hong 
Kong, it would effectively mean the violation of the provisions stipulated in the 
Sino-British Joint Declaration and the Basic Law. The Chinese government was clearly 
not prepared to bear the political risks of creati.ng international opprobrium and political, 
economic and social instability in Hong Kong on this matter. There were other policy 
areas that the Chinese government had more interest in and, thus, chose to target. Bray 
(1997, p. 14) argued that: 'the educational sector was given nothing like the attention 
devoted to such matters as the new airport, financial reserves, land reclamation or the 
Court of Final Appeal'. Under these circumstances, the Chinese government did not break 
I up the curriculum policy network and heighten the issue of civic education to the Joint 
Liaison Group, nor did it force their demands onto the agenda within the network by 
giving direct instructions to the Hong Kong Government (interview with a member of the 
CDC). It relied on its indirect influence on the curriculum-makers, and this influence was 
limited by the nature ofthe curriculum policy network. As a result, the network was able to 
minimise the extent of change through the exclusion of groups and issues. 
7. Conclusion 
This chapter has revealed that the course of policy change in civic education in Hong 
Kong during the colonial transition was complex and dialectical. There were two forces, a 
force for change and a countervailing force, t~at coexisted and shaped the curriculum 
policy on civic education in Hong Kong. During the1980s and 1990s, the development of 
a representative system and the change of sovereignty acted as a motor of change. They 
, had a significant impact on Hong Kong politics, which created threats for the pre-existing 
network covering the Education Department and the mainstream teaching profession and 
its decisions on the curriculum policy on civic education. However, it would be inaccurate 
to say that, as some political scientists have suggested (Li, 1997; Newman, 1985; Segcl, 
1993; Wang, 1995; Chiu and Levin, 2000; Cheung, 1997; Miners, 1994; Lau, 1999; Yukari, 
1996), change in policy-making and policy outcomes simply occurred as a result of the 
processes of decolonisa:tion and democratisation in Hong Kong. Rather, these contextual 
changes did not have an effect independent of the curriculum policy network, which was 
structurally strong and so had the ability to withstand the pressure for change. In other 
words, the impact of colonial transition in Hong Kong on civic education policy greatly 
depended on the nature ofthe network. 
Whilst it is important not to overemphasise the impact of contextual factors, it is 
apparent from this study that the changes in Hong Kong's political environment during the 
transition, including the end of colonialism and the development of representative 
government, affected the change in civic education policy. They created new problems to 
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which the established agenda within the Education Department and the teaching 
profession network did not have available solutions. They brought the poverty of civic 
education into sharper focus because the apolitical and academic-oriented curriculum 
could not easily be reconciled with the need to prepare pupils for the transition of Hong 
Kongto China. They also led to the creation of groups that were interested in using civic 
education to shape political culture in Hong Kong, thereby affecting the course of political 
transition. Similarly, as a result of the change of sovereignty, the Chinese government was 
increasingly concerned with the curriculum policy on civic educ~tion in Hong Kong. Of 
greater significance was the increase in relative power of the Chinese authorities and 
domestic groups demanding policy change. 
In short, civic education became a major issue in Hong Kong during the transition, as 
it was inextricably intertwined with the changes in Hong Kong's political landscape. The 
outcome of this was that in the 1980s, and particularly the 1990s, Hong Kong's curriculum 
policy on civic education saw some change in the network and policy outputs. This 
demonstrates that, although the notion of a policy community is very static, the closed and 
well-integrated network i~ curriculum policy was not completely independent and 
impervious to the changes in Hong Kong's political environment. Thus far, two sets of 
policy guidelines, which were ostensibly used to strengthen civic education, have been 
issued to schools. In addition, a number of political topics that were previously regarded as 
unacceptable have been introduced into the civic education programmes sponsored by the 
network. 
However, as has been seen, it is also the case that civic education policy did not 
change automatically. The Education Department and the teaching profession network 
was the other important factor that affected the trajectory of change. In accounting for 
policy change, we need to examine the nature of the network and how it interacted with the 
changes in Hong Kong's political environment. The network was structurally strong, with 
a single decision-making centre, a high degree of institutional support and resource· 
exchange, and a consensual mode of policy-making. Therefore, it survived the processes 
of decolonisation and democratisation in Hong Kong, and remained intact, closed and 
highly integrated in the 1980s. The political pressure became greater during the 1990s, and 
thus led to a greater degree of change in the network. Yet the network did not change 
dramatically. It was protected by its institutional structure and clear consensus on 
. . 
curriculum policy, which united the network and excluded opposition interests from the 
core of curriculum making. Therefore, within the network, there was still a high level of 
exclusion and int~gration. The politicisation of Hong Kong during the transition did not 
lead to a politicisation of the policy arena. 
Here, it is necessary to point out that the network was also saved by its constitutional 
and international contexts in which the Chinese authorities refrained from directly 
imposing any policies on Hong Kong. As a result, power did not gravitate away from the 
network to other institutions. This demonstrates the importance of network's context in 
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explaining the change i~ a network and policy. In the case of civic education policy, the 
context of Hong Kong created both threats and possibilities for the network. Nevertheless, 
the nature of the network was still important because the pressure from the Chinese 
authorities, though restrained, was still immense. 
Since the network did not break down, it had the ability to affect the pace and extent 
of policy change. As we have seen, the network had less control over the agenda, which 
changed in that civic education became more important. However, those most intimately 
involved in making curriculum policy had an interest in maintaining the apolitical and 
academic-orientated curriculum. Policy-makers remained the same. Any changes largely 
occurred within the Education Department and the teaching profession network. By 
securing control over the reforms in curriculum policy, the network was able to limit 
.damage to the established curriculum. On the one hand, it incorporated minor changes at 
the margins in order to reduce the political pressure. On the other, it rejected radical 
proposals for change and excluded from the core of curriculum making the groups 
demanding further reforms. The existence of the network, through the exclusion of issues 
and groups, explains 'why so little change was made to the established curriculum in order 
to promote civic education durin~ the 1980s and 1990s. Consequently, civic education, 
especially political education, was squeezed out of the implemented curricula in most 
schools. 
Chapter 7 The Development of Manpower Policy Network in Hong Kong 
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This chapter will examine how a fairly well integrated and closed policy network 
developed and succeeded in the area of manpower policy in Hong Kong between the 
1970s and the early 1990s. The policy network included the Education and Manpower 
Branch (EMB) ofthe government and the key business groups in Hong Kong - the Hong 
Kong General Chamber of Commerce (HKGCC), the Federation of Hong Kong 
Industries (FHKI) and the Chinese Manufacturers Association (CMA). This chapter will 
show that the governmentlbusiness relations in the policy network were distinctive, and 
that the network had a significant impact on the development of manpower policy. 
A stock argument that is commonly used to explain the governmentlbusiness 
relations emphasises the financial resources available to business and their importance to 
the success of economy as a whole, which gives' business a privileged position in 
policymaking. However, in the second section, I shall argue that the manpower policy 
network was distinctive. It was not created because of the power of business. Rather, it 
emerged as a result of the colonial nature of Hong Kong. As an undemocratic colony, the 
Hong Kong government encountered a built-in legitimacy crisis and, therefore, 
particularly needed the successful economy for the stability and legitimacy of the regime. 
In order to secure the economic prosperity, the major business groups were co-opted. The 
immediate reason for the establishment of the network was the economic difficulties 
facing Hong Kong in the 1970s, which gave rise to shared views between the government 
and business on how to manage the labour force. This demonstrates that the network was 
less based on the economic power of business than on a consensus on manpower policy. It 
was only when the consensus took shape that the network began to develop. 
In the third section, I shall argue that the manpower policy network was different 
from normal pressure politics, because it was not fluctuating but stable, closed and fairly 
well integrated for two decades. Central to the network were three major components. 
First, a limited number of participants were involved in the network, which meant that a 
consensus was relatively easy to reach. Second, the stability and integration of the 
network was achieved by the shared views between the government and business on the 
values and goals of manpower policy. There was also a general agreement on how to 
achieve these goals. Third, contrary to the pluralist position, access to the network was 
highly restricted. The shared views on manpower policy acted as a means of excluding 
radical groups, notably trade unions, from the network. The restricted membership of the 
, 
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network meant that the actors did not change frequently, and that the government and 
business were able to de-politicise the domain ofpolicymaking. 
The fourth section of this chapter will go on to discuss how the nature of the 
network affected manpower policy. It wi11 argue that the existence of the network was 
important in explaining why the manpower policy was biased towards the economic 
interests at the expense of the labour's ones. It will reveal that the network, through the 
mechanisms of defining what problems existed and what policy options were acceptable, 
• had great influence on the development of manpower policy. This demonstrates the 
importance, within the manpower policy network, of its consensus on the values and 
goals of manpower policy. The network also affected the manpower policy, by preventing 
other problems and alternative solutions raised by trade unions from getting onto the 
agenda. Moreover, the trade unions that were opposed to the manpower policy were 
excluded from the network. Hence, the role of radical groups in influencing manpower 
policy ~as limited by the policy process, and the network was impervious to their 
challenges to its decisions. The policy process was far from neutral. As a consequence, 
the economic interests prevailed over the interests of labour in the development of 
manpower policy. 
In spite of the fact that the network was strong enough to dominate the area of 
manpower policy for two decades, it contained a number of deficiencies. The last part of 
this chapter will highlight the structural weaknesses of the network, and argue that these 
weaknesses, which did not de-stabilise the network during a period of rapid eCQnomic 
growth and buoyant labour market, would explode as the political and economic 
circumstances changed. It will demonstrate that the network was fundamentally different 
from the cuITiculum policy network discussed in the previous chapters, and these 
differences made it much weaker. 
1. The Definition of Manpowe'r Policy in Hong Kong 
This chapter will begin by outlining the major elements constituting the manpower 
policy in Hong Kong before discussing how the manpower policy network developed 
during the 1970s. What does manpower policy mean in Hong Kong? This study adopts 
the official definition, by which 'manpower' refers to: 'all persons in employment, 
inch.lding employers, employees and workers on own account' (Education and ManP9wer 
Branch, 1991, pp. iii-iv). In other words, manpower policy concerns the management of 
labour force in Hong Kong. 
According to the Secretary for Education and Manpower (SEM), the manpower 
policy in Hong Kong had three major components, including manpower development 
(tecIniical education, vocational training and employees retraining), labour importation, 
and employment services. Although the three components could be independent policy 
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sub-sectors, they were closely related by the fact that they all affected the manpower 
structure and labour market in Hong Kong. The fundamental principle governing the 
manpower policy was: 'to ensure that Hong Kong has a well-trained, positive and 
enterprising working population to meet the ever-changing manpower needs of Hong 
Kong, and to maintain our competitiveness in the international market'. To put this 
principle into practice, the Education and Manpower Branch (EMB) of the government 
provided the society with vocational education and training, and imported foreign 
workers to sustain the economic prosperity (Hong Kong Legislative Council, 5 
November 1997, p. 166). Based on the official definition, this study examines the 
development of manpower policy in Hong Kong by focussing on the policy changes in 
manpower development and labour importation. 
2. The Development of the Manpower Policy Network 
Traditional theories of interest group intermediation, including pluralism, 
corporatism, elitism and marxism (instrumental approach), place particular emphasis on 
the financial and economic resources controlled by business and their importance to' 'the 
economic performance, in order to explain the relations between the government and 
business (Smith, 1993, pp. 15-47). To some extent, the above argument provides a useful 
insight into understanding the impact of business on policy outcomes. In Hong Kong, the 
financial and economic resources of business always placed their organisations in a 
privileged position in terms of policymaking. However, I shall argue that the manpower 
policy network was fundamentally different from an entity in which the business groups 
used their financial and economic resources to lobby and influence the government. 
Instead of this, the network was embedded in the nature 'of Hong Kong colonial state. 
Moreover, it was created not because of the power of business, but because the shared 
views between the government and business emerged as a result of economic difficulties 
during the 1970s. 
The growth of the network was highly related to the colonial nature of Hong Kong. 
Cheng (1992, pp. 98-99) argued that: 'the notion oflegitimacy is particularly significant 
for the government of Hong Kong', which was basically 'in a state oflegitimacy deficit'. 
The legitimacy problem inevitably arose because of the undemocratic colonial nature of 
Hong Kong goveniment. Under these circumstances, the government of Hong Kong 
particularly needed economic prosperity as one of the measures to maintain the \ 
legitimacy and stability of the regime. The success of the economy was important due to 
the fact that many people in Hong Kong were immigrants fleeing the political and 
economic turmoil in mainland China in the 1950s and the 1960s. Through the 
achievement of economic success, the Hong Kong government created a situation in 
which the people contrasted their living standards with the economic and social failures 
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exhibited next door by mainland China, and thus were willing to accept the colonial status 
quo. 
It was clear that: 'the economic perfonnance of Hong Kong was crucial to the 
stability of the colony' (interview with the leader of a trade union). The Hong Kong 
government prioritised the economic development over other issues. In order to develop a 
manpower policy to support economic growth, the co-operation of the business 
community was essential. Therefore, the major business groups like the HKGCC, the 
FHKI and the CMA were incorporated into the domain of manpower policymaking, and 
the government: 'paid special attention to their interests and worries (interview with the 
leader of a trade union). The business groups perfonned the roles of aggregating d~mands 
and channelling the views and interests of business to the government. They also helped 
to sell the agreed programmes to their members (McGregor, December 1977, pp. 3-4). 
Through the establishment of the manpower policy network, the government secured the 
co-operation of business groups in tenns of infonnation exchange in the policy process. 
Infonnation exchange was especially important in the light ofthe fact that the economy of 
Hong Kong wa's highly open, volatile and, to some extent, fragile (Macleod, 1995, p. 11). 
The business groups were 'the people who presumably knew how best to maintain the 
territory's seemingly fragile prosperity', and their participation in the policy process 
contributed to the potency of manpower policy. Moreover, through the network, the 
government was well versed in the interests and worries of business, and could take 
immediate actions to revive their economic confidence in the government (Ahmed, Tao 
Lai and Wilding, 1997, p. 3). 
Besides, the network was established not because of the power of business, but 
because of the development of a general agreement between the government and business 
on how to manage the labour force in the 1970s. The business groups had long lobbied the 
government for a more proactive manpower policy aimed at facilitating economic growth. 
However, a policy network did not develop until the 1970s when a consensus on 
" . 
manpower policy began to take shape among the government and business groups. This 
demonstrates the importance of consensus-building in the development of the network. In 
addition, the immediate reason for the growth of the consensus was the worsening 
economic situation of Hong Kong in this period. With the emergence of shared beliefs, 
the government and business groups were able to co-operate constantly in the making of 
manpower policy. 
As early as the 1960s, the business associations, including the FHKI and the CMA, 
called on the government to take a more active role in managing the labour market and to 
fonnulate a comprehensive system of manpower training under the government revenue 
and administration. They were increasingly aware that the industrial productivity of Hong 
.Kong needed to be upgraded, and that the whole economy would benefit from the 
establishment of a centralised vocational training system, which would supply a sufficient 
number of skilled workers for technology-intensive production. They pressurised the 
Chapter 7 The Development of Manpower Policy Network in Hong Kong 129 
government in the hope of setting up a governmentlbusiness committee to thrash out the 
issue (Advisory Committee on Diversification, 1979, pp. 4-5). They argued: . 
There is in the industrial infrastructure a major and vital area which Hong Kong has 
neglected and is still neglecting. It is technical education and industrial training for the 
young generation. This is an internal factor, over which we in Hong Kong have full 
control. .. As a result, the shortage of technicians and craftsman is becoming increasingly 
critical and, unless there will be some significant improvement in the near future, our rate 
of industrial expansion, and hence economic growth, may be slowed down apparently 
(Hong Kong Legislative Council, 7 October 1970, p. 41). 
Although the CMA and in particular the FHKI were powerful, with the membership 
I 
accounting for above 60 percent of total industrial outputs in Hong Kong and employing 
over 50 percent of the local manufacturing workers, they received only negative feedback 
from the government in the 1960s (Li, February 1988, p. 2; The Commerce and Industry 
Department, 1970, pp. 56-57). This was because a consensus between the government and 
. business on how to manage the labour force had not existed yet. This shows that the 
financial and economic resources controlled by business were not a major factor in 
determining the development of the network. Contrary to the demands made by the 
business groups, the government clung onto the traditional principle of positive 
non-intervention. It was maintained that the government should: 'leave the initiative to 
industries themselves' (Advisory Committee on Diversification, 1979, pp. 4-5). The 
principle oflaissez-faire was enshrined in the government and, therefore, it did not support 
a more proactive approach to manpower policy proffered by the business groups (Ng, 
1993, pp. 60-66). Without a clear consensus, the government distanced itself from the 
business and refused to set up a committee with their representatives to discuss how to 
implement a change to manpower policy. As a consequence, a government and business 
network did not develop in manpower policy in the 1960s. 
However, the 1970s saw the emergence of the network. The economic situation of 
Hong Kong worsened dramatically, which triggered the establishment of the network. In 
the face of economic obstacles, the government changed its posture, and a consensus 
began to grow rapidly among the government and business. During the 1970s, the harsh 
international trade protectionism seriously troubled export-oriented Hong Kong's 
economy. Trade restrictions increased in number and strength in the major trade partners 
of Hong Kong, including the United States, Britain and other European countries (Choi, 
1999, p. 143; HKGCC, June 1977, p. 17). Consequently, about 80 percent of domestic 
exports of garments and textiles, which were the major products of Hong Kong's 
manufacturing industry, were adversely affected by protectionist packages (HKGCC, 
August 1982, pp. 5-9). Meanwhile, regional competition and labour shortage aggravated 
the economic problems. Taiwan, South Korea and Singapore: 'had one by one jumped on 
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the export manufacturing bandwagon and presented Hong Kong with formidable 
competition' (Choi, 1999, p. 143). Besides, the problem oflabour and skill shortages for 
. 
construction and manufacturing industries fuelled big wage increases. The lack of 
well-trained workers also constrained the ability of business to resolve the economic 
difficulties by upgrading the technological level of production (HKGCC, May 1976, p. 
14). ,. 
The government was immensely concerned about the economic difficulties, which 
can be understood in the light of the colonial nature of Hong Kong. It responded by 
changing its attitudes towards manpower policy. Consensus began to take shape among 
the government and business. First, they thought it important to maintain the vigorous 
manufacturing industry, and economic diversification was regarded as the best way 
forward. They believed that the manufacturing industry: 'must continue to upgrade its 
products, increase productivity and improve quality standards' (McGregor, December 
1977, p. 5; FHKI, 2 November 1977, p. 2; Hong Kong Legislative Council, 5 October 
1977, pp. 7-9). Second, the economic difficulties demonstrated to the government that the 
laissez-faire paradigm no longer worked in the area of manpower policy and could not be 
.. 
reconciled with the need to move upmarket. As a result, the government deviated from the 
traditional principle of positive non-intervention, and accepted that it had a greater role to 
play in ensuring a sufficient supply of skilled workforce to facilitate economic 
diversification (FHKI, 2 November 1977, p. 2). The business groups, including the 
HKGCC primarily representing the British hongs (trade houses) and the others speaking 
for manufacturers like the FHKI and the CMA, completely supported the· new 
government's stance. They echoed the government's belief that the economic strategy of 
diversification was 'little more than empty words and phrases', unless a new policy was 
. 
made to guarantee the supply of 'suitably trained manpower to make these activities 
possible' (Hong Kong Legislative Council, 28 March 1979, p. 660). 
The growth of the consensus was important to ·the development of the manpower 
policy network. This was because the consensus cleared the ideological barrier for stable 
and closed governmentlbusiness relations to develop in the area of manpower policy. In 
fact~ as put by the former leader of the FHKI, the issue facing the government and business 
.in the 1970s was no longer on: 'whether the Government should be involved in industrial 
development but to what extent the involvement should be' (FHKI, 19 April 1978, p. 62). 
As the intervention in manpower policy to facilitate economic diversification became a 
clear agreement, the foundation for the government and business to co-operate in the 
policy process emerged. Therefore, a policy network developed. The major business 
groups like the HKGCC, the FHKI and the CMA were incorporated into the policy process 
through their access to the Advisory Committee on Diversification (ACD). They advised 
the government on: 'whether the process of diversification of the economy, with particular 
reference to ~e manufacturing sector, can be facilitated by the modification of existing 
policies or the introduction of new policies' (FHKI, 2 November 1977, p. 1). They were 
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also co-opted into the Vocational Training Council (VTC), whereby they could influence 
the policies on manpower training (Tang, 1990, p. 35). Besides the formal channels, they 
also established informal links with the EMB, through which both were in constant contact 
in the form of telephone meetings, conferences, luncheons, policy documents and the like 
(Miners, 1995, p. 188). 
From the above discussion, it has been demonstrated that the manpower policy 
network was distinctive because its establishment was less a consequence of the resources 
available to business than of other factors. There was a structural fac~or that significantly 
affected the development of the network. The network was embedded in the nature of 
Hong Kong's colonial regime, which needed the success of the economy for its stability 
and legitimacy. Besides, there was an immediate reason for the development of the 
network. During the 1'970s, in the face of the economic difficulties, a basic consensus on 
manpower policy began to grow between the government and business. This consensus 
created the network. 
3. The Nature of the Manpower Policy Network 
It has been shown that the manpower policy network came into existence during the 
1970s when' a proactive approach to manpower policy was widely accepted by the 
government and business. In this section, I shall argue that unlike normal pressure politics, 
the network was not fluctuating and open to change. Rather, it was stable, closed and fairly 
well integrated for two decades until the early 1990s. The stability and integration of the 
network were achieved by its three important. components: the limited number of 
participants; the widely accepted consensus on economic-oriented manpower policy; and 
the isolation of the network from labour's interests. 
3.1 The Limited Number of Participants 
The manpower policy network was stable and fairly well integrated. To some extent, 
its stability and cohesion depended on the limited number of participants. It primarily 
involved one government agency - the EMB, and three major business groups in Hong 
Kong - the HKGCC, the FHKI and the CMA (interview with a government official). 
Although the HKGCC was mainly representative of trade and commerce, especially of the 
. interests of British hongs (trade houses), whilst the FHKI and the CMA were the agents of 
industries, they were not competing forces. Chan (1998, p. 4) argued that the former: 'had 
more or less good working relations with the Chinese manufacturers', because it: 
'provided loans, marketing, shipping, insurance, technology and many other services to 
the manufacturers'. In other words, the interests of the HKGCC, the FHKI and the CMA 
were interconnected. Actually, within the policy network, they shared the same interests 
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and agendas in the making of manpower policy. They supported the increase in training 
facilities under the government's revenue and the importation of foreign workers in a bid 
to enhance Hong Kong's economic competitiveness (Christie, February 1989, p. 2; 
Rodwell, May 1989, p. 12; CMA, February 1986, p. 14; FHKI, 2 November 1977, p. 2; 
HKGCC, October 1977, p. 12). 
At the executive level, the EMB was a major government actor in the manpower 
policy network. Although other government agencies were occasionally involved in the 
network, they accepted the lead of the EMB in the making of manpower policy. For 
instance, in the sub-sector of vocational education and training, the Labour Department 
sometimes participated in the policy process, by: 'updating the EMB on the state of the 
labour market'. However, 'according to the government structure, the Labour Department 
was under the EMB and, therefore, it must accept the lead of the latter' (interview with a 
government official). Likewise, in the sub-sector of labour importation, the Security 
Branch, the Economic and Services Branch and the Labour DePru:tment took part in the 
process of policymaking from time to time. Since the importation of foreign workers was a 
complex issue that had policy implications for other sectors, such as the immigration 
control and labour abuse, the EMB needed the co-operation of other government agencies. 
However, according to a legislator, the EMB was the single government actor that was 
finally responsible for the details of the policy. The other government actors were 
co-operative but not competing for the lead (interview with a legislator). 
The limited number of participants affected the nature of the manpower policy 
network. It meant that it was easier for the government and business groups to reach and 
maintain a consensus on manpower policy over a relatively long period of time. And the 
consensus contributed to the stability and cohesion of the network. 
3.2 The Consensus and Stability of the Manpower Policy Network 
From the 1970s, a belief in economic-oriented manpower policy was widely 
accepted, if not by the general public arid labour, then by the government and business 
within the network. In the network, policies on technical education, vocational training 
and labour importation that could affect the labour market were explicitly linked with the 
pursuit of economic growth, through the enhancement of economic competitiveness and 
the control over labour costs. With a fairly high degree of consensus, the relations between 
the government and business groups were stable and integrated for two decades. 
In the policy network, there was a clear agreement on the values and goals of 
manpower policy. The ideal manpower policy was dedicated to the enhancement of Hong 
Kong's economic competitiveness and the success of its economy. In the policy process, 
the economic needs of Hong Kong took priority over other issues, such as the protection of 
labour. As Ng (1993, p. 73) argued: 
Chapter 7 The Development of Manpower Policy Network in Hong Kong 133 
In a way, labour policy has slowly lost its distinctiveness such that it now regularly 
. coincides with economic policy concerns. As a result, it has been alternatively labelled 
employment policy, manpower policy, human resource policy, or even education and . 
training policy. It has become increasingly an integral aspect of the complex organic, 
circuit of economic management in parallel to other pluralistic industrial societies. 
The importance of manpower to the survival and prosperity of Hong Kong's economy led 
a belief in economic-orientated manpower policy being widely accepted by the 
government and business. As the former Secretary for Education and Manpower (SEM) 
emphasised (Hong Kong Legislative Council, 17 July 1991, p. 3050): 
Hong Kong is devoid of natural resources. We have to rely mainly on our labour force to 
give impetus to economic development. A sustained shortage of manpower will limit the 
potential for economic growth. If we do not try our best to rectify the imbalance of supply 
and demand in the labour market, the social and economic development of Hong Kong 
will be impeded, and local and foreign new investment as well as reinvestment will also be 
adversely affected. 
Human r~sources were of particular significance to the performance of Hong Kong's 
economy. Therefore, the economic orientation of manpower policy became a clear 
agreement between the members of the p,olicy network (Advisory Committee on 
Diversification, 1979, p. 217). 
There was also a general agreement on how to achieve the economic goals of 
manpower policy. In the eyes of the government and business, vocational education and 
training were pivotal to the drive: 'to facilitate the process of diversification of economy' 
(Advisory CO?1mittee on Diversification, 1979, p. 219). They were used to increase Hong 
Kong's productivity and move into more sophisticated products (Hong Kong Legislative 
Council, 27 March 1980, p. 660). A plan for massive expansion of government-sponsored 
vocational education and trainjng was set out, which stated that: 'it is worth risking an 
( over-provision of places for education and training' (Advisory Committee on 
Diversification, 1979, p. 217; p. 244). Besides, the importation of foreign labour was also 
regarded as central to the enhancement of economic competitiveness and the pursuit of a 
healthy economy (Advisory Committee on Diversification, 1979, p. 322). ~ the policy 
network, it was commonly held that: 
, 
Where a particular sector of the economy carne under temporary pressure from excessive 
demand, there might be a case for bringing in additional capacity, in terms of both capital 
and labour ... to maintain our position in a particular export market of value' (Hong Kong 
Legislative Council, 13 April 1978, p. 816). 
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The government and business shared a view that labour importation was one of the 
solutions to the running of a healthy economy. It could make 'the production more 
competitive' and provide 'the economy with greater scope for growth', because it relieved 
economic bottlenecks and removed wage pressures on employers (Hong Kong Legislative 
Council, 17 July 1991, p. 3042). 
The EMB and business groups had a shared view on the parameters of manpower 
policy - for the sharpening of Hong Kong's economic competitive edge. There was also a 
general agre~ment on how to achieve the economic goals of policy. This consensus had the 
important effect of maintaining and integrating the relations between the government and 
business in the policy network. This was because it served the interests of the government 
and business, which needed economic prosperity for their survival. Therefore, they did not 
intend to break down the network. More importantly, the consensus contributed to the 
stability and integration of the network because it limited the range of controversy over 
manpower policy. Issues relating to the management of the labour market were reduced to 
simply technical and routine issues within the policy network (see CMA, January 1986, p. 
9-10; February 1986, p. 14). Take the immigration of foreign labour as an example. 
Although it was highly controversial in society, technical issues like how to effectively 
implement and monitor the labour importation scheme dominated the debate in the policy 
network. There was no questioning of the policy goals (Rodwell, 1989, pp. 12-14; Hong 
Kong Legislative Council, 7 November 1990, p. 315). As the range of controversy over 
manpower policy was limited in the political domain, the relations between the 
government and business groups tended to be stable and fairly well integrated between the 
1970s and the early 1990s. 
3.~ The Isolation of the Manpower Policy Network 
The manpower policy network was distinctive because of its isolation from the 
labour's interests. Pluralists suggest that the state is ne~tral and access to the state is 
relatively open (Jessop, 1983; Schmitter, 1974). However, in this case, access to the 
manpower policy network was highly restricted. Other interest groups, notably organised 
labour, were denied access to the network for two decades. The restricted membership of 
the network was not a consequence' of the power of business. Instead, the consensus 
between the government and business on manpower policy acted as a significant means of 
exclusion. It was extremely difficult for the trade unions that did not abide by the agreed 
values, agendas and options to penetrate into the policy network. 
Organised labour, including the Federation of Trade Unions (FTU), the 
Confederation of Trade Unions (CTU) and the Federation of Hong Kong and Kowloon 
Labour Unions (FLU), were strongly opposed to the labour importation scheme. They did 
not believe the economic justifications fO.r this manpower policy. They argued that the 
scheme deprived the local workers of their fair share of economic benefits in good times, 
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and threatened their job security (interview with the leader of a trade union). They claimed 
the need to be involved in the policy network. However, between the 1970s and the early 
1990s, the network was not open to them. The leader of a trade union pointed out that in 
the making oflabour importation policy, the EMB consulted only the business groups like 
the HKGCC, the FHKI and the CMA. It: 'did not regard the trade unions as legitimate 
interlocutors'. Therefore, the trade unions were left out in the cold (interview with the 
leader of a trade union). Another trade unionist also argued that organised labour: 'was not 
consulted by the government during the course of policymaking'. They: 'needed to battle 
for a seat in the consultative process, if only to voice out their objections directly to the 
labour importation policy' (interview with the leader of a trade union). 
'. In the manpower policy network, the EMB was not neutral but shared the belief with 
the business groups in economic-oriented manpower policy. This consensus was 
important in explaining why the trade unions were denied access to the manpower policy 
network. It acted as a significant means of exclusion in two perspectives. First, the 
problem of labour and skill shortages, inflation, and the labour importation policy were 
seen in the light of the consensus. They were construed as wholly economic issues, 
although they also had implications for the labour's living and working conditions, as 
argued by trade unionists (interview with the leader of a trade union). The Secretary for' 
Education and Manpower (SEM) maintained that the labour importation policy merely: 
'affected the development of Hong Kong's economy and went well beyond pu~ely labour 
considerations' (South China Morning Post, 5 July 1990). Therefore, there was no need to 
include the representatives of labour in the discussion of the issue. Hence, trade unions 
were excluded from the policy network. 
Second, the consensus made it extremely difficult for the trade unions to access the 
network, because the EMB and business groups wanted to maintain their agreements on 
the values, agendas and policy options. To avoid the politicisation of the issue of labour 
importation, they refused to include the trade unions, which tried to raise other values, 
problems and solutions, in the policy process. As a consequence, the trade unions were 
deliberately excluded from the policy network. A senior official of the EMB argued that: 
The consultation would not be appropriate because obviously there are other various 
interests. If you go and ask them [trade unions] whether we should import any labour, the 
answer is definitely 'No'. yve know the an.swer already (Adversario, September 1991, p. 
30). 
A former principal assistant Secretary for Education and Manpower elaborated the 
argument and emphasised:' 
But Government has to make up its mind on the level of quota that should be imposed. 
When you consult, you want to get something from it. If you don't expect to get any sort of 
/ 
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consensus out of the consultation exercise, you'd have to make a decision one way or 
another' (Adversario, September 1991, p. 30). 
Access to the manpower policy network was highly restricted not only in the 
sub-sector of labour importation but also in that of vocational education and training. In 
this sub-sector, the shared belief in the economic orientation of manpower policy also 
served as a means of restriction. The EMB believed that the 'training policies must 
accommodate the needs of economic development' (interview with the leader of a trade 
. union). Obviously: 'business associations were widely regarded as the organisations that 
had a good grasp of the difficulties faced by different economic sectors. And the business, 
not labour, was regarded as the primary users of the training facilities' (interview with the 
leader of a trade union). The consequence was that the business groups like the HKGCC, 
the FHKI and the CMA were incorporated by the EMB into the domain ofp,olicymaking, 
through the Vocational Training Council (VTC). On the other hand, the representatives of 
labour were marginalised (VTC, 2002; interview with a trade unionist). 
The stability and continuity of the manpower policy network resulted, to a large 
degree, from its restricted membership. The restricted membership meant that the groups 
involved in the policy network did not change frequently. Moreover, the trade unions that 
did not abide by the agreed values, agendas and policy options were automatically 
excluded from the policy network. Therefore, the government and business' groups were 
able to de-politicise the domain ofpolicymaking over a relatively long period of time, and 
to contain conflicts in the process of decision-making. As a consequence, between the 
1970s and the early 1990s, the policy network was stable. 
So far, it has been argued that the network covering the EMB, the HKGCC, the 
FHKI and the CMA in the area of manpower policy was special in a variety of dimensions. 
First, it was stable, closed and cohesive between the 1970s and the early 1990s. Second, 
only a limited number of actors had representation in the network. At the executive level, 
the EMB was the major government actor in the network. Other government actors 
accepted its lead. The business associations that participated in the network were not 
competing forces, but had interconnected interests. Third, there was a fairly high degree of 
. consensus within the policy network. The belief in economic-oriented manpower policy 
was widely accepted by the government and business. Fourth, due to this shared belief, 
access to the manpower policy network was highly restricted. The trade unions not 
subscribing to the consensus were automatically excluded from the network. The network 
was distinctive, but how did it affect the manpower policy from the 1970s? The following 
section will tum to analyse the impact of the network on manpower policy. 
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4. The Impact of the Network on Manpower Policy 
In this section, I shall demonstrate that the manpower policy network significantly 
affected the development of manpower policy in Hong Kong between the 1970s and the 
early 1990s. It affected the manpower policy through the mechanisms of defining the 
nature of problems and privileging policy options favourable to economic interests. 
Meanwhile, it constantly excluded trade unions and their agendas from the domain of 
policymaking. As a result, the manpower policy was conspicuously biased towards the 
economic interests of the government and business, whereas the interests of labour were 
inevitably ignored. 
First of all, between the 1970s and the early 1990s, the manpower policy network 
was important in the development of manpower policy because in the policy process its 
shared views defined what problems existed and what actions were to be taken to deal with 
the problems. In other words, the consensus determined the agenda within the policy 
process. 'In doing so, it enSUred that the interests of the government and business - the 
economic growth of Hong Kong - were served. 
It has been argued that the EMB and business groups had a consensus on manpower 
policy, which was dedicated to the enhancement of economic competitiveness and the 
pursuit of economic growth. Under this consensus, any trends in the labour market 
inimical to Hong Kong's competitiveness were regarded as problems that warranted the 
consideration of government's actions. For example, from the 1970s, regional competition 
and protectionist restraints demonstrated that Hong Kong's economy needed to diversify 
and move upmarket (CMA, February 1986, p. 14). However, the lack of workers who 
were sufficiently educated to acquire new skills and change to new technology crippled 
the drive to upgrade industrial production. This signalled to the EMB and business groups 
that it was necessary for the government to take actions to redress this problem in the 
labour market (CMA, January 1986, pp. 9-10; March 1986, p. 11). 
Similarly, the trend of labour shortage in the 1980s was seen in the light of the 
economic-oriented principle within the policy network. It was argued that: 'the 
combination of a tight labour market with rising wages jeopardizes the competitiveness of 
, Hong Kong products and the attractiveness of Hong Kong to investors'. Since the tight 
labour market was regarded as an issue hampering the economic competitiveness of Hong 
Kong, the government's action was justified. The EMB and business groups believed that: 
'unless we take concrete steps to break the wage-push inflationary cycle, we will never 
solve the problem' (Hong Kong Legislative Council, 4 July 1990, p. 1907). The 
government's intervention in the labour market in the form of reducing the labour costs 
was, however, against the wishes of workers. Obviously, trade unions argued that the 
problem oflabour shortage did not exist. In their eyes: 'Hong Kong has in fact always had 
~o face a vacancy rate, and its existence is a normality'. Moreover, 'the current level of 
Chapter 7 The Development of Manpower Policy Network in Hong Kong 138 
workers' wages is in fact not too high' (Hong Kong Legislative Council, 4 July 1990, pp. 
1904-1905). They preferred the government to let the labour market re-adjust itself, but 
their demands went unheeded in the policy process (interview with the leader of a trade 
union). By neglecting the arguments made by the trade unions, the economic interests of 
the government and business were served . 
. In the making of manpower policy, the consensus defined not only what problems 
existed but what options were available. Policy options that could tackle the problems in 
the labour market and restore Hong Kong's economic competitiveness were acceptable to 
the government and business groups in the policy network. For example, the government 
and business groups emphasised the importance of vocational education and training, 
because 'they believed that the policy option could accelerate economic diversification and 
improve Hong Kong's economic competitiveness. They argued that: 'vocational training 
is extremely important for providing the manpower necessary for the continuing 
development of industry, commerce and services' (FHKI, 22 August 1979, p. 8; Hong 
Kong Legislative Council, 6 January 1982, p. 324). As a consequence, the EMB in the 
1980s liberalised its hitherto restrained role in technical education and vocational training, 
and began the expansion of the training system (Ng, 1993, p. 66) .. The expansion 
programmes increased the total number of technical institutes to eight in 1987. By 1988, 
full-time and part-time places in technical institutes numbered 11,500 and 50,500, which 
amounted to an increase of 158 percent and 41 percent respectively since the VIC was 
established in 1983. Moreover, the number of vocational training centres increased to 16 
by 1988, and the annual numbers of training places rose to 12,000 full-time and 5,000 part 
time (Vocational Training Council, 1 ?87). 
In the face oflabour shortage and inflation, the EMB and business groups believed it 
appropriate to import foreign workers to make up the shortfall. Although the policy option 
was highly controversial, the government and business believed that it was legitimate and 
justifiable because it could lessen the problem of labour and skill shortages and: 
'safeguard the forward development of Hong Kong's economy' (Hong Kong Legislative 
Council, 17 July 1991, p. 3043; Education and Manpower Branch, 1992, p. 3). Therefore, 
the EMB and business groups ignored the labour's opposition, and pushed ahead with the 
policy. In the 1980s, in addition to the importation of professionals and domestic helpers, 
the EMB formulated the quota-based General Labour Importation Scheme (Labour 
Department, 1995, pp. 30-31; South China Morning Post, 4th August 1989). Under the 
general scheme, 25,000 skilled, semi-skilled and experienced foreign labour at the 
technician, supervisor, craftsman and operative levels was allowed to work in Hong Kong 
at anyone time (Labour Department, 1991, p. 12). The importation of foreign workers 
served the interests of the government and business, because it helped the business to , 
remove wage pressures, and safeguarded the growth of Hong Kong's economy. 
Second, the manpower policy network was also important in the development of 
manpower policy because it prevented problems raised by trade unions and their 
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alternative options from entering the domain of policymaking. Since the government and 
business were i!ltegrated and united around the principle of economic-led manpower 
policy, they were able to manipulate the agenda. In fact, the network constantly kept 
labour's concern and their policy proposals off the agenda within the policy process. As a 
result, between the 1970s and the early 1990s, the manpower policy was biased towards 
the advancement of economic interests at the expense of labour protection. This 
mechanism of exclusion was particularly important in the making of labour importation 
policy, in view of the fact that the trade unions were strongly opposed to the idea oflabour 
importation. 
. Trade unions like the FTU, the CTU and the FLU uniformly disagreed with and 
raised problems about the policy option of labour importation. They argued that the 
importation of foreign labour had severe social impacts. Itjeopardised the position oflocal 
workers, as they were replaced by imported foreign labour (South China Morning Post, 13 
February 1989). It opened the floodgates of abuses of foreign labour by unscrupulous 
employers (interview with the leader of a trade union). Moreover, the trade unions 
emphasised the other problem - the great impact of labour importation on the local 
workers' incomes. It was argued that labour importation depressed wages, and affected:' 
'the improvement to the livelihood ofthe working class' (Hong Kong Legislative Council, 
4 July 1990, pp. 1905-1906). Worry about these social problems was not restricted to the 
trade unions, but was also broadly shared in society (South China Morning Post, 20 March 
1989). 
However, the problems of labour importation that were raised by trade unions could 
not get onto the agenda within the policy process .. In the policy network, the EMB and 
business groups agreed on the range of existing problems - the problems inimical to the 
economic c.ompetitiveness of Hong Kong. The social impacts of labour importation did 
not fall into this category. More importantly, labour importation was conducive to the 
" 
economic growth of Hong Kong, which was central to the economic-oriented principle. 
Therefore, the policy network repeatedly dismissed the existence of these problems. It 
suggested that these problems were neither present nor serious enough to justify a 
substantial policy change. Contrary to trade unions, the EMB and business groups did not 
believe the labour importation scheme jeopardising the position of local workers. They 
argued that the scheme did not 'significantly drag down wages for locals', because 
employers were required to 'pay the same to employ overseas contract workers as they 
would to employ comparable local workers' (Rodwell, 1989, p. 13; South China Morning 
Post, 31 May 1990). In their eyes, there was sufficient protection for local workers, by 
requiring 'all the applicants to demonstrate that they have made an effort to recruit locally 
and fail to fill their vacancies' (South China Morning Post, 31 May 1990). The policy 
network did admit some employers abused the system oflabour importation. Bu! it argued 
that the situation was not grave and thus large-scale change was unnecessary. The 
problems of labour importation were reduced to only: 'a matter of building sufficient 
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safeguards' (Adversario, September 1991, pp. 29-30). In short, the trade unions were 
opposed to labour importation and raised some problems about it. However, the policy 
network excluded these problems from the agenda within the policy process .. 
The trade unions also suggested alternative options to replace labour importation. 
Nevertheless, the policy network dominated the domain of policymaking and restrained 
these options from getting onto the agenda. The Christian Industrial Committee (CIC), a 
prominent trade union in'Hong Kong, suggested raising salaries and improving working 
conditions. The Confederation of Trade Unions (CTU) recommended automation (South 
China Morning Post, 8 April 1989). In the policy network, these alternative optio'ns, in 
comparison to labour importation and vocational training, were defined as either 
infeasible or insufficient to allay the problems of labour and skill shortages. Wage 
adjustment was regarded as infeasible because it would fuel production costs and inflation, 
and cause hi,gh turnover (CMA, January 1989, p. 27; Hong Kong Legislative Council, 17 
July 1990, p. 3042). Moreover, the gove111l11ent and business emphasised that advanced 
machinery could not be adopted in many economic sectors. Therefore, automation was 
defined as insufficient to relieve the problem of labour and skill shortages and, again, 
excluded from the agenda (Rodwell, 1989, p. 13; Hong Kong Legislative Council, 17 July 
1991, p. 3049). 
It has been demonstrated that the network dominated the policy process. In the 
policy network, there was a consensus which determined that labour and skill shortages 
affecting the economic competitiveness of Hong Kong were serious problems with which 
the network had to deal. Under the consensus, vocational training and labour importation 
that could restore the economic competitiveness were acceptable solutions. On the other 
hand, the policy network ensured that other problems and solutions suggested by trade 
unions were not conceived of during the course of policymaking. As a result, betWeen the 
1970s and the early 1990s, the manpower policy was tilted in favour of the economic 
interests at the expense ofthe labour's ones. The former leader of the United Democrats of 
Hong Kong argued that the formulation of manpower policy: 'invariably involves the 
question of identification and espousal of certain social values'. In Hong Kong, economic 
growth was always high on the government's list of priorities, whilst labour had to bear the 
adverse effects of the economic-oriented manpower policy, such as labour importation. In 
effect, the government: 'trade[ d] the principle 'of social equity simply for economic 
prosperity' (Hong Kong Legislative Council, 29 January 1992, p. 1602). 
Finally, the network affected the manpower policy by excluding trade unions from 
the domain of policymaking. In other words, the trade unions and their voice of opposition 
were marginalised in the policy process. It has been discussed in the previous section that 
access to the manpower policy network was highly restricted. The trade unions that did not 
abide by the consensus were automatically excluded from the policy network. This is hot 
to say that the trade unions, such as the FTU, the CTU, the FLU and the CIC, desisted from 
challenging the manpower policy, especially the labour importation scheme. In fact, in the 
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second half of the 1980s and the early, 1990s, they organised an array of public campaigns 
in a bid to drum up the public support for their cause (interviews with trade unionists). 
However, as they could not access the policy network, their public campaigns did not pose 
a serious challenge to its decisions on manpower .policy. The leader of a trade union 
pointed out: 
As the government did not regard us [trade unions] as legitimate interlocutors in the 
making of manpower policy, the only thing we could do was to keep voicing out our 
opinions and concern over labour importation through media, petitions and 
demonstrations. .. Apparently, our measures were not sufficient to persuade the 
government to change the policy. The business had access to the government and was very 
influential. As a consequence, the government continued to make policies in favour of 
economic interests (interview with the leader of a trade union). 
All in all, between the 1970s and the early 1990s, the network covering the EMB and 
business groups dominated the domain of manpower policymaking. It was stable, closed 
and fairly well integrated over this period, which was achieved by the following factors: a 
limited number of participants; a consensus on economic-oriented manpower policy; and 
highly restricted membership. The network was important in the development of 
manpower policy. It affected the policy through the mechanisms of defining what 
problems existed and what options were acceptable. It also prevented other problems and 
alternative solutions raised by trade unions from getting onto the agenda, and marginalised 
the trade unions in the policy process. The existence of the network explains why the 
manpower policy was biased towards the advancement of economic interests, whilst the 
interests of labour were generally overlooked. 
Yet, in spite of the fact that the manpower policy network was strong enough to 
dominate the domain of policymaking for two decades, the last part of this chapter will 
argue that the policy network contained some structural defects. These structural defects 
did not destabilise the relations between the government and business associations during 
a period of economic growth and buoyant jobs market. But they would explode once the 
political-economic conditions substantially changed. The manpower policy network was 
significantly different from the curriculum policy network that was analysed in Chapters 5 
and 6, and these differences made it much weaker. I shall now highlight these structural 
weaknesses. 
5. The Structural Weaknesses of the Manpower Policy 
Network 
Despite the apparent consensus within the manpower policy network, it contained a 
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number of deficiencies. It was not as integrated as the curriculum policy network. In the 
manpower policy network, there was fundamental agreement between the EMB and 
business groups on the values and goals of manpower policy. As discussed earlier, both the 
government and business groups believed that manpower policy should be dedicated to 
the enhancement of Hong Kong's economic competitiveness and economic growth. 
However, there were some differences between the government and business on what 
should be done and as to what extent the interests of labour should be sacrificed in the 
pursuit of economic growth. Although these differences did not stem from the deep 
ideological divergence that existed among the major actors, they could create internal 
divisions within the policy network. 
The first of these differences lay in the durability of the labour importation scheme. 
Although the government and business had a fundamental consensus on the use of labour 
importation to sharpen Hong Kong's competitive edge, there was no agreement on the 
durability of this strategy. The EMB of the government regarded the labour importation 
policy as 'a temporary measure' to develop the economy at a time when it was hardly hit 
by the problem oflabour and skill shortages. It believed that in the longer run: 'sustained 
productivity growth, coupled with flexibility of adjustment in the labour market, provides 
the only real and lasting solution' (Hong Kong Legislative Council, 14 October 1987, p. 
62). By contrast, the business groups like the HKGCC, the FHKI and the CMA argued that 
the government: 'should allow the immigration on a relatively long-term basis', in order to: 
'safeguard the forward development of Hong Kong's economy' (Hong Kong Legislative 
Council, 13 April 1978, p. 816; 17 July 1991, p. 3043). This disagreement was a cause of 
potential conflicts over policy when the business groups urged the government to renew or 
enlarge the arrangements of labour importation (Ho, 1992, pp. 200-203). 
Of greater significance was the difference between the government and business 
groups on the extent to which the workers' interests should be sacrificed in the pursuit of 
economic growth. This is not to say that the government and business groups did not have 
a consensus on the values and goals of manpower policy. In fact, as discussed earlier, they 
fundamentally agreed on the economic orientation of manpower policy. There was a 
universal acceptance that the enhancement of economic competitiveness should be given a 
priority in decision-making. However, they had little agreement on how to deal with the 
workers' interests in the making of manpower policy, especially when the workers' 
interests were incompatible with the economic ones. Obviously, the business groups gave 
their unreserved support to the notion that the welfare of labour should be subservient to 
the pursuit of economic growth (Hong Kong Legislative Council, 17 July 1991 ~ p. 3048). 
They argued that 'Hong Kong is always a business city' and must 'go for growth'. To them, 
the sacrifice of workers' interests in the pursuit of economic growth was completely 
justifiable because: 'a high economic growth rate will bring long-term benefits to all the 
people of Hong Kong' (Hong Kong Legislative Council, 29 January 1992, p. 1624). The 
position of the EMB was subtler, and it was more concerned than its business counterparts 
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about the social impacts of manpower policy. It resembled the business groups in 
prioritising the economic aspect of manpower policy. But unlike the business groups, in 
pursuing economic development through manpower policy, it considered limiting the 
damage to local workers (Hong Kong Legislative Council, 17 July 1991, p. 3050; 17 
October 1991, p. 71). Therefore, there were occasional skirmishes between the EMB and 
business on the size oflabour importation (see FHKI, July 1990, pp. 9-10; HKGCC, 1989, 
p. 2; South China Morning Post, 7 April 1989). If these differences began to fester, it 
would undermine the general agreement on how to achieve the goal of economic 
development and even the integration of the policy network. 
Nevertheless, these differences neither surfaced nor destabilised the manpower 
policy network amid rapid economic growth and buoyant labour market between the 
1970s and the early 1990s. Faced with the acute problem oflabour and skill shortages and 
a situation of full employment, the EMB sidelined its concern over the durability oflabour 
importation and the possible social impacts of manpower policy. During this period, the' 
most pressing issue in the policy process was to relieve the problem of labour and skill 
shortages as quickly as possible. The vigorous labour market meant that the protection of 
labour's interests was not a major issue (interviews with senior government officials). In 
this situation, a clear agreement on the goals and a general consensus on how to achieve 
them were established between the government and business within the policy network. 
Based on this consensus, the policy network was stable and fairly well integrated. Yet the 
consensus became increasingly difficult to maintain as the economic and political 
circumstances substantially changed: In the 1990s, the unemployment rate climbed and 
the relative power of trade unions sharply increased, which greatly impinged· on the 
consensus and the integration of the manpower policy network. This will be discussed in 
the next chapter. 
The manpower policy network was also relatively weak because, unlike the 
curriculum policy network, the relations between the EMB and business groups were not 
highly institutionalised. Although access to the network was restricted because the 
representatives of labour who did not abide by the agreed values, goals and options were 
automatically excluded, the network lacked an institutional basis that provided a further 
means of exclusion. The Advisory Committee on Diversification (ACD), on which the 
business groups like the HKGCC, the FHKI and the CMA were represented, provided the 
focus for government and business interaction in the 1970s. However, it was an ad hoc 
institution, and dissolved in the early 1980s (FHKI, 2 November 1977, p. 1). The 
membership of the Vocational Training Council (~TC) that advised the EMB on the 
policies on vocational education and training was exclusive to the HKGCC, the CMA and 
the FHKI (VTC, March 2002; interview with a government official). Yet the VTC was 
confined in the sub-sector of manpower training. It did not provide an institutional cover 
for the government I business relations in the sub-sector of labour importation. This 
weakness did not create great difficulty for the manpower policy network in excluding 
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radical groups when the consensus was strong and the opposition was weak. However, it 
became increasingly difficult for the network to keep the trade unions out in the 1990s as 
they launched ferocious attack on manpower policy and the consensus began to waver in 
the face of changing political-economic circumstances. 
A further weakness of the manpower policy network was that it was not as vertically 
independent of the actors above it as the curriculum policy network. The Governor did 
playa role in manpower policy. This limited the extent to which the network could seal 
itself off and de-politicise the domain of policymaking, particularly when the Governor 
did not subscribe to the consensus between the EMB and business groups. So, what was 
the role of the Governor? In the process of policymaking, the EMB in close consultation 
with the business associations was responsible for identifying and defining problems, and 
initiating policy proposals. Normally, the Governor intervened at an advanced stage and 
had a final say on the policy (South China Morning Post, ~ 0 May 1989; 29 May 1990). A 
member of the Legislative Council pointed out: 
In my understanding, the policy on labour importation must have gone through the 
Governor-in-Council, before the government finally took the decision. So who was the 
policymaker? I think that the EMB was the one identifying the problem of labour and skill 
shortages and initiating the arrangements of labour importation. At the last stage, the 
policy proposals were submitted to the Governor for final approval. With the Governor's 
blessing, the EMB fmalised the policies and put them into effect (interview with a member 
of the Legislative Council). 
It was inevitable that the Governor, as a final decision-maker, had significant influence on 
manpower policy. Sometimes the Governor even used this influence to intervene at an 
earlier stage in the policy process, as what happened in the middle of 1990s (next chapter). 
Again, the influence of the Governor did not destabilise the manpower policy network 
between the 1970s and the early 1990s. This was because from MacLehose through to 
Wilson, the Governor clearly supported the agreement between the government and 
business on the economic orientation of manpower policy (MacLehose, 1979, pp. 20-25; 
Wilson, 1990, pp. 5-7). Yet once the Governor began to question the existing policy line 
during the course of de-colonisation, this weakness would become a major destabilising 
factor. The potential for rapid politicisation of ~e policy area was great, as the existing 
consensus would break down, and the Governor, the administration and business groups 
would propose different policies. 
In short, once the political-economic conditions of Hong Kong changed, the 
structural deficiencies of the manpower policy network would worsen. At that time, it 
would be very difficult to maintain the network. 
/' 
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6. Conclusion 
Manpower policy in Hong Kong between the 1970s and the early 1990s was made 
'within the confines of a stable, closed and fairly well integrated policy network. This 
policy network included the Education and Manp~wer Branch (EMB) of the government 
and the major business, groups in Hong Kong - the Hong Kong General Chamber of 
Commerce (HKGCC), the Federation of Hong Kong Industries (FHKI) and the Chinese 
Manufacturers Association (CMA). They developed a shared view of the values, goals and 
options of manpower policy, and dominated the domain of policymaking 
It is clear from this study of manpower policy that the manpower policy network had 
something more than an entity in which the business groups simply used their economic 
and financial resources to lobby and exert influence on the government. It was created, not 
because of the power of the business, but because of the colonial nature of Hong Kong and 
the economic difficulties facing the territory in the 1970s. The undemocratic colonial 
status of Hong Kong meant that the government inherently lacked legitimacy and 
particularly needed a successful economy to uphold the stability and legitimacy of the 
regime. In order to develop the economy, the goverrurient co-opted the business 
associations into policymaking. Through the establishment of the policy network, the 
government secured the co-operation of the business in tenns of infonnation exchange in 
the making of policy. Moreover, through the network, the government was attuned to the 
interests and worries of the business, and thus could take immediate actions to revive their 
economic faith. Besides this structural factor, th~ immediate reason for the establishment 
of the network was the economic difficulties facing Hong Kong in the 1970s. The 
. economic hardship meant that the government had to intervene in manpower policy to 
give a fresh impetus to economy, and a consensus between the government and business 
began to take shape. It was only when a shared view of manpower policy began to emerge 
that the policy network developed. In other words, the development of the network was a 
consequence of consensus-building. 
Unlike nonnal pressure politics, the manpower policy network was distinctive 
because it was stable, closed and fairly well integrated for two decades. The stability and 
integration of the network were achieved by a number of factors. First, in the network, the 
participants were limited, which meant that a consensus on broad goals was relatively easy 
to reach. Second, between the government and business groups, there was a shared view 
on the values and goals of manpower policy, which was dedicated to the enhancement of 
economic competitiveness in the face of trade protectionism and regional competition. 
They also had a general agreement on how to achieve the goals, through the expansion of 
vocational training and the importation of foreign labour. The consensus contributed to the 
stability and integration of the network because with it, the issues of manpower policy 
were largely de-politicised and seen as technical issues in the policy process. Third, access 
.' 
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to the network was highly restricted, and the consensus acted as an effective means of 
exclusion. The trade unions that did not abide by the shared views of manpower policy 
were automatically excluded from the network. As a result, the groups involved in the 
network did not change frequently, and the government and business groups were able to 
de-politicise the domain of policymaking. 
The case of manpower also reveals that the policy network covering the EMB and 
business groups significantly affected the manpower policy in Hong Kong. In other words, 
the nature of the manpower policy network was important in explaining the development 
of manpower policy from the 1970s. The network affected the policy through the 
mechanisms of defining what problems existed and what policy options were acceptable. 
This demonstrates the importance, within the policy network, of its shared views on 
manpower policy. The consensus on economic-orientated manpower policy determined 
that the issues in the labour market crippling the economic competitiveness of Hong Kong, 
notably the labour and skill shortages since the 1970s, were serious problems that 
warranted the government's intervention. In order to revitalise the economy, the expansion 
of vocational education and training, and the importation of foreign labour were regarded 
as acceptable policies. The network also influenced the manpower policy by preventing 
other problems and alternative options raised by trade unions from getting onto the agenda. 
The network insisted that the problems of labour importation either did not exist or was 
not serious enough to justify a substantial change. Alternative solutions raised by the trade 
unions were defined as infeasible or insufficient to allay the problem of labour and skill 
shortages. The policy process was far from neutral, and the policy outcomes were biased 
towards economic interests at the expense of the workers' interests as a result. Finally, by 
excluding the trade unions from the network, the radical groups opposed to the policy 
were marginalised and thus could not pose a challenge to the network and its decisions. 
, 
In spite ofthe fact that the manpower policy netWork was strong enough to dominate 
the domain of policymaking, it contained a number of problems that would explode as 
political and economic circumstances changed. It is clear from this study that the 
manpower policy network was, to a large extent, different f~om the curriculum policy 
network, and these differences made it much weaker. It lacked the integration of the 
curriculum policy network. Although there was a shared view on the values and goals of 
manpower policy and some agreement on how to achieve them, there were differences 
between the EMB and the business on the durability of labour importation, and on the 
extent to which the interests of workers should be sacrificed. Moreover, unlike the 
curriculum policy network, the manpower policy network lacked an institutional means of 
exclusion, and it was not independent of the Governor. Rather, the Governor had a role to 
play in the policy process. If he used his power, he was able to influence the policy 
outcomes. All of these weaknesses were important, but they did not de-stabilise the 
network during a period of rapid economic growth and vigorous labour market. In the face 
of labour and skill shortages and full employment, the consensus was strong and the 
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opposition was weak. Nevertheless, the network had the seeds of its own destruction 
embedded in its make-up. Once the political and economic circumstances dramatically 
changed, as what happened in the 1990s, these seeds of destruction would undermine the 
network and cause substantial changes to manpower policy. This will be discussed in the 
next chapter. 
Chapter 8 The Decline of the Manpower Policy Network 
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.This chapter will examine the decline of the economic-oriented manpower policy 
network that contained the Education and Manpower Branch (EMB) of the government 
and the major business associations during the 1990s, and how this decline affected the 
development of manpower policy in Hong Kong. It will argue that the structural 
weakness of the manpower policy network prevented it from being a major factor in 
policy change. This structural weakness meant that the network was unable to survive the 
political and economic change of Hong Kong, which mostly occurred during the 1990s 
and triggered a -great deal of pressures for change in manpower policy. In fact, the 
network had disintegrated by the middle of the 1990s. Due to this decline, it could not 
mediate the external pressures for change and lost its influence on policy outcomes. 
Therefore, the contextual factors were more important than the network in determining 
the course of change in manpower policy. 
In the 1990s, the economic-oriented manpower policy network was subject to 
increasing challenge. This chapter will begin by examining why this challenge occurred 
and how it affected the policy network. In the first section, I shall argue that the challenge 
was a consequence of major change in the political and economic conditions of Hong 
Kong 4uring the colonial transition. In the 1990s, the state of labour market in Hong 
Kong worsened markedly in the wake of economic re-structuring and integration with 
mainland China. The growing problem of unemployment stoked the trade unions' 
opposition to the economic-oriented network and its decisions on manpower policy. 
Besides, the network was under the influence of political liberalisation in Hong Kong. 
The development of representative government affected the distribution of power in the 
territory, and greatly strengthened the position of trade unions that put the network under 
unprecedented pressure. Tl}.e challenge to the network was also closely related to another 
change in the political picture of Hong Kong. As the end of colonialism approached, the 
. 
British policy towards Hong Kong shifted from prioritising stability through economic 
success to making a graceful exit and popular policies in the immediate years before the 
handover. This transformation threatened the very basis of the economic-oriented 
network. . 
The second section will show that the weak manpower policy network was not 
important in the development of manpower policy in the 1990s, because it contained the 
seeds of its own ~estruction. This structural weakness meant that the network was highly 
susceptible to the external pressures for change and was unable to survive the contextual 
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change. There was an explosion in the structural problems within the network, triggered 
by contextual change, which eventually undermined the network. First, the stability of the 
network heavily relied on whether or not the Governor supported the economic-oriented 
principle of manpower policy. However, Governor Patten, who was influenced by the 
change in the Bri~ish policy towards Hong Kong, no longer subscribed to this value and 
removed decision-making from the network. Second, as a consequence of the growing 
. problem of unemployment, the latent differences between the EMB and business on 
manpower policy surfaced and widened. The consensus within the network rapidly broke' 
down and internal divisions developed. Third, the network was weak because there was a 
low degree of institutionalisation. When the consensus broke down and trade unions 
gained in political strength, it did not have a further means of exclusion. Hence, the trade 
unions penetrated the domain of policymaking and further diluted the network. 
The third section will examine how the collapse of the network affected the 
trajectory of policy change. It will argue that the network had disintegrated by the 
mid-1990s and lost its influence on policy outcomes. As the Governor increased his role in 
the policy process, it was difficult for the network to delay or manipulate the direction of 
policy change. Moreover, as the consensus broke down and the trade unions accessed the 
policy process, the network could not mediate the external pressures by defining the nature 
of problems and privileging the existing policy. Nor could it limit the extent of policy 
change through the exclusion of trade unions, radical issues and alternative solutions from 
the policy process. In short, the contextual change and the concomitant pressures led to a 
politicisation of the policy area. As a consequence, manpower policy that had been 
conspicuously biased towards economic interests at the expense of workers' welfare 
substantially changed and became more evenly balanced in the middle of the 1990s. 
Although there was no general shift to a labour-oriented manpower policy. there were an 
increasing number of provisions being made to safeguard the interests of workers. 
1. Political and Economic Change and Challenges to the 
Manpower Policy Network 
In the 1990s, the economic-oriented network covering the EMB and major business 
associations was subject to many challenges. This chapter will begin by examining why 
these challenges occurred and what impact they had on the policy network. It has been 
argued in the last chapter that the establishment and success of the policy network was 
based on the colonial nature of Hong Kong and its vigorous labour market. However, the 
political and economic conditions of Hong Kong have massively changed since the 
signing of the Sino-British Joint Agreement in 1984, and these changes were particularly 
explicit in the latter part of transition during the 1990s. This section will argue that the 
challenges to the network were a consequence of these contextual changes - the 
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vicissitudes oflabour market, the development of representative government and the end 
of colonialism - and these shifts in contexts eroded the basis of the network and its 
economic-oriented manpower policy. 
1.1 Change in Labour Market, New Problems and Intense Worker's 
Opposition 
Chapter seven argued that full employment in the 1970s and the 1980s led to a 
belief in economic-oriented manpower policy being widely accepted in Hong Kong. The 
chance of unemployment was remote so policymakers and even workers did not pay 
enough attention to the labour side of manpower policy. However, in the 1990s, the 
economic-oriente'd network was subject to increasing challenge because of a change in 
the labour market of Hong Kong, which itself was an economic consequence of the 
colonial transition. The vicissitudes of the labour market affected the manpower policy 
network by presenting it with new problems and uncertainty. 
As a consequence of the colonial transition, the state oflabour market in Hong Kong 
deteriorated in the 1990s. The signing of the Sino-British Joint Agreement, which stated 
that the sovereignty of Hong Kong would be restored to China in 1997, exacerbated and 
accelerated the economic integration between mainland China and Hong Kong. Since the 
early 1980s, the manufacturing sector of Hong Kong economy has continuously moved to 
the vast hinterland of China, especially the Pearl River Delta, in an attempt to lower the 
production costs. Meanwhile, Hong Kong has rapidly shifted from a labour-intensive 
manufacturing centre to a capital-intensive service hub (Ip, 1997, p. 170). This ongoing 
process of economic re-structuring has had far-reaching implications for the labour 
market of Hong Kong. It meant that the manufacturing sector remaining in Hong Kong 
had surplus labour, and that a large number of surplus manufacturing workers had to 
change their jobs to the service sector. 
Yet the skills and experience of many redundant manufacturing workers were not 
readily transferable, and the expansion of service sector could not keep pace with the 
demise of the manufacturing sector. As a result, in the early 1990s, the problem of 
unemployment began to surface, and it particularly worsened from 1995 (South China 
Morning Post, 20 April 1995). The unemployment rate sharply rose from 2.8 percent in 
the first quarter of 1995 to 3.6 percent in November. The level of 3.6 percent meant 
unemployment hitting a record high, which was only a faction below the rate of 3.7 
percent in 1984, when the Hong Kong economy was hard hit by the political uncertainty 
about the future status of Hong Kong (HKGCC, December 1995, p. 39: South China 
Morning Post, 18 August 1995). Although, theoretically speaking, unemployment at the 
level of3.6 percent was by no means serious, it was a major issue and actually 'provoked 
much collective hand-wringing' in Hong Kong, because the people were used to a very 
low unemployment level during a long period of rapid economic development (Asiaweek, 
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23 June 1995, p. 32). Moreover, as the Hong Kong government did not provide 
unemployment benefits, unemployment at this level inevitably brought about severe 
financial difficulties for the unemployed (Wong, 1995a, p. 30). 
Growing unemployment affected the economic-oriented manpower policy network 
in three major ways. First, it triggered labour unrest and intensified workers' opposition to 
the labour importation policy. Trade unions, including the FTU, the CTU and the FLU, 
blamed the labour importation scheme for the surge in unemployment. Although the 
causes of unemployment were complex, they argued that the policy on labour importation 
, 
aggravated the problem. According to t~em, many imported foreign workers had taken up 
jobs that did not require special skills, and these jobs could have gone to local workers. 
Therefore, they challenged the manpower policy network and its decisions, by calling for 
an end to labour importation (South China Morning Post, 20 April 1995). 
Second, the economic re-structuring and the surge in unemployment created a new 
problem to which the manpower policy network had no available solutions. Many 
displaced workers were previously employed in manufacturing industries and were 
middle-aged, with low levels of education and skills (Asiaweek, 20 October 1995, p. 44). 
When the manufacturing sector was shrinking, the unemployed needed targeted and 
subsidised retraining programmes to reinforce their competitiveness in the labour market. 
However, the traditional policies on manpower training did not provide a solution, 
because they were economic-oriented and neglected the issue of labour protection. To 
achieve economic diversification and rapid growth, the traditional training programmes 
were focussed on target trainees who were young and educated, and could acquire 
sophisticated knowledge and skills quickly (Hong Kong Legislative Council, 9 October 
1996, p. 104). Displaced workers who were middle-aged and less educated were 
generally neglected. As a new problem arose to which no solutions were available, trade 
unions challenged the network and called on the government to change the existing 
policies on manpower training. The leader of the CTU argued that: 'the present 
predicament is a result of the lack of a long-term policy on labour and manpower and 
Government's failure to inject adequate resources to provide retraining for local workers'. 
Therefore, the trade unions pressurised the government to help the unemployed by: 
'providing funds for the provision of retraining to local workers' (Hong Kong Legislative 
Council, 29 January 1992, p. 1597). 
Third, the vicissitudes of the labour market prompted the trade unions to question 
not only the policies but also the values and principles that dominated the policy process. 
Traditionally, manpower policy was dedicated to the pursuit of economic growth through 
the provision of training programmes and the importation of foreign workers. This 
economic-oriented 'principle of manpower policy was a consensus between the 
government and business in the policy network (see the third and fourth sections of the 
last chapter). However, in the midst of growing unemployment, the trade unions and the 
political parties representing workers' interests increasingly questioned the 
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economic-oriented principle the network has followed since the 1970s. They urged the 
government to pay greater attention to the values of social justice and equity in the 
making of manpower policy. They argued: 
No doubt economic growth is important for Hong Kong, particularly when we are facing 
1997! Economic growth will add to our confidence in the future of Hong Kong. Yet we 
cannot trade the principle of social equity simply for economic prosperity. If the gap 
between the rich and the poor in Hong Kong widens "and social conflicts intensify, it will 
not be to the advantage of our long-term economic growth. Conversely, it is only when we 
are pursuing economic prosperity and at the same time upholding social equity that every 
one of us, whatever hislher position in society, can have a share in the fruit of economic 
growth. Only then will there be real stability within our society and hence prosperity 
(Hong Kong Legislative Council, 29 January 1992, p. 1602-1603; emphasis added). ' 
All in all, the "change in Hong Kong labour market, which originated in the colonial 
transition, caused and intensified the workers' opposition to the manpower policy 
network, its values and decisions on manpower policy. 
1.2 Political Reform and Stronger Labour Movement 
In the 1990s, the manpower policy network was also confronted with increasing 
challenge arising from the political reform in Hong Kong during the colonial transition. It 
has been argued that trade unions in the 1990s stepped up their opposition to the 
economic-oriented manpower policy network and its decisions on manpower training and 
labour importation. Like the curriculum policy network, the manpower policy network 
was influenced by the development of representative government in Hong Kong during 
the colonial transition. This political change affected the network by strengthening the 
position of trade unions and political groups representing the interests of workers. As a 
result, they were able to put the network under unprecedented political pressure. 
The development of representative government started shortly after the signing of 
the Sino-British Joint Agreement, and gained in pace during the 1990s. In 1991, for the 
first time in Hong Kong history, direct elections on the basis of universal franchise were 
introduced into the Legislative Council, a lawmaking body in Hong Kong, and elected 
members (directly and indirectly) formed a majority of the legislature (Lo, 1992, p. 1). 
The development of representative government changed the political landscape and the 
distribution of power in Hong Kong. The revamped Legislative Council increased the 
political influence of trade unionists and political activists who penetrated the political 
domain on a platform of advancing the workers' interests (Louie, 1992, pp. 58-59). 
Particularly in 1995, the legislature was further open to election, and the seats won by the 
trade unions like the FTU, CTU and the FLU increased from two to eight, which 
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substantially enhanced their influence within the political domain (South China Morning 
Post, 19 September 1995). To this electoral victory was "added the increasing presence of 
labour-friendly political groups on the Legislative Council, such as the Democratic Party 
(DP), the Association for Democracy and People's Livelihood (ADPL) and the 
Democratic Alliance for the Betterment of Hong Kong (DAB) (South China Morning 
Post, 19 September 1995). On manpower policy, the trade unions and political groups had 
similar positions. Their cooperation could form a majority on the Legislative Council and 
mount a great deal of pressure on the manpower policy network (Wong, 1995b, p. 28) .. 
, 
As political reform strengthened the political influence of organised labour, they 
were able to challenge the manpower policy network. In the face of growing 
unemployment, the CTU, the FTU, the DP, the DAB and the ADPL all pledged their 
support to the protection of workers' interests (South China Morning Post, 20 September 
1995). To indemnify the local workers against unemployment, the trade unions and 
political groups drew on their influence on the Legislative Council. They used motions, 
question and answer time and, especially, private member's bills in a bid to pressurise the 
government to change the economic-oriented manpower policy. The DP, for instance, 
moved the Employment Protection Bill in 1995 in an attempt to remove decision-making 
from the manpower policy network. If the bill were passed, it would allow the Legislative 
Council to set overall limits on the number of imported foreign workers for each industry 
(South China Morning Post, 30 May 1995). Moreover, the FTU and the CTU, in 
co-ordination with the unionists on the Labour Advisory Board (LAB), moved a more 
radical ,bill that aimed at completely terminating the General Labour Importation Scheme 
(South China Morning Post, 10 October 1995). 
By trying out their mandated role as people's representatives, the trade unions and 
political parties put the government under a great deal of pres sure. It became increasingly 
difficult for the government to resist their call for change and exclude them from the 
domain of manpower policymaking. As the leader of a trade union pointed out: 
The unemployment level increased sharply in the 1990s, and thus manpower policy 
became a focus of concern in society. Trade unions were opposed to labour importation all . 
along, and we [trade unions] stepped up our opposition under these circumstances ... I 
personally believe that an increase in the number of trade unionists on the Legislative 
Council was significant in changing the manpower policy. The government was 
apprehensive that if it turned a deaf ear to the demands made by the trade unions and 
. labour-friendly political groups on manpower policy, it might have difficulty of finding 
enough votes to secure passage of proposals in manpower and other policy areas. As 
trading of political favours, the government became more responsive to our demands on . 
manpower policy (interview with the leader of a trade union). 
In short, the development of a representative system in Hong ~ong had an impact on the 
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manpower policy network. This was because the trade unions and political groups 
representing the workers' interests penetrated the political domain through the Legislative 
Council, and became more influential in challenging the manpower policy network and its 
policy decisions. It was increasingly difficult for the policy network to exclude themJrom 
the policy process. 
1.3 The Impending End of Colonialism and the New Goals of 
Governance 
The increasing challenge to the manpower policy network was also closely related to 
a fundamental change in the political picture of Hong Kong - the end of colonialism. 
Chapter seven (second section) argued that the manpower policy network was distinctive 
because its establishment and success were deeply embedded in the colonial nature of 
Hong Kong. The colonial state needed success in the economy for the stability and 
legitimacy of the regime. Therefore, an economic-oriented policy network into which the 
major business groups were co-opted was established in the 19?Os. However, with the 
advent of sovereignty transfer, the political nature of Hong Kong fundamentally changed 
during the transition. 
After the signing of the Sino-British Joint Agreement, the British Hong Kong 
government had thirteen years to prepare' for the handover of Hong Kong during the 
transitional period. This colonial transition significantly affected the British policy 
towards the governance of Hong Kong after 1984. The survival of Hong Kong as a colony 
was no longer an important issue. To maintain the colonial stability through the economic 
growth of Hong Kong became less significant. Instead, since Hong Kong would be 
de-colonised without independence and under the governance of a socialist state, the 
British government: 'was under pressure to indemnify itself against attack by opposition 
parties at home and against international condemnation'. In this situation, the foremost 
goal of British policy towards Hong Kong was: 'to leave the colony as gracefully as 
possible'. In order to make a graceful exit, the British Hong Kong government pursued 
policies that were popular inside and outside Hong Kong (Sing, 2000, pp. 23-24). On the 
one hand, it pressed ahead with the democratisation of Hong Kong's political system, 
which earned it political credit in the international community, Britain and Hong Kong. On 
the other hand, in the immediate years before the handover, it placed unprecedented 
emphasis on the grassroots' interests in making policies, which was popular among the 
general public in Hong Kong (Lau, 1997, p. 74). 
The impending sovereignty transfer and the resultant change in the British policy 
towards Hong Kong affected the manpower policy network because they posed a 
significant threat to the basis of the network. They transformed the British governance of 
Hong Kong from prioritising stability and economic' success, on which the network was 
based, into making a graceful exit and popular policies in Hong Kong. This meant that 
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there was a decreasing need for a business policy network that could assist the government 
in pursuing economic growth through manpower policy. In contrast, there was an 
increasing need for a pluralistic policy network by which the government could show that 
it was attuned to the interests of general public. The change in the British governance of 
Hong· Kong also created uncertainty for the manpower policy network because the 
formulation of policies that were popular among the general, public threatened the 
consensus between the EMB and business groups within the policy network on 
economic-oriented manpower policy. As the leader of a trade union argued that: 
. During the immediate years before the handover, the British Hong Kong government, in 
view of the paramount goal of graceful exit, intended to avoid labour unrest and pacify the 
working class by having a more balanced policy on the management of economy, welfare 
and manpower (interview with ~he leader of a trade union). 
As a sop to organised labour, the British Hong Kong government tended to pursue more 
evenly balanced policies. This inevitably impinged on the economic-oriented policy 
network that strictly prioritised economic growth at the expense of workers' interests. 
So far, I have argued that in the 1990s the manpower policy network was subject to 
increasing challenge, which arose from three salient changes in the political and economic 
conditions of Hong Kong during the colonial transition. These significant contextual 
changes 'included the vicissitudes of labour market, the development of representative 
government and the end of colonialism. How did they affect the manpower policy network? 
First, the economic integration and re-structuring and the resultant problem of 
unemployment affected the network by intensifying the workers' opposition to the 
, existing policy and creating new problems to which the network had no available solutions. 
The growing unemployment also prompted trade unions to increasingly question the 
economic-oriented values and goals of manpower policy. Second, the development of 
representative government affected the policy network by strengthening the position of 
trade unions and political groups that clamoured for a change in manpower policy. As they 
penetrated the political domain through the Legislative Council, it was increasingly 
difficult for the government to exclude them from the policy process. Third, with the end 
of colonialism in the offing, there was a shift in the British policy towards the governance 
of Hong Kong. This threatened the very basis of the business policy network and its 
consensus on the economic orientation of manpower policy. 
In the face ofthese pressures, the manpower policy network became fragmented and 
turned into an open network in the middle of the 1990s. The Governor no longer distanced 
himself from the policy process and removed from the network part of the initiative in 
policymaking. This meant that there was no longer a single institution providing policy 
direction. The consensus on manpower policy substantially weakened. The relations 
between the EMB and business groups were strained. I shall now examine why this policy 
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network collapsed so quickly. 
2. The Decline of the Manpower Policy Network 
This section will examine the decline of the manpower policy network covering the 
EMB and major business groups in the 1990s. It will argue that the collapse of the 
economic-oriented manpower policy network was the consequence of a combination of 
external (contextual change) and internal (structural weakness) factors. On the one hand, 
political and economic change posed a serious threat to the network. On the other hand, 
the network was so weak that it was unable to withstand the increasing challenge 
resulting from the political and economic change during the colonial transition. The 
structural weakness meant that it was highly susceptible to the external pressures for 
change. The weakness also made it difficult for the network to withstand these pressures. 
This indicates that the weak manpower policy network was not important in determining 
the course of policy change in the 1990s, because it did not have the ability to survive the 
political and economic change during the colonial transition. It had the seeds of its own 
destruction embedded in its make-up. It was structura1Jy weak, and these structural 
problems surfaced and exploded once the political and economic conditions of Hong 
Kong changed. As a consequence, unlike the curriculum policy network, it had 
disintegrated by the middle of the 1990s. 
2.1 Dependence on and Interference from the Governor 
The first weakness of the manpower policy network was that it contained two 
powerful actors at the executive level (see section five of Chapter 7). Normally, the EMB 
of the government, which provided the business groups with an access point, had the 
initiative in making manpower policy. Yet the network was not independent of the 
Governor, who had a role to play in the policy process. Institutionally speaking, he was a 
powerful actor because he had the authority to make final decisions on manpower policy. 
Ifhe wielded his power, he could break up the network. This structural weakness did not 
de-stabilise the network whilst there was agreement on the economic-oriented principle 
of manpower policy. However, as the Governor no longer subscribed to the 
economic-oriented principle when the handover approached and the state of labour 
market worsened, this structural weakness became increasingly evident and made it 
difficult for the network to withstand change. 
In 1992, Chris Patten became the new governor of Hong Kong. Compared to his 
predecessors, he was remarkably less in favour of the economic orientation of manpower 
policy. This was because he, as the last governor of Hong Kong, was under the influence 
of the end of colonialism. He was the representative of the British government in Hong 
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Kong, who had to implement the new British policy towards Hong Kong in the 
immediate years before the handover (Hook, 1997, pp. 25-28). Through him, the British 
policy towards the governance of Hong Kong affected the policymaking in the territory. 
In order to: 'leave as gracefully as possible', Governor Patten made policies that were 
popular among the general public in Hong Kong. For example, in his first policy address 
to the Legislative Council in 1992, he set out his agenda for the coming five years, on 
which the improvement of welfare was given top priority (Patten, 1992, p. 1). 
By the same token, Governor Patten paid special attention to the problem of 
growing unemployment and the intense worker opposition to the policy on labour 
importation. He neither clung onto the economic-oriented principle of manpower policy 
nor dismissed the existence of the problem. Instead, he admitted that the policy on labour 
importation had flaws, which caused unemployment (South China Morning Post; 3 June 
1995). He also emphasised that: 'full employment should, in effect, be the Government's 
single most important welfare objective'. Therefore, the problem of unemployment was 
the 'major economic worry', which warranted the government action (patten, 1995, p. 11). 
As a sop to trade unions and millions of local workers, Governor Patten made an explicit 
challenge to the economic-oriented principle of manpower policy. He argued that: 
I know there are employers who are very concerned about finding the workers they need to 
carry on their businesses successfully. There are also many workers and their trade union 
representatives who believe there should be no importation oflabour at all while there are 
many people without jobs. The Government must devise and revise its policies with the 
simple objective of securing the best interests of the whole community. I think in this 
instance the best interests of the whole community lie in getting our unemployed workers 
back into jobs (HKGCC, November 1995, p. 10; emphasis added). 
In short, the Governor no longer subscribed to the consensus between the EMB and 
business groups on economic-oriented manpower policy. He wanted to widen the goals of 
manpower policy to include the protection of workers' interests. 
Faced by the Governor's challenge, change to the manpower policy network was 
almost pre-ordained. This was because the network was not independent of the Governor, 
which meant that it did not have the ability to endure the contextual change and the 
resultant Governor's challenge. This structural weakness made it difficult, if not 
impossible, for the network to seal itself off and depoliticise the policy process. Policies 
initiated by the EMB had to go through the Governor for final approval. The highly 
resourced Governor then used this power to impose change on the policy network, which 
eventually led to its decline. 
In the middle of the 1990s, Governor Patten became directly involved in the making 
of manpower policy. Although he did not break up the network, he drew on his power to 
intervene at an early stage in the policy process, and removed from the network part of the 
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initiative in policymaking (interview with a government official). In 1995 and 1996, he 
organised and chaired a number of summit conferences, in which both the business and 
labour's representatives were invited to participate, in order to thrash out the issues of 
unemployment, labour importation and manpower training (South China Morning Post, 1 
June 1995; 3 June 1995). According to a government official, in the unemployment 
conferences, 'Governor Patten actively identified particular problems and issues and 
issued recommendations to the EMB, to which the EMB had to respond accordingly' 
(interview with a government official). In other words, the manpower policy was no 
longer completely made within the confines of the network that covered the EMB and 
major business groups. There was no longer a single institution providing policy direction. 
As a result, the network failed to remain intact and declined. 
2.2 Latent Differences and Internal Divisions 
The second weakness of the network was that there were latent differences between 
the EMB and business groups on manpower policy. In the face of political and economic 
change, these differences surfaced, widened and undermined the integration of the 
network in the 1990s. It was argued in Chapter 7 (section five) that the manpower policy 
network was much weaker than the curriculum policy network, because it lacked the 
integration of the latter. Although there was a general agreement on the economic-oriented 
goals ofmanpo~er policy, there were differences between the EMB·and business on what 
should be done. They did not have a clear agreement on the durability of the labour 
importation scheme. Of greater significance was the difference on how to deal with the 
workers' interests in making manpower policy. Whereas the business groups believed that 
the workers' interests should be subservient to economic growth, the EMB was more 
concerned about the labour side of manpower policy. These differences did not tum into a 
major conflict during a period of rapid economic growth and vigorous labour market. Yet 
they 'Yere latent problems that made the network susceptible to the pressures resulting 
from contextual change. Once the political and economic conditions of Hong Kong 
changed in the 1990s, these latent differences quickly surfaced, widened and sparked off 
internal tensions between the EMB and business groups within the network. As a result, 
the network was unable to weather the political and economic change and rapidly 
disintegrated into a loose entity. 
In Hong Kong dunng the 1990s, it was increasingly evident that economic interests 
were incompatible with the interests of workers in the making of manpower policy. The 
traditional manpower policy served the economic interests by prioritising the need for 
economic growth. It was focussed on how to enhance the economic competitiveness of 
Hong Kong. Yet it caused and aggravated the problem of unemployment. Therefore, how 
to redress a balance became a pressing issue. As unemployment was on the increase and 
there was heightened opposition to the existing manpower policy, the differences between 
Chapter 8 The Decline of the Manpower Policy Network 159 
the EMB and business groups within the policy network that were previously donnant 
surfaced and turned into a major wrangle. The EMB was increasingly concerned about the 
growing problem of unemployment and the social impact of economic-oriented 
manpower policy (interview with the leader of a trade union). Trade unions that were 
strengthened by the development of a representative system, such as the FTU, the CTU 
and the FLU, also made enough noise on the issue to persuade the government to 
re-consider the policy on labour importation (interviews with the leaders of trade unions). 
This is not to say that the EMB was prepared to give up the economic-oriented principle of 
manpower policy, which prioritised economic growth over other issues. Yet it tended to 
adjust the principle, in order to achieve some kind of balance between the pursuit of 
economic growth and the protection of workers' interests. In making manpower policy, the 
EMB placed greater emphasis on limiting damage to the interests of local workers. The 
Principal Assistant Secretary for Education and Manpower (SEM) argued that: 
Our unemployed are human beings out of a job. As a Government we are responsible to· 
make sure our own people are well looked after. This is what a responsible and wise 
Government should do. This is not a hang-up. It is a brave ·and wise thing to do ... The 
local workers are real human beings not numbers. With the Government the bottom line is 
the human side and that is important (HKGCC, October 1994, p. 36). 
However, because of the traditional differences on manpower policy, there was no 
consensus on the changes that needed to be made. Whereas the EMB tended to re-consider 
the existing policy, the incorporated business groups, however, adopted an 
uncompromising posture on the issue. As such, the differences between them on the labour 
side of manpower policy came to the surface and widened into a vast chasm. The business 
groups clung onto a belief that the economic growth of Hong Kong· was paramount and the 
welfare of workers should be subservient to the pursuit of economic growth. They 
challenged the government's stance on a change to manpower policy. For instance, the 
leader of the joint association of business groups argued: 
If we deprive ourselves of workforce our economy can't grow at the speed it would 
otherwise grow. But when the economy is allowed to grow the benefits of that growth filter 
through to everybody - local workers as well as imported workers. In real terms you are 
improving the wages oflocal workers. You are not suppressing them (HKGCC, November, 
1994, p. 56; emphasis added). 
They also argued that a change to the economic-oriented principle of manpower policy 
would not be beneficial to Hong Kong as a whole and the interests of workers in particular. 
They pointed out: 
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Hong Kong workers should enjoy the benefits of Hong Kong's growth, a point that 
everyone in the community supports but Hong Kong workers are not well served by 
encouraging inflation and restraining the potential growth of the economy; greater growth 
will lead to higher real wages in an environment where Hong Kong becomes more cost 
competitive (HKGCC, February 1995, p. 20; emphasis added). 
In short, the business groups criticised the EMB for 'changing its policy line. They refused 
to adjust the economic-oriented principle of manpower policy, because they firmly 
believed that in the long run the economic growth of Hong Kong would benefit not only 
the business but also the workers in the territory. 
All in all, in the middle of the 1990s the manpower policy network became much 
looser, as internal divisions between the EMB and business groups on a change to 
manpower policy developed. It became an entity of political controversy. The combination 
of external (contextual change) and internal (structural weakness) factors precipitated the 
disintegration of the network. The growing unemployment and stronger opposition from 
organised labour posed a threat to the consensus on economic-oriented manpower policy. 
On the other hand, because of the latent differences between the EMB and business groups 
on manpower policy, the manpower policy network was highly susceptible to the external 
pressures arising from political and economic change. If there had not been any latent 
differences within the network, the chances were that the economic-oriented network 
would have survived the political and economic change and there would have been a 
consensus on the changes that needed to be made. It was only when the latent differences 
surfaced and festered that the network disintegrated. The fact that the network was too 
weak to survive the contextual change explains why the manpower policy network, with a 
number of structural problems, was not an important factor in explaining the course of 
policy change in the 1990s. 
2.3 Low Level of Institutionalisation and the Inclusion of Labour 
Chapter 7 (section five) argued that the manpower policy network was weak for its 
low level of institutionalisation. Unlike the curriculum policy network, it lacked an 
institutional basis that provided a means of exclusion. This weakness did not create great 
difficulty for the network in excluding' radical groups when the consensus between the 
EMB and business groups on economic-orientated manpower policy was strong and the 
opposition was weak. In the 1970s and the 1980s, trade unions that did not share the values 
of the network were automatically thrown out of the domain of policymaking. However, 
the weakness became increasingly evident in the 19908 when trade unions gained in 
political strength and the consensus on economic-oriented manpower policy waned. 
, Without an institutional basis, it was difficult for the network to avoid change. As a result, 
from the middle of the 1990s the major trade unions, including the FTU, the CTU and the 
Chapter 8 The Decline of the Manpower Policy Network 161 
FLU, penetrated and further diluted the manpower policy network. 
The institutional weakness of the network became evident in the 1990s when the 
political change in Hong Kong had an impact on the network. It has been argued that the 
development of representative government affected the relative power of various groups 
and strengthened the trade unions and political parties that were opposed to the 
economic-oriented manpower policy network. In the 1990s, elections to the Legislative 
Council returned many representatives of trade unions and radical political groups, such as 
the Democratic Party (DP), the Association for Democracy and People's Livelihood 
(ADPL) and the Democratic Alliance for the Betterment of Hong Kong (DAB). On the 
issue of manpower policy, they managed to forge an alliance and drew on their legal power 
to penetrate the network. They introduced a number of bills in a bid to break up the 
network and change the existing manpower policy (South China Morning Post, 21 
February 1995; 30 May 1995; 10 October 1995). In short, they posed a serious threat to the 
network that was dominated by economic interests. 
To .a large extent, the structural weakness of the network led to its own destruction. 
Faced by this political pressure, it was difficult for the network to avoid change to its 
composition. The relations between the EMB and business groups were not highly 
institutionalised. Therefore, there was no particular institution within the policy network 
that the EMB and business groups could take cover from the increasing political pressure. 
This is not to say that within the network there were no institutions at all. The ad hoc 
Advisory Committee on Diversification (ACD) was one of the institutions central to the 
policy process, but it dissolved in the early 1980s (FHKI, 2 November 1977, p. 1). 
In the 1970s and the 1980s, the representatives of major business associations, 
including the HKGCC, the FHKI and the CMA, and the members who were primarily 
concerned with the economic performance of Hong Kong had an overwhelming majority 
on the Legislative Council, its manpower panel and trade and industry panel. These 
institutions then provided a focus for government I business interaction in the area of 
manpower policy throughout the 1970s and the 1980s (CMA, April 1986, pp. 11-12; 
HKGCC, January 1983, pp. 28-29; Hong Kong Legislative Council, 14 October 1987, pp. 
62-65). However, as a result ofthe development of a representative system, the Legislative 
Council itself was the centre of change in the 1990s. Elections to the revamped lawmaking 
body returned many representatives of radical groups (see section 2.2). A large number of 
members who were concerned with the workers' interests penetrated the body. The 
business bloc no longer had a majority on the Legislative Council and its committees. The 
business vote that was once a significant factor in the making of manpower policy had 
much less influence. Hence, the network was no longer able to use these institutions to 
exclude the trade unions from the policy process. 
The Vocational Training Council (VIC). which advise~ the EMB on the policies in 
relation to vocational education and training, was the other institution withip the 
manpower policy network. Unlike the Legislative Council and its committees, it was not 
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open to the representatives of organised labour that gained in political strength during the 
1990s (VTC, March 2002). However, the institution was confined in the sub-sector of 
manpower training. It did not provide an institutional cover for the government / business 
relations in the sub-sector oflabour importation. In other words, the network could not use 
this institutional structure to prevent the trade unions from accessing the process of 
making labour importation policy. 
The institutional weakness of the network also became increasingly evident as the 
internal divisions between the EMB and business groups within the network emerged. In 
the middle of the 1990s, the EMB decided to open itselfto workers' interests. In doing so, 
it attracted the political actors into the arena who could strengthen its position against the 
business groups ru:td increase its legitimacy. Paul Cheng, the leader of the HKGCC, 
pointed out that the EMB was playing 'the game of politics' with business groups and 
trade unions. It drew in and 'negotiated almost exclusively with the unions', which ' 
generally supported its position on the change to manpower policy. in order to isolate the 
business groups (HKGCC, February 1996. pp. 34-36). The EMB also gave the trade 
, unions access to the domain of policymaking because it increasingly relied on their votes 
in order to pass manpower and labour legislation. To find enough votes to secure passage 
of legislation, the EMB forged a coalition with the trade unions (South China Morning 
, , 
Post, 5 November 1996). 
Obviously, the business groups did not want a change to the composition of the 
network. The inclusion 'of trade unions in the network would dilute their influence' on 
manpower policy (HKGCC, December 1995, p. 39). But again, when the consensus on 
manpower policy weakened, the (lack of) institutional structure of the network did not 
provide the business groups with a further means of exclusion. The business groups could 
not thwart the government in its attempt to attract trade unions into the domain of 
policymaking by incurring substantial cost on the EMB within the policy process. This 
was because the institutional structure within the network did not enable them to do so. For 
example, the Business Council was an important institution within the network. Through 
the Business Council, the EMB sought information on business interests and views on a 
range of issues affecting the Hong Kong economy. The business groups attempted to use 
this institution to prevent the EMB from re-shaping the network. On the Business Council, 
they raised the issue of manpower policy and tried to block any policy proposals made by 
the EMB and trade unions. However, as the EMB was not required to reach any concrete 
consensus with the business representatives on the Business Council before taking 
decisions, the intransigence of business interests did not cause a great deal of trouble to the 
EMB within the policy process (Hong Kong Legislative Council, 7 December 1994, pp. 
1221-1222). In other words, the cost involved in changing the make-up ofthe network was 
low. Therefore, to a large extent, the EMB was able to re-shape the network without let or 
hindrance. 
Change to the make-up of the manpower policy network occurred in the middle of 
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the 1990s, when the EMB allowed the major trade unions, including the FTU, the CTU 
and the FLU, access to the policy process. The EMB changed its previous posture and 
regarded the trade unions as one of the legitimate interlocutors in making manpower 
policy. It emphasised the importance of taking into account the views expressed by 
organised labour and consulting their representatives on the Legislative, Council and the 
Labour Advisory Board (LAB) (Hong Kong Legislative Council, 8 November 1995, p. 
51). Consequently, in the middle of the 1990s, the closed manpower policy network turned 
into a loose network with a number of actors, including the representatives of the EMB, 
business and organised labour, who might not be able to work together. This does not 
necessarily mean that since then the power within the network has been evenly distributed. 
However, it was conspicuous that organised labour was given a formal ro~e within the 
policy process, and their interests carried more weight than they previously did in the 
making of manpower policy. As a trade unionist pointed out: 'the business groups might 
still be influential but at least the government had to accept part of the demands made by 
the trade unions in the making of manpower policy' (interview with the leader of a trade 
union). In short, since the mid-1990s, the network has changed from one where trade 
unions were almost completely excluded to one where they were involved on an 
increasingly equal basis to business interests. 
This section has shown why the weak manpower policy network was insignificant in 
the development of manpower policy in the 1990s. It became insignificant because it had 
the seeds of its destruction embedded in its make-up. Once the political and economic 
conditions changed in the 1990s, the structural problems surfaced, exploded and crippled 
the network's ability to weather the contextual change. Due to the latent differences 
between the EMB and business groups on manpower policy, the network was highly 
susceptible to the external pressures resulting from the political and economic change. The 
network was dependent on the Governor and weak in terms of institutional arrangements. 
Therefore, it did not have the ability to withstand the increasing pressures when problems 
grew. In short, the weak network did not have the ability to survive the contextual change, 
, . 
and thus its impact on the trajectory of policy change was marginal. This section has also 
demonstrated that the network containing the EMB and business groups had disintegrated 
by the middle of the 1990s. The Governor removed part of the initiative from the network. 
The consensus between the EMB and business groups on manpower policy broke down. 
Internal tensions developed within the network. The trade unions that were previously 
excluded penetrated the domain of policymaking. 
Having shown why the weak manpower policy network was not a major factor in 
explaining the course of change, the next section will examine how the decline of the 
network actually affected policy outcomes. 
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3. Explaining Policy Outcomes: Redressing the Balance 
This section will demonstrate that the manpower policy network, which had 
disintegrated by the mid-1990s, lost its influence on the development of manpower policy. 
The decline of the network meant that it was no longer strong enough to mediate the 
, 
external pressures for policy change. It could not limit the extent of policy change through 
the mechanism of defining the nature of problems or privileging the existing policies. Nor 
could it affect policy outcomes through the exclusion of radical groups and issues that 
would lead to substantial change. As such, the contextual factors were more important 
than the network in determining the course of policy change. The upshot of all this was 
that the manpower policy, which had been biased towards economic interests at the 
expense of the welfare of workers, considerably changed and became more evenly 
balanced in the middle of the 1990s. Although there was no general shift to a 
labour-oriented manpower policy, there were an increasing number of provisions being 
made to safeguard the interests of workers. 
First of all, the network covering the EMB and business groups lost its influence on 
manpower policy because the Governor was increasingly involved in the policy arena. 
This shift in power meant that there was no longer a single institution providing policy 
direction, and thus the network was no longer in full control of the agenda within the 
policy process. As power gravitated away from the network to the highly resourced 
Governor who questioned the economic-oriented principle of manpower policy, it was 
difficult, if not impossible, for the network to delay or neglect the issue of policy change. 
In addition, the shift in power also crippled the network's ability to control the direction of 
policy change. 
In the middle of the 1990s, Governor Patten intervened in manpower policy. As 
unemployment worsened and the Iiandover of Hong Kong was in the offing, the Governor 
demurred at the economic-oriented principle of manpower policy and supported change. 
He removed part of the initiative in policymaking from the manp<?wer policy network, and 
organised a number of anti-unemployment summit conferences to initiate change (South 
China Morning Post, 19 May 1995; 1 June 1995; 3 June 1995). Although he did not use his 
power to break up the network covering the EMB and business groups, he overtly 
questioned the existing policy on labour importation, and pushed the EMB for a policy 
review (HKGCC, November 1994, p. 31). Under these circumstances, it was difficult for 
the network to neglect the issue of policy change. As a result, in 1994 the EMB undertook 
to review the controversial policy on labour importation (Hong Kong Legislative Council, 
14 December 1994, p. 1399). 
Moreover, since the Governor had increased his input into the policy process, the 
manpower policy network was unable to control the pace of change in manpower policy. 
In other words, the network could not put the policy change off. Although the EMB 
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promised to review the labour importation scheme, it initially stopped short of specifying 
when the policy review would start and how long it would take. This posture was regarded 
by trade unions as deliberate procrastination on policy change. They argued that the EMB 
wanted to 'drag on with the issue', in the hope that the jobless rate would drop and thus it 
could 'get away with the scheme' (South China Morning Post, 20 April 1995). However, 
there was little room for 'delaying tactics', as Governor Patten increased his role in the 
policy process. He was increasingly convinced that a review of the labour importation 
policy must be launched and completed as quickly as possible. In order to reassure the 
trade unions about the government's commitment to indemnify the local workers against 
growing unemployment, he imposed on the EMB a tight schedule in relation to the policy 
review. As a consequence, the review was brought forward and would be completed 
within four months (South China Morning Post, 19 May 1995). 
As the Governor increased his role in manpower policy, the network lost its influence 
on the pace of policy change. In addition, this shift in power also greatly weakened the 
network's ability to control the direction of policy change. Initially, the network attempted 
to manipulate the direction of policy review, so as to limit damage to the existing policy on 
labour importation. It accepted that there was a· need to review the labour importation 
policy, but confined the review to only the consideration oftechnicaf issues. For example, 
the EMB and business groups agreed to review the method of quota allocation and the 
monitoring system of labour importation. They also agreed to: 'increase and step up 
enforcement action against illegal workers' (Hong Kong Legislative Council, 14 
December 1994, p. 1399; 3 May 1995, pp. 3481-3483 and p. 3527). Yet they refused to 
include more salient issues like the termination of labour importation or any substantial 
changes in the policy review. They argued that: 'it will not be right to call for its 
termination without thoroughly and carefully reviewing its value in the context of our 
overall employment policies and our economy' (Hong Kong Legislative Council, 3 May 
1995, p~ 3527). 
However, the Governor intervened again, and thus the room for .manoeuvre was 
substantially reduced. Through the anti-unemployment conferences, he redefined the 
general direction of policy review, which the network had to follow. Contrary to the 
network's position, he demanded a comprehensive review of the labour importation policy, 
and gave top priority to curbing the growing problem of unemployment (South China 
Morning Post, 7 June 1995). He argued that: 
Government policies are not immutable. They must change to meet changing 
circumstances. The case for the General Labour Importation Scheme has been eroded in 
recent years by changes in the labour market. The labour market has changed and 
government policy must change with it (HKGCC, November 1995, p. 10) .. 
As a result of the Governor's intervention, there was a shift in the direction of policy 
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review. The network was eventually prepared to launch a radical review of the labour 
importation policy, which re-examined the goals of policy, the size of labour importation, 
the application and vetting procedures, and the quota allocation criteria. The protection of 
local workers against growing unemployment was highlighted throughout the process of 
policy review, which aimed at ensuring that local workers would 'be given priority in 
employment' and they would 'not be displaced by imported workers' (Education and 
Manpower Branch, 1995, p. 90). 
In short, the manpower policy network lost its influence on the course of policy 
change because there was a shift in power from the network to the Governor. This shift in 
power made it difficult for the network to neglect the issue of change in manpower policy. 
It also vitiated the network's ability to control the pace and direction of policy change. As 
a result, a substantial change to manpower policy that aimed at protecting the interests of 
workers suddenly became a top priority on the government's agenda in the middle of the 
1990s. 
Second, the manpower policy network was also insignificant in the course of policy 
change because the consensus between the EMB and business groups on manpower policy 
broke down. The policy area became one of political controversy. This meant that the 
network was no longer strong enough to mediate the external pressures for change by 
clearly defining what problems existed and privileging the existing policy within the 
policy process. A whole range of problems and solutions that would lead to various 
degrees of change were proposed and debated within the network. As a result, the outcome 
of the policy review was an uneasy and messy compromise, which inevitably included 
substantial changes and some continuity. 
In spite ofthe fact that the network lost its influence on the direction of policy review, 
it was still within its power to determine the scope and forms of policy change. In normal 
circumstances, the network would follow a strategy of damage limitation by accepting the 
need for certain minor changes without destroying the economic interests. If manpower 
policy had been made within a policy community that had a high degree of integration and 
a strong consensus, the chances were that a great deal of changes' would be prevented in 
manpower policy. In the real circumstances, though, the manpower policy network was 
unable to limit damage because the EMB and business groups disagreed on how to deal 
with the interests of workers and subsequently on the existing problems and details of 
policy change. 
The breakdown of the consensus on how to deal with the interests of workers led to 
the rapid politicisation of the policy area. Within the policy network, there were 
subsequent differences on the range of existing problems that warranted government 
action. In other words, there was no agreement on 'accepted problems with which the 
network had to deal. As a result, a whole range of problems were proposed within the 
policy process, and the network was unable to prevent changes by suggesting that new 
problems either did not exist or were not serious enough to justify substantial changes to 
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manpower policy. 
The EMB became increasingly concerned with the problem of unemployment. It 
tended to redress the balance in manpower policy, and thus it raised this issue within the 
policy process. The Secretary for Education and Manpower (SEM) argued that: 
The Government is very concerned about the unemployment rate. Although the percent is 
not a very high figure compared with other industries, it is the highest rate in Hong Kong 
compared with the past (South China Morning Post, 19 May 1995). 
The EMB also increasingly accepted the argument that there had been a causal linkage 
between the problem of unemployment and the policy on labour importation, and raised 
this issue within the policy process. The Principal Assistant SEM argued that the labour 
importation policy had caused and aggravated the unemployment problem, because 'some 
employers preferred eager and hardworking imported labour to those who had been in the . 
industry for 20 or more years'. Therefore: 'if more migrant labour quotas were given there 
would be more unemployed local workers' (HKGCC, October 1994, p. 36). In short, 
through the EMB, new problems like the growing unemployment and the defects in 
manpower policy infiltrated the domain of policymaking. 
On the other hand, the business groups were unwilling to adjust the 
economic-oriented principle of manpower power and challenged the EMB's views on the 
range of existing problems. Despite their recognition of an increase in unemployment, 
they suggested that the problem was not serious enough to justify any substantial policy 
changes. As Anthony Griffiths, one of the leaders of the joint association of business 
groupS argued: 
So I find this issue of Hong Kong's unemployed completely blown out of proportion and it 
is promoted as an emotional argument to carry the day. The problem with that to my mind 
is that it is not good government. I think we deserve better of our Government than a lot of 
emotional response to an issue that needs calm, serious attention' (HKGCC, November 
1994, p. 59). 
The business groups also questioned the EMB's diagnosis of the existing unemployment 
problem. They commissioned an 'authoritative and objective' study on the problem of 
Unemployment, and argued that: 'the relationship between unemployment and the 
imported labour scheme is actually very weak'. Instead, 'the increase in unemployment is 
. really due to a temporary increase in the working population' (HKGCC, December 1995, p . 
. 40). Obviously, the business groups tended to define the new problems as 'temporary' or 
minor issues with which the policy network did not have to deal urgently. Yet there was no 
agreement on this definition of existing problems within the network. As the EMB argued 
that the problems with labour importation were serious enough to justify the government 
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action, it was impossible for the business groups to exclude these problems from the 
domain of policymaking. 
Within the policy network, there were differences between the EMB and business 
groups on the range of existing problems. Inevitably, there were also major differences on 
the potential solutions to these problems. The EMB and business groups had little 
agreement on the scope and fonns of policy change. This is not to say that their views on 
policy options were completely discordant. In order to pacify the trade unions that were 
discontented with the economic-oriented manpower policy, they were able to reach a 
strategic agreement on the introduction of retraining programmes. Yet this agreement did 
not privilege the existing policy on manpower training. The EMB wanted to be seen as 
having a new policy in place to tackle the problem of unemployment, whilst the business 
groups intended to use these new programmes to appease the trade unions' opposition to 
the labour importation policy (interviews with the leaders of trade unions). As a result, the 
network met the trade unions' demands for government assistance, and the policy on 
manpower training substantially changed. The employees' retraining programmes that 
primarily provided financial assistance and training opportunities for the unemployed 
. were set up and strengthened during the 1990s (Hong Kong Legislative Council, 26 May 
1993, pp. 3821-3824; 3 May 1995, p. 3527). As such, a new element oflabour protection 
was infused into the traditional policy on manpower training. 
However, it was more difficult to reach an agreement on the scope and fonns of 
change in the sub-sector of labour importation. This difficulty stemmed from the major 
differences between the EMB and business groups on the labour side of manpower policy 
and on the understanding of existing problems. There was no consensus on the changes 
that needed to be made. In fact, the network covering the EMB and business groups 
disintegrated in the middle of the 1990s. It was no longer able to mediate the external 
pressures for change by privileging the existing policy and defining legitimate solutions. 
As a result, a range of policy options were proposed and debated within the network, 
which eventually led to substantial changes in manpower policy . 
. The economic-oriented principle of manpower policy that dominated the policy 
process in the 1970s and the 1980s still had a great deal of influence on the business 
groups. They still believed that the economic growth of Hong Kong was paramount, and 
the unemployment problem was mild. They did not think it necessary to adjust the 
economic-oriented principle of manpower policy. Therefore, they were generally against a 
change to the existing labour importation policy (HKGCC, February 1995, p. 20; Hong 
Kong Legislative Council, 3 May 1995, p. 3477). However, in order to placate the trade 
unions, they were prepared to accept certain minor changes at the margins. For ~xample, 
they were opposed to the tennination of the General Labour Importation Scheme, but they 
supported the government in imposing 'tough penalties against any employer who abuses 
the importation scheme' (Hong Kong Legislative Council, 3 May 1995, p. 3483; HKGCC, 
February 1995, p. 20). 
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For the EMB, the influence of the economic-oriented principle of manpower policy 
, 
began to ebb away in the mid-1990s. Unlike the business groups, the EMB wanted to 
redress the balance in manpower policy by limiting damage to the interests of local 
workers. It increasingly accepted the argument that the importation of labour had 
aggravated the problem of unemployment and so was increasingly prepared to meet the 
trade unions' demands for policy change. It did not privilege the existing policy. Nor did it 
think that minor changes at the margins were enough. Instead, it proposed that the size of 
the labour importation scheme should be reduced, in order to protect the local workers 
against the rising level of unemployment. The Principal Assistant SEM argued: 
Under our schemes we import about 30,000 people. But then we have 50,000 unemployed 
of our own. Why can't we use our own people instead of depending on outside help? If 
Government doesn't get the balance right we could end up with no quotas. The situation is 
very delicate and real (HKGCC, October 1994, p. 36). 
The EMB also proposed a change in the application procedures for labour importation, so 
as to prevent unscrupulous employers from abusing the system. Within the process of 
policy review, it suggested that the application procedures should be toughened up. 
'Employers will have to prove that local workers are not available before we begin to 
process their applications to import labour' (Education and Manpower Branch, 1995, p. 
90). 
As the consensus between the EMB and business groups broke down, the network no 
longer had the ability to affect policy outcomes by excluding radical problems and options 
. from the domain of policymaking. A range of issues and solutions that would lead to . 
substantial policy changes went onto the agenda in the policy process. As a consequence, 
the network was unable to limit damage to the economic-oriented policy on labour 
importation. The policy became an outcome of uneasy compromise, which included not 
only some continuity but also substantial changes that aimed at protecting the interests of 
local workers. To some extent, the policy on labour importation has not changed. In order 
to pursue economic growth and to canvass the business groups for support, the EMB did 
not put an end to labour importation. Following completion of the policy review, the EMB 
emphasised the importance of retaining the policy option of importing foreign workers. It 
argued that: 'to maintain the competitiveness of Hong Kong as an open and flexible 
economy, there is a continued economic need to retain this policy option of employing 
foreign workers where they are necessary' (Hong Kong Legislative Council, 25 October 
1995, p. 31; Patten, 1995, p. 12). 
Despite this continuity, manpower policy from the middle of the 1990s was not as 
economic-oriented as it had been in the past. There were substantial changes in the labour 
importation policy, which compromised the need for economic growth so as to provide the 
local workers with better protection. After the policy review, the EMB initiated a radical 
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plan for the refonn of the labour importation policy. It decided to: 'bring the existing 
scheme to an end', The existing General Labour Importation Scheme (General Scheme): 
'will be run down naturally and replaced with radically revised arrangements' (Education 
and Manpower Branch, 1995, p. 90). In 1996, the EMB replaced the existing scheme with 
a new Supplementary Labour Scheme (SLS), and the two schemes were greatly different. 
According to the new SLS, the number of foreign workers who were allowed to work in 
Hong Kong was considerably scaled down. The 'quota ceiling will be 5000 compared with 
25 000 under the existing scheme' (Education and Manpower Branch, 1995, p. 90). 
Moreover, in order to 'safeguard employment opportunities of local workers', tougher 
application and vetting procedures were introduced into the new scheme. According to 
these procedures, employers wishing to import workers were required to go through a 
lengthy process that contained two-week advertisement, four-week recruitment exercise 
and two-month Job ~atching Programme (JMP) of the Labour Department, before their 
applications were processed further (Hong Kong Legislative Council, 8 November 1995, 
pp. 51-52). In short, from the middle of the 1990s, the manpower policy became 
increasingly balanced between the pursuit of economic growth and the protection of 
workers' interests. 
Third, the network that included the EMB and business groups had only limited 
influence on the trajectory of policy change because it could not mediate the external 
pressures by excluding trade unions from the policy process. It has been argued that from 
the middle of the 1990s the EMB increasingly relied on the trade unions' support in order 
to legitimise its policies and pass legislation. As internal divisions developed between the 
EMB and business groups within the network, the EMB faced the difficulty oflegitimising 
its policies. During the 1990s, it also had the problem of finding enough support within the 
Legislative Council to secure passage of manpower and labour legislation. In order to 
strengthen its position in both the network and the Legislative Council, the EMB in the 
mid-1990s developed a coalition with the major trade unions and incorporated them into 
the policy process. 
However, the need for such a coalition further diluted and politicised the domain of 
policymaking. It placed severe constraints on the EMB and business groups to exclude 
new 'issues and alternative solutions from the policy process. The major trade unions, 
including the FTU, the CTU and the FLU, accessed the policy process when the review 
. exercise entered an advanced stage. During the review exercise, they questioned the 
5000-quota ceiling initially proposed by the EMB and pressurised the government into 
cutting further the size of quotas granted for labour importation (South China Morning 
Post, 8 December 1995). Moreover, they raised a new issue about the labour importation 
, policy within the policy process. They argued that the importation of foreign workers 
without constraints on particular industries had severely worsened the problem of 
unemployment. This was because a large number of imported workers: 'were in precisely 
those sectors of the economy where unemployment is rising' (South China Morning Post, 
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13 October 1995}. In other words, imported workers: 'have taken up the same jobs that our 
local wor~ers are trying to get' (Hong Kong Legislative Council, 3 May 1995, p. 3502). In 
order to tackle this problem, the trade unions wanted to reduce the ~cope of labour. 
importation, and suggested that 'requests for imported workers in twenty-six job 
categories should not be approved' (interview with the leader of a trade union). During the 
review exercise, they also raised an issue about how to review the labour importation 
policy in the future. They pushed the government for establishing a mechanism that would 
institutionalise their role in the making of labour importation policy (interview with the 
leader of a trade union) . 
. The trade unions penetrated the domain of policymaking. This not only placed 
constraints on the network in preventing radical issues and options from getting onto the 
agenda, but also weakened its ability to crush these issues and solutions within the policy 
process. In order to gain the trade unions' support, the EMB had to take on board their 
issues and demands and make the policy acceptable to them. As a trade unionist argued: 
It was clear that from the middle of the 1990s, the government gave more attention to the 
interests of workers. If trade unions strongly demanded or opposed certain policy options, 
I believe that the government would act accordingly (interview with the leader of a trade 
union) . 
. The trade unions that accessed .the policy process wanted to have a further change to the 
labour importation policy. During the review exercise, the EMB did take into 
consideration their issues and demands and reconciled the differences. One of the trade 
unionists, who participated in the review exercise, pointed out that 'the EMB was more 
flexible in managing the interests of workers and prepared to make a compromise on the 
controversial labour importation policy' (interview with the leader of a trade union). 
As a result, on top of the changes initiated by the EMB, there were further changes to 
the labour importation policy in the direction of safeguarding the workers' interests. First, 
the size of labour importation was further reduced. The EMB came under pressure to cut 
the quota from 5,000 to 2,000 (South China Morning Post, 3 January 1996). Second, under 
the pressure from trade unions, the EMB agreed to limit the scope oflabour importation. It 
introduced a list of job categories to be nonnally excluded from the Supplementary 
Labour Scheme (SLS). In a briefing paper to the Legislative Council, it stated that 'having 
regard to the availability of local labour and the underlying principle of the scheme, 
requests for imported workers in certain job categories will not nonnally be approved' 
(Education and Manpower Branch, 1996, p. 3). Third, the EMB agreed to give the trade 
unions an institutional voice in the policy process. It developed a mechanism that 
institutionalised the tripartite relations between the government, business and labour in 
making policy on labour importation. As regards future review, the briefing paper stated 
that: 
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When a total of 2,000 visa applications have been approved under the SLS, a review will 
be conducted by the Government in consultation with the Labour AdviSOry Board to 
ensure that the SLS is achieving its policy objective. The review is expected to be 
completed within 6 weeks and the outcome will be presented to the LegCo (Legis/ative 
Council) Panel on Manpower for discussion (Education and Manpower Branch, 1996, p. 4; 
. emphasis added). 
The major trade unions, such as the FTU, the CTU, and the FLU, were members of the 
Labour Advisory Board and the Legislative Council (LegCo) Manpower Panel. Their. 
membership of these bodies ensured that from the middle of the 1990s they had access to 
the manpower policy network. Since then, the closed policy network has turned into a 
tripartite policymaking entity. 
All in all, the manpower policy network covering the EMB and business groups 
collapsed so quickly because of its structural weakness. As the economic-oriented 
network disintegrated, trade unions were in a better position to influence policy. The 
Governor and the EMB were more concerned with the interests of workers. The trade 
unions penetrated the domain ofpolicymaking and were given an institutional voice in the 
policy process. As a consequence, the mid-1990s saw a substantial change in manpower 
policy. In spite of the fact that there was no general shift to a labour-oriented manpower 
policy, there were an increasing number of provisions being made to safeguard the 
interests of labour. The policy became increasingly pluralistic, labour-friendly and evenly 
balanced. This change was epitomised in the objective of new labour importation policy, 
which stated that: 
To ensure that local workers have priority in employment and that their salaries and 
benefits are safeguarded, employers must accord priority to fill available job vacancies 
with local workers. If employers have genuine difficulties in finding suitable stafTlocally, 
they can import workers to fill such vacancies (Education and Manpower Branch, 1996, 
p.2; emphasis added). 
In other words, the government pledged itself to balance the interests of workers, notably 
their employment opportunities and living standards, and the need for economic growth. 
4. Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that the weak network covering the EMB and major business 
groups was not important in the development of manpower policy in the 1990s, when it 
was subject to immense pressure arising from the political and economic change of Hong 
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Kong. Despite the economic strength of business, it did not manage to survive the 
contextual change. The agenda changed in that it was much less economic-oriented, and 
policymakers did not remain the same. The network rapidly disintegrated and, therefore, 
was unable to affect policy outcomes. This is not to say that the network did not have any 
impact on manpower policy. However, by comparison with the political and economic 
factors, the network was an insignificant factor that determined the development of 
manpower policy. As a consequence, the mid-1990s saw a substantial change to the 
economic-oriented manpower policy. 
It is clear from this study that the decline of the manpower policy network was, to a 
certain extent, due to the change in the context within which it operated. In the 1990s, the 
network was under increasing attack, which resulted from the political and economic 
change of Hong Kong during the transition. Change in Hong Kong's labour market and 
increased concern over unemployment posed a threat to the economic-oriented netWork. . 
As the economic integration between mainland China and Hong Kong accelerated after 
1984, Hong Kong experienced a painful process of economic re-structuring, and 
unemployment began to rise in the 1990s. Growing unemployment intensified the trade 
unions' opposition to the network and confronted it with new problems to which the 
economic interests did not have solutions. Moreover, the development of representative 
government in Hong Kong during the transition, especially in the 1990s, had an important 
impact on the closed network between the EMB and business associations. Elections to 
the Legislative Council returned many trade unionists and members who were concerned 
with the interests of workers, "and so considerably strengthened the position of trade 
unions that put the network under unprecedented pressure. In addition, the decline of the 
network was also closely related to the end of Hong Kong as a British colony. With the 
end of colonialism in the offing, the British policy towards Hong Kong shifted from 
prioritising stability through economic success, on which the network was based, to 
making a graceful exit and popular policies in Hong Kong in the imnlediate years before .. 
the handover. This change threatened the basis of the economic-oriented manpower 
policy network. 
. However, it is also undoubtedly the case that the decline of the manpower policy 
network resulted from its own structural weakness. It contained the seeds of its own 
destruction. Once the political and economic circumstances of Hong Kong dramatically 
changed, these seeds of destruction became increasingly evident and eventually 
undermined ~he network. This indicates that when there was political and economic 
change in the 1990s, the weak manpower policy network became insignificant in the 
development of manpower policy, because it did not have the ability to survive. There 
were major structural problems within the network that exploded, triggered by contextual 
change. Due to the latent differences between the EMB and business groups on manpower 
policy, the network was highly susceptible to the external pressures resulting from the 
political and economic change. These latent differences surfaced and widened in the 1990s. 
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As a result, the consensus within the network quickly broke down and internal divisions 
emerged. Moreover, the network was weak because it was not independent of the 
Governor. This meant that when the Governor no longer subscribed to the 
economic-oriented principle of manpower policy and attempted to force new issues onto 
the agenda, the network did not have the ability to seal itself off and depoliticise the policy 
process. In addition, the network was weak for its low level of institutionalisation. There 
was a lack of a well-established institution within the policy network that provided it with 
a further means of exclusion, as the consensus weakened and the trade unions gained in 
political strength. This weakness further crippled the network's ability to survive the 
political and economic change, and so a number of trade unions managed to penetrate the 
domain ofpolicymaking in the mid-1990s. In short, the manpower policy network became 
" 
insignificant in the development of manpower policy because it was too weak to weather 
the pressures resulting from the political and economic change of Hong Kong. By the 
middle of the 1990s, it had disintegrated and turned into a loose and volatile entity. 
The decline of the network 'meant that it lost its influence on the development of 
manpower policy in the middle of the 1990s. When problems grew, it was no longer strong 
enough to mediate the external pressures for change and limit damage to the existing 
policy. First, as power gravitated away from the network to the highly resourced Governor 
who was increasingly concerned with the interests of workers, the network no longer had 
full control over the agenda within the policy process. It was difficult, if not impossible, 
for the network to delay or neglect the issue of policy change. This shift in power also' 
crippled the network's ability to control the direction of policy change. Second, as the 
consensus between the EMB and business groups on manpower policy broke down, the 
policy area became one of political controversy. The network could neither define what 
problems existed nor privilege the existing policy within the policy process. A whole 
range of problems and solutions that would lead to policy change were 'proposed and 
debated within the network. Third, the major trade unions penetrated the domain of 
policymaking. This placed severe constraints on the network to exclude radical issues and 
options from the policy process. In order to gain the trade unions' support in the network 
and the Legislative Council, manpower policy had to be made acceptable to them. 
Whereas the network lost its influence on manpower policy, the contextual change became 
an important factor that determined the course of development in manpower policy. As a 
consequence, in the middle of the 1990s, manpower policy considerably changed in that it 
was much less economic-oriented. Although there was no general shift to a 
, 
labour-oriented manpower policy, there were an increasing number of provisions being 
made to advance the interests of workers. 
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This chapter will return to the questions and propositions outlined in Chapters 1 and 
3 respectively by comparing the various policy networks that have been examined in this 
thesis. The comparison will focus on three vital aspects of policy analysis: government! 
group relations in policy-making; the effect policy networks had on policy outcomes; and 
how they affected the trajectory of policy change during Hong Kong's colonial transition. 
Based on the evidence presented in the case studies, the chapter will argue that most of the 
propositions outlined in Chapter 3 have been justified. The notion of policy network 
offers a flexible and effective means of conceptualising the relationship between the 
government agencies and pressure groups in the policy process. It is also important in 
, " 
explaining policy outcomes, as networks affected policy outputs and provided particular 
groups with the mechanisms to influence policy. Perhaps more importantly, the nature/ 
, . 
types of policy networks are a significant factor that affected the course of policy change 
in Hong Kong during the transition. The other major point to emerge from the case 
studies is that network analysis is complex. Policy networks were not completely isolated 
from the context within which they operated. Hence, we need to be aware of macro-level 
variables like the political structure in Hong Kong and its international context when we 
analyse networks and how they affected policy outcomes and policy change. 
The chapter will begin by demonstrating that a number of policy networks have 
been identified. The nature of these networks, in curriculum and manpower policy, varied 
across sectors and time. The chapter will then indicate how the notion of policy network 
provides a fuller understanding of government! group relations in policy-making in Hong 
Kong than the traditional approaches discussed. Contrary to the theoretical perspective of 
coopt ion, the case studies show that the relationship between the government and 
integrated groups was one of mutual dependence, resource exchange and a positive-sum 
game rather than dependence, deference and supplication. They also demonstrate that; in 
marked contrast to elitism, the government! group relations in Hong Kong differed from 
sector to sector, which can be explained by a range of meso-level variables in policy 
networks. In the third section, I shall demonstrate that policy networks did affect policy 
outcomes in Hong Kong in a number of ways. They provided the government agencies 
with the means of developing and implementing particular policies. Through their shared 
views and consensus, they affected the policy age~das. They also affected policy 
outcomes by excluding diametrically opposed interests from the policy process. Policy 
networks were not neutral. The interests of integrated groups were built into the structure 
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of networks. Therefore, policies in some arenas were constantly tilted in favour of 
particular groups at the expense of others. 
There are two major points in the fourth section. First, I shall argue that policy 
networks· significantly affected policy change in Hong Kong during the colonial 
transition. The relationship between the changes in Hong Kong's political environment 
and pre-existing policy networks was dialectical rather than uni-dimensional. Although 
. all the networks in this thesis have changed to some extent, the analysis of policy change 
cannot be reduced to the analysis of macro-level developments and their impact on policy .. 
It is apparent from the case studies that policy networks, especially policy communities, 
could mediate the external pressure and affect the extent and pace of policy change. The 
impact of policy networks depended on their nature/ types. The other major point in the 
section is that despite the importance of networks in affecting change, they were not 
completely isolated entities. To some extent, the success ofrietworks in resisting change 
was due to the context within which they operated. 
The fifth section will indicate that policy networks were distinctive because of the 
political structure in Hong Kong. As Hong Kong had an executive-dominated political 
system, there was a natural tendency for networks to develop into stable policy 
communities. For the same reason, the relationship between the government and groups 
within policy networks tended to be asymmetric. The structure of policy networks also 
reflected the broader pattern of structural inequality in Hong Kong's society and politics. 
It was easier for business and professional interests than for the majority of groups to 
access policy networks and seal their arenas off from other actors. In addition, from the 
early 1980s the changes in Hong Kong's political environment affected the general trend 
of change in networks that shifted from policy communities to more open networks. All 
. . 
of this does not mean that policy networks were subservient to the macro-level 
developments in Hong Kong. However, we need to be aware of the network's 
environment when we utilise the concept in analysing the policy process, policy 
outcomes and policy change. 
Having established the utility of network analysis in explaining policy outcomes 
and policy change in the context of Hong Kong, the last section of the chapter will focus 
on the theoretical discussion of policy network. It will pay particular attention to the 
development of a policy network approach to policy analysis in Asian authoritarian 
capitalist regimes, and l}ighlight a number of significant issues for policy network 
research, which emerge from the thesis and demand further investigation. These issues 
include the transferability of the policy network concept, the explanatory utility of the 
concept in non-democratic states, and the need to integrate network analysis with 
associated approaches at macro and micro levels. 
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1. Policy Networks in Hong Kong 
Discussions of policy networks are common in the analysis of public policy in the 
UK, Europe and the United States. However, policy networks are not confined to liberal 
democracies. ~n this thesis two networks in curriculum policy and manpower policy in 
Hong Kong have been identified. To varying degrees, these networks changed in the 
1980s, and particularly the 1990s. Therefore, two networks with four different forms have 
been examined in the thesis. 
In the 1970s and, to a lesser extent, the 1980s, there was a stable, closed and very 
well integrated policy network in Hong Kong's curriculum policy. According to Marsh 
and Rhodes' (1992a; 1992b) typology, it can be seen as a policy community. Central to 
the curriculum policy network were three major components. First, although it contained 
a relatively large number of participants, it was stable because there was a clear state-led 
view of education and a single decision-making centre provided by the Education 
Department. Second, it was very well integrated, as there was a strong consensus on the 
system, parameters and direction of cumculum between the Education Department and 
the mainstream teaching profession. Third, it involved a high degree of exclusion, with' 
access being restricted largely to teacher educators, school councils/ bodies, school head 
associations and teachers' unions. Groups like pro-China schools, pressure groups and 
political activists were excluded through the consensus on apolitical! academic-oriented 
curriculum and the institution of the Curriculum Development Committee (CDC). 
To some extent, the curriculum policy network grew weaker in the face of Hong 
Kong's colonial transition. The agenda slightly changed in that it was less apolitical. It 
became easier for outsider groups, such as pro-China schools, community groups and 
political activists, to access the periphery of the network. Nevertheless, the network 
remained stable, integrated and closed in the 1980s and the 1990s. It was independent of 
the Governor and other networks. There was still a high degree of exclusion. Although in 
the mid-1990s a number of opposition groups penetrated the outer circle of the network, 
they neither accessed the core nor had any lasting influence. In addition, the Education 
Department and the mainstream teaching profession managed to maintain their 
agreement on the direction and parameters of curriculum policy. 
Compared to the curriculum policy network in the 1970s, a less integrated network 
existed in manpower policy. The manpower policy network, in the 1970s and the 1980s, 
was still relatively close to the policy community end of the continuum. However, it was 
obviously not so cohesive as the curriculum policy network. It contained a limited 
number of participants, which included the Education and Manpower Branch (EMB) of 
the government and major business associations. There were shared views on the broad 
values and goals of manpower policy, which was dedicated to the pursuit of economic 
growth. There was also some agreement on how to achieve these goals. Access to the 
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network was restricted, with trade unions being consciously excluded. However, the 
network contained a number of structural weaknesses. At the executive level, there were 
two powerful actors - the Governor and the EMB. This limited the extent to which the 
network could seal itself off and depoliticise the domain of policy-making. Despite some 
agreement on manpower policy, there were differences between the EMB and business 
groups on how to deal with workers' interests in making economic-oriented manpower 
policy. Access to the network was restricted, but, unlike the curriculum policy network, it 
lacked the institutional means of exclusion. 
, Due to these structural defects, the manpower policy network, which was subject to 
increasing political and economic pressures, disintegrated in the middle of the 1990s. It 
shifted from the policy community end to the issue network end of the continuum. As 
support for the economic-oriented policy ebbed away, the Governor removed part of the 
initiative in policy-making from the network. The consensus between the EMB and 
business groups broke down, and internal tensions developed within the network. Trade 
unions that were previously excluded penetrated ·the domain of policy-making. The 
policy agenda substantially changed in that the protection of workers' interests became 
more important. In short, since the mid-1990s the network has turned into a loose and 
volatile entity. 
It is apparent from the above case studies that policy networks have existed in Hong 
Kong. In this thesis four different types of networks have been identified and investigated. 
The curriculum policy network during the 1970s and, to a lesser extent, the 1980s can be 
seen as a stable policy community. Less integrated networks existed in curriculum policy 
in the 1990s and manpower policy in the 1970s, but they were still close to the policy 
community end of the continuum. However, the manpower policy network from the 
. . 
mid-1990s was erratic and loose, which was akin to an issue network. The next section 
will examine how these various networks affected the government! group relations in 
policy-making in Hong Kong, and why particular forms of networks developed. 
2. Government/ Group Relations in Policy Networks 
It was demonstrated in Chapter 2 that there are problems with the traditional 
approaches, notably the theories of cooption and elitism, in understanding the 
government! group relations in policy-making in Hong Kong: It is apparent from the case 
studies in this thesis that the notion of policy networks, which emphasises the structure of 
mutual dependence, resource exchange and reciprocal advantage, provides a better means 
of conceptualising the relationship. 
The traditional approaches see the relationship between the government and 
integrated groups as a means of cooption rather than empowerment. Groups are 
incorporated into the policy process in order to achieve the goals set by the government. 
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The relationship is one of dependence, deference and supplication. The case studies 
suggest that, to some extent, the theory of cooption is corroborated. Both the curriculum 
policy network and the manpower policy network were created not because of the 
intrinsic power of groups, but because the government wanted to intervene in society. In 
curriculum policy, the colonial nature of Hong Kong and anti-colonial political education 
meant that the government had to develop an interventionist policy towards school 
curricula. In order to strengthen its influence on school curricula, the cooperation of the 
teaching profession was essential. Therefore, in the early 1970s the Education 
Department created the network and allowed the representatives of the teaching 
profession access to the domain of curriculum making. Likewise, the importance of 
economic success to the legitimacy of the government and the economic difficulties 
facing Hong Kong in the 1970s galvanised the government into assuming a more active 
role in managing the labour market. As a result, the EMB incorporated a number of major 
business groups into the policy process and a manpower policy network developed. All of 
this suggests that the historical, political and economic conditions of Hong Kong and 
government decisions had an important impact on the establishment of networks. 
However,the theory of cooption oversimplifies the relationship between 
government and groups in policy-making. The case studies demonstrate that when policy 
networks were created, the government! integrated group relations were not of 
dependence and deference. Rather, they were the structures of mutual dependence and 
resource exchange. In the case of manpower policy, the EMB needed the resources and 
assistance of business groups in the development of effective policy. Within the network 
the business groups performed the roles of aggregating demands, channelling the views 
of business to the government and helping the government to sell agreed policies to their 
members. In return, they established formalised relations with the EMB and influenced 
policy. In curriculum policy, the structure of resource inter-dependence was more evident. 
The Education Department would have encountered intractable difficulties ifit had had to 
develop and implement a common curriculum without the cooperation of schools. 
teachers and teaching experts. It needed their assistance in the development and regular 
revisions of a huge common curriculum. Moreover. as the majority of schools in Hong 
Kong were non-government schools over which the Education Dep.artment had no direct 
control, it was essential for the government to obtain their cooperation in implementing a 
common curriculum without a great deal of political disruption and policy dislocation. It 
was impossible for the Education Department to develop an alternative administrative 
structure that could bypass the teaching profession. 
As the structure of mutual dependence developed within networks, the government 
began negotiating with the integrated groups in the policy process. Once negotiation 
started, the government had to make concessions to the groups in order to maintain the 
stability of the networks. Therefore, contrary to the theory of cooption, the government! 
group relations were not a zero sum game with the latter sacrificing their entire power to 
r 
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the fonner. The groups' influence on policy was not a product of supplication and 
political largesse. Instead, it derived from the structure of resource exchange, and policy 
depended on negotiation. The teaching profession in Hong Kong could influence 
curriculum policy by modifying the government's proposals. It was difficult for the 
Education Department to hatch and implement a curriculum plan without their consent 
The same was true with the business groups within the manpower policy network. 
Through negotiation, they could influence the scope and fonns of labour importation 
policy and manpower training programmes. This is not to say that the networks led to 
pressure group capture of the government agencies. In fact, the groups relied on the 
government agencies to access the policy process. However, in order to avoid the costs in 
tenns of losing the means of implementation, political disruption and increasing the 
uncertainty of the policy process, it was in the government's interests to maintain· the 
networks. This structure of mutual dependence accorded the integrated groups influence 
on policy. 
The relationship between the government and groups was also a positive sum game 
because both in.creased power in relation to other interests by being involved in an 
integrated and closed network. For instance, in curriculum policy, the Education 
Department and the mainstream teaching profession worked together to seal their policy 
arena off from pro-China schools, political activists, other networks and even the 
Governor. In manpower policy, the EMB collaborated with major business associations 
on enhancing their autonomy in relation to organised labour. In doing so, both the 
government agencies and integrated groups were in a stronger position to influence 
policy. 
The case studies also suggest that~ by comparison with general theories like elitism, 
the notion of policy network offers a flexible means of conceptualising the government! 
group relations in Hong Kong. From the 'evidence presented, policy-making in Hong 
Kong did not appear to be elitist in the sense that a single elite class, notably business and 
related interests, was constantly dominant across various policy arenas. This is not to 
deny that business and related interests tended to be more influential than other groups in 
a number of policy areas like economy, taX and industrial relations. Yet this general 
picture oversimplifies the relationship between the government and groups, which 
actually varied from sector to sector and from time to time. The government as a whole 
did not represent particular interests. In this regard, the meso-level concept of policy 
network that is concerned with ~xplaining behaviour within particular policy areas or 
sub-sectors provides a more flexible account of policy -making. 
The government! group relations in policy-making varied in a number of ways. 
They differed in tenns of membership and the interests involved. The manpower policy 
network contained the EMB and major business groups, whilst the curriculum policy 
network include~ the Education Department and a number of educational groups and 
organisations that were not beholden to moneyed interests. The government! group 
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relations also varied according to the extent of integration and continuity. If the elitist 
analysis of Hong Kong policy were accurate, networks covering business would have had 
a higher degree of integration and continuity than other networks. In the cases of 
curriculum and manpower policy, however, it seems that the relationship was the other 
way round. The manpower policy network containing major business groups was less 
integrated and stable than the network in curriculum policy. In addition, the government! 
group relations differed across other dimensions like the nature of relationship and 
interaction. All of this indicates that numerous relations may have developed in 
policy-making in Hong Kong. Thus, instead of adopting general theories like elitism 
which contain certain presumptions about the distribution of power, we need to be 
specific in analysing the relationship between government and groups in particular areas 
in order to understand the policy process. 
The case studies suggest that there was a variety of government! group relations 
existing in different policy arenas. This raises an important question: why did different 
types/ nature of networks develop in different arenas? The policy network theory 
provides an account of this variation and sees some common features in particular forms 
of networks. It is easier to establish a policy community if there are a limited number of 
participants, consensus between the government and integrated groups, and mechanisms 
for exclusion. Policy communities also develop in areas of importance. However, there 
are several problems with this explanation. First, the aspect of membership does not 
apply to the case study of curriculum pol,icy in Hong Kong. The curriculum policy 
network in the 1970s can be seen as a policy community as it was stable, very well 
integrated and closed, although it covered a relatively large number of actors. Second, 
consensus and mechanisms for excluding opposed interests were important, but not 
sufficient, for establishing a policy community. The manpower policy network had some 
consensus that served as a means of exclusion, but it disintegrated and became a loose 
network in the mid-1990s. Third, the existence of a loose network in manpower policy in 
the mid-1990s demonstrates that issue networks could occur in areas of great political 
significance where it was difficult to establish a consensus and multiple decision-making 
centres existed. 
In addition to the above aspects, the case studies of curriculum and manpower 
policy suggest a number of meso-level variables in particular forms of networks. Policy 
. 
communities normally occurred in areas where a structure of resource dependence 
developed between the government and integrated groups. In curriculum policy, the 
government needed the teaching profession in developing and implementing a common 
curriculum, and it was difficult, if not impossible, for the governmen.t to establish an 
alternative means of implementation bypassing the teaching profession. Therefore, a 
policy community developed and remained intact in curriculum policy in the 1970s and 
the 1980s. The structure of resource dependence was not as strong in manpower policy. 
The EMB did not need the business groups in implementing policy. It had alternative 
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groups like organised labour that it could talk to and seek political support from. Thus, a 
network close to the issue network end of continuum developed in the mid-1990s . 
. It was also easier to establish a policy community if the relationship between the 
government and integrated groups was institutionalised. On top of the consensus on the 
curriculum, the curriculum policy network had an institutional basis (CDC) that served 
from the 1970s as a further means of exclusion. This means that it was highly difficult for 
outsiders to penetrate the network even though the consensus might occasionally wobble. 
Within the manpower policy network, there were no such definite institutional 
arrangements. Thus, its stability and exclusiveness had to depend on how well it could 
maintain its consensus. Moreover, the comparison between the two cases demonstrates 
the importance of having a single decision-making centre to the establishment and 
maintenance of a policy community. 
To recapitulate, the case studies suggest that the notion of policy network provides a 
better approach to understanding the policy process in Hong Kong. Due to a number of 
meso-level variables in networks, various forms of government! group relations 
developed hi different policy arenas in .Hong Kong. Within policy networks the 
relationship between groups and the government agencies was one of mutual dependence, 
resource exchange and reciprocal advantage rather than mere dependence and deference. 
Once networks and inter-dependence developed, policies were products of negotiation 
and cooperation instead of supplication and political largesse. Therefore, the government! 
group relations within networks were normally a positive sum. The next section will 
examine how networks affected policy outcomes in Hong Kong and explain why in some 
arenas policies consistently favoured and indulged particular interests at the expense of 
. others. 
3. Policy Networks and Policy Outcomes 
It was demonstrated in Chapter 3 that there is little agreement as to whether the 
concept of policy network has any explicit explanatory power. The case studies in this 
thesis indicate that policy networks are in fact a significant factor that affected policy 
outcomes in Hong Kong. On the whole, they affected policy in a number of ways. Firstly, 
they were important because they provided the government with the means of 
intervention. In other words, they increased the infrastructural power of government 
actors and the~efore ensured that interventionist policies could be developed. From the 
early 1970s, the network covering the Education Department and mainstream educational 
groups and organisations created the mechanisms for resource exchange and consensus 
building, which allowed the Education Department to intervene in school curricula . 
. Consequently, a common curriculum was fonnulated and implemented in all types of 
schools without political reverberations or a policy mess. Had there not been an 
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integrated network in curriculum matters, it would have been difficult for the government 
to impose a common curriculum on non-government schools without political disruption. 
Secondly, networks defined what problems existed and what policy options were 
acceptable. Therefore, they affected the policy agendas in the policy. process. This 
demonstrates the importance, within the networks, of their shared views and consensus 
on policy. For example, during the 1970s ana 1980s, the economic-oriented principle was 
enstructured into the manpower policy network, which affected the attitudes and 
behaviour of policymakers. Hence, the policymakers determined that the labour and skill 
shortages crippling Hong Kong's economic competitiveness since the 1970s were major 
problems that warranted the government intervention. By the same token, the large-scale 
expansion of vocational training and the highly controversial labour importation scheme 
that would possibly revitalise Hong Kong's economy were regarded as acceptable 
measures. In the curriculum policy network in the 1970s, the problem was anti-colonial 
political education in pro-China schools and the solution was unifying and depoliticising 
school curricula. 
Thirdly, the networks further limited the range of problems and policy options to be 
deliberated in the policy process by keeping alternative problems and solutions raised by 
outsiders out of the agendas. As a result, only particular policy decisions w~uld be made. 
Despite ferocious attacks on labour importation from the 1980s, the policy-makers 
influenced by the economic-oriented principle within the manpower policy network 
repeatedly denied that the problems arising from labour importation were serious enough 
to justify a policy change. Alternative solutions raised by trade unions were dismissed as 
infeasible and insufficient to allay the problems oflabour and skill shortages and rampant 
wage inflation. Likewise, within the curriculum policy network there was a strong 
consensus on the apolitical and academic orientation of the school curriculum. Therefore, 
over a long period, the network prevented the issue of pupils' civic needs and the option 
of civic education, especially a mandatory civic education syllabus, from getting onto the 
policy agenda. 
Finally, policy networks affected policy outcomes by excluding groups from the 
domain of policy-making. The curriculum policy network from the early 1970s excluded 
a range of opposed interests like pro-China schools, political activists and community 
groups, whilst the manpower policy network in the 1970s and the 1980s blocked the 
access of organised labour. The consensus and institutions provided the means of 
exclusion. As a consequence, the opposition groups were marginalised in the policy 
process, and could not pose a serious challenge to the networks and their decisions. 
Policy networks were not neutral. Their existence in Hong Kong explains why in 
some areas policies were consistently made in particular groups' favour. It was argued in 
Chapter 3 that the elitist approach to policy analysis in Hong Kong contains certain 
presumptions about the structural inequality in politics but has difficulty in explaining 
how particular groups actually influenced policy. The case studies in this thesis ~uggest 
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that the notion of policy network may bridge this academic gap. The existence of policy 
networks created the mechanisms that enabled particular groups to influence policy. The 
networks included some groups and excluded others. The integrated groups were able to 
shape policy not because of their structural positions within society or the resources they 
possessed, but because their interests were built into the structure of the networks, which 
could be a set of rules, standard operating procedures, ideology, consensus or institutions. 
In the policy process, the structure of a network created a certain range of choices 
that served the interests ofthe dominant actors within the network. Within the curriculum 
policy network, the structure was the agreement between the Education Department and 
the teaching profession on the need to maintain an apoliticaV academic-oriented 
curriculum in schools. The consensus confined the curriculum-making process to the 
deliberation of conventional academic disciplines. Civic education was not within these 
limits and so was precluded in the policy process. This range of policy options favoured 
the interests and ideas of the key actors within the network. For the teaching profession, it 
allowed educators, schools and teachers to eschew instruction in thorny social and 
political subjects and to concentrate entirely on preparing pupils for public examinations 
and higher education. It also made it easier for the Education Department to plug the 
loopholes in school curricula that would possibly escalate into a threat to the legitimacy 
and stability of the government. 
In addition, the structure of a policy network served the interests of particular 
groups by ensuring that diametrically opposed interests and alternative issues and 
solutions were routinely excluded from the domain of policy-making through the 
consensus and institutions within the network. In curriculum and manpower policy, the 
networks prevented alternative problems (pupils' civic needs or social injustice), options 
(e.g. civic education, automation, better working conditions) and opposition groups (e.g. 
pro-China schools, political parties and trade unions) from accessing the policy process. 
By constraining the policy agendas and excluding opposition groups, the government 
actors and integrated groups within the networks were able to influence policy, and any 
challenges to their interests were diluted. Consequently, the policy outputs constantly 
reflected the interests and ideas of the dominant actors. 
All in all, the case studies· demonstrate that policy networks are important in 
I 
explaining policy outcomes in Hong Kong. They affected policy by providing the 
government with the means of intervention, defining the nature of problems, creating a 
certain range of policy options and excluding opposed interests from the policy process. 
In addition, the existence of networks explains why policies in some areas favoured the 
interests of some groups over time in a fairly consistent way against pressure contrary to 
them. Policy networks created the mechanisms that allowed particular groups to 
influence policy. The interests of integrated groups were built into the structure of policy 
networks, which ensured that their interests were served in the policy process. By 
privileging certain groups, problems and solutions whilst excluding others, the networks 
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created a certain range of policy options and thus produced particular policy outputs that 
were tilted in favour of the key actors within the networks. 
However, in the 1980s, and particularly the 1990s, policy networks in Hong Kong 
were subject to increasing challenges as a result of the colonial transition. The next 
section will examine the external pressures that pre-existing policy networks faced, and 
how the notion of policy network offers a'more sophisticated view of change in Hong 
Kong than the traditional approaches. 
4. Context, Networks and Policy Change 
It was demonstrated in Chapter 2 that the traditional approaches concentrate on the 
changes in Hong Kong's political environment in order to explain policy change during 
the colonial transition. Their argument that policy change has occurred as a result of ' 
macro-level developments in Hong Kong is, to some extent, borne out by the case studies 
in this thesis. Both the curriculum policy network and the manpower policy network in 
the thesis were under mounting pressure for change during the 1980s and the 1990s. 
Consequently, they changed in varying degrees in terms of their nature and policy 
outcomes. 
The changes In Hong Kong's political environment, notably the process of 
decolonisation and democratisation, impinged on established networks and their policy 
agendas in a number of ways. First, the contextual changes created new problems for 
which the established networks did not have available solutions. In the 1980s and the 
1990s, the curriculum policy network was faced with a pressing need for civic education 
that was intended to provide an ideological prop for the integration of Hong Kong into 
China and the development of a representative system. However, the established agenda 
within the network originally created to unify and depoliticise school curricula could not 
cope with this problem. Since the early 1980s, in terms of manpower policy, the political 
transition of Hong Kong to China has accelerated and exacerbated the economic 
integration between the two places. This promptly gave rise to the problems of economic 
restructuring and rising unemployment in Hong Kong, which the network had difficulty 
in solving. 
Second, as new problems arose, the established networks were likely to be 
confronted with intense opposition. In curriculum policy, the pressure for change was 
both internal and external. It c~e from a number of pressure groups and political parties 
that wanted to use civic education to shape political culture within society and then 
influence the course of political transition. Added to this domestic pressure for change 
was the pressure from the Chinese authorities that regarded civic education as conducive 
to the political integration of Hong Kong into China. In manpower policy, growing 
unemployment stoked the trade unions' opposition to the eC,onomic-oriented network and 
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their policy decisions. Third, the colonial transition was important in changing networks 
and policy because it restructured the political landscape in Hong Kong. It affected the 
relative power of various groups and organisations, and active participants in Hong 
Kong's political arena increased. In curriculum and manpower policy, a number of groups 
like pro-China schools, political activists and organised labour that were previously 
excluded from the networks gained in political strength and managed to penetrate the 
enlarged political arena as a result, of elections to the revamped Legislative Council. 
Moreover, the transition of Hong Kong to China substantially enhanced the power of the 
Chinese authorities over Hong Kong's domestic matters. 
For the above reasons, the political pressure for change became increasingly intense. 
Consequently, the curriculum and manpower policy saw some changes in the networks, 
their policy agendas and policy ·outputs. In the 1980s, and particularly the 1990s, the 
curriculum policy network grew weaker as the opposition groups penetrated its perIphery 
and the Chinese authorities exerted a great deal of pressure on the curriculum-makers to 
excise the curriculum from the colonial past. The policy agenda also changed to some 
extent with civic education becoming increasingly important. In manpower policy, the 
network and its economic-oriented agenda changed more dramatically in the 1990s. As a 
consequence, there were an increasing number of provisions being made to protect 
workers against unemployment and the adverse effects of labour importation. The 
changes in curriculum and manpower policy indicate the importance of macro-level 
developments in Hong Kong, notably the processes of decolonisation and 
democratisation, in changing the pre-existing policy networks, their agendas and policy 
outputs. 
Nevertheless, the case studies also demonstrate that the relationship between 
context and networks was not unidirectional. If political pressure occurred in areas where 
strong networks or policy communities existed, there was always resistance to reform, 
and the trajectory of policy change tended to be complex and dialectical. The networks 
might not automatically collapse. Instead, they affected the extent and speed of policy 
change by mediating the effect of Hong Kong's colonial transition on policy outputs. 
Hence, contrary to the traditional approaches, the analysis of policy change in Hong Kong 
cannot be reduced to the analysis of macro-level factors. The curriculum policy network 
was structurally strong, which enabled it to survive the contextual uncertainty and affect 
the course of policy alteration. Despite some changes in its nature and agenda, the 
network remained largely intact during the 1980s and the 1990s. It was cushioned from 
growing political pressure by the fact that it was independent of the Governor and other 
networks. There was also a high level of resource dependence, institutional support and 
consensus, which resulted in the network being cohesive and not open to change. 
As the network weathered the contextual uncertainty and the curriculum-makers 
. remained the same, it was able to withstand the political pressure and control the pace and 
forms of policy change. Faced by the groundswell of politicisation in China and Hong 
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Kong, it managed to depoliticise the domain of curriculum decision-making. It was deft 
at diluting the external pressure by accepting minor changes at the margins and twisting 
political-oriented civic education into depoliticised moral education. In doing so, it 
limited damage to the interests and ideas of the key actors within the network. It also 
prevented change by precluding the most radical issues raised by the Chinese authorities 
and domestic groups, such as the provision of political education and the formulation ofa 
mandatory civic education syllabus, from getting onto the reform agenda. In addition, 
through the institutions and consensus, it excluded the opposed interests like the political 
activists, pro-China schools and pressure groups from the inner core of the network, and 
thus marginalised their influence in the policy process. As a consequence, thus far the 
political pressure has resulted only in minimal changes in the curriculum policy on civic 
education. Whilst the network has issued a number of unbinding recommendations to 
schools on how to promote civic education, it has repudiated many proposals for change. 
There was no compulsion on schools to implement the official guidelines on civic 
education, and in the guidelines political elements were watered down by moral issues. 
The ability of networks to resist change varied from policy sector to policy sector. It 
depended on the nature/ types of particular networks involved. In the face of similar 
external pressure, a network with a higher degree of internal integration and exclusion 
was in a stronger position to resist change than a weaker network. Therefore, the impact 
of macro-level developments in Hong Kong on policy change differed across policy 
arenas. During the transition, the political pressure produced a great deal of change in 
manpower policy but little in curriculum policy where China's involvement was greater. 
This puts a different gloss on the traditional argument that policy change resulted from the 
changes in Hong Kong's political environment (see Chapter 2). The macro-level 
variables. were important, but their effect greatly depended on the nature of networks, 
which affected the ability of the networks to prevent change. Hence, the nature! types of 
networks were as important as the macro-level developments in explaining the trajectory 
of policy alteration. 
It has just been argued that the curriculum policy network was internally integrated 
and independent of the Governor and other networks. There was also a high degree of 
resource dependence, consensus and institutional support. Thus the network was able to 
survive the political pressure and swat down a lot of proposals for curriculum reform. By 
contrast, the network covering the EMB and business groups in manpower policy was 
structurally weaker. It was less closed, consensual and isolated from the Governor who 
had the intent and authority to undermine the network. These structural weaknesses did 
not destabilise the network in the 1970s and the 1980s when the participants, in the face 
of rapid economic growth and robust labour market, were prepared to accept the 
economic-oriented manpower policy and sideline their concern over its adverse effects on 
society. However, the network contained the seeds of its own destruction. 
Once economic problems and political pressure arose as a result of Hong Kong's 
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col~nial transition, a schism developed between the Governor, the EMB and the 
integrated business groups. The Governor became more involved in policy-making. The 
disagreement between the EMB and business resulted in the EMB drawing in trade 
unions in order to strengthen its position on policy adjustment. In this situation, the 
network disintegrated in the mid~1990s and lost a great deal of influence on the refonn 
agenda. Unlike the curriculum policy network, it had little ability to mediate the external 
pressure and prevent change by excluding radical groups, problems and options from the 
domain of policy-making. Consequently, it failed to limit damage to the 
economic-oriented manpower policy. The policy substantially changed in that the 
government snuffed out the General Labour Importation Scheme and there were an 
increasing number of provisions being made to advance the interests of workers. 
Despite the importance of networks in understanding change, it is essential to point 
out that they were not completely isolated entities in the context of Hong Kong. The 
transition of Hong Kong to China gave rise to increasing threats to the dominant interests 
within networks. In addition, it is clear from the case studies that the success of networks 
in surviving the contextual shifts and fending off political pressure was, to some extent, 
due to the context within which· they operated. In curriculum policy, it was the 
international and constitutional contexts of Hong Kong which allowed the network to 
resist the political pressure for change that came from the Chinese authorities. There were 
a number of domestic and international factors that hobbled the influence of the Chinese 
government on Hong Kong's educational policy-making. They included the Sino-British 
Joint Agreement, the Basic Law and a massive international scrutiny of Hong Kong's· 
transition to China. 
As the legal sovereign power of Hong Kong, the Chinese government could use its 
despotic power to break up the curriculum policy network and force their issues onto the 
agenda, regardless how strong the network was. The problem with this strategy was that 
the political costs could be very high. If the Chinese government changed the network 
and took decisions itself, it would effectively mean gross violations of the Sino-British 
Joint Agreement and the Basic Law, which accorded the Hong Kong government 
administrative autonomy in education and other domestic affairs. It was eminently not 
prepared to bear the political costs of international arraignment and any political, 
economic and social instability in newly acquired Hong Kong on this matter. This was . 
especially true, given that it was eager to demonstrate to the international community 
including Taiwan its capacity and willingness to allow Hong Kong to operate in the ways 
spelt out in the international and constitutional documents. More important to the Chinese 
government was the possible damage being done to China's image abroad and the 
stability and prosperity of Hong Kong. Therefore, it was squeamish about meddling in 
Hong Kong's curriculum policy. The network took succour from these international and 
constitutional contexts. Consequently, it was able to survive the restrained pressure from 
China and put off fundamental changes in civic education policy. 
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Two major points have emerged from the above discussion. First, policy networks 
were an important factor affecting how policy changed in Hong Kong during the colonial 
transition. Although the processes of decolonisation and democratisation made an impact 
on Hong Kong's politics, the relationship between context and networks proved to be 
complex and dialectical. The effect of these contextual changes on policy greatly 
depended ori the nature/ types of particular networks. Generally speaking, policy 
communities or the networks with a high degree of stability, internal integration, 
institutionalisation and independence were able to counteract the mounting political 
pressure "and control the scope and pace of policy change by coopting certain reform 
pressure and excluding others. Hence, policy change tended to be tardy and limited in 
areas where integrated policy networks existed. On the other hand, less integrated and 
independent networks, particularly issue networks, were in a weaker position to weather 
the macro-level developments and ~ard off the external pressure for change. Thus, where 
weak and less consensual networks existed, substantial changes in networks, policy 
agendas and policy outputs were the most likely outcome. " 
It is also the case that policy networks were not a single factor determining the 
trajectory of policy change in Hong Kong during the transition. This leads to the second 
point in this section. Although networks were important, they were not completely 
isolated from the broader context within which they operated. The transition of Hong 
Kong to China created increasing political pressure that posed an unprecedented 
challenge to pre-existing networks. In addition, to some extent, the success ofnetworks in 
resisting change was the result of their international and constitutional contexts that gave 
them space to manoeuvre. Therefore, in spite of the fact that network analysis is vital, it 
needs to be used within the macro-level developments in Hong Kong in order to provide a 
more comprehensive view of policy change .. 
As policy networks were embedded in the context of Hong Kong, it is important to 
investigate how the Hong Kong context actually affected the networks so as to understand 
the government! group relations in the policy process. Therefore, the following section 
will examine the ways in which the political context of Hong Kong influenced the nature 
of networks and the extent to which the networks were distinctive. 
5. Networks and Political Structure 
It has been demonstrated throughout the thesis that, although the notion of policy 
network has been confined to policy analysis in Europe, Britain and the United States, 
networks have existed and significantly affected policy outcomes and policy change in 
Hong Kong. This raises the question of how distinctive these networks were in the 
political context of Hong Kong, which was different from the political structures in 
liberal democracies. Although it is not the focus of this thesis to compare and contrast 
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policy networks in different countries, the case studies suggest that policy networks in 
Hong Kong were distinctive. The idiosyncratic nature of policy networks can be 
explained by the political structure in Hong Kong, notably its executive-dominated 
. 
political system and structural inequality in politics. In other words, the macro-level 
variables in Hong Kong's political structure were important because they influenced the 
features of networks and the way they operated. 
Policy networks in Hong Kong had a number of general characteristics. First, the 
executive-led political system in Hong Kong encouraged the formation of stable, 
integrated and independent policy networks. Therefore, the networks had a tendency 
towards policy communities. It was demonstrated in Chapter 1 that Hong Kong was an 
'administrative state', where the administrative organisations played a far more 
prominent role in mak~ng policy than the legislature and judiciary. Power was 
concentrated with senior civil servants, who made most of the policy decisions only to be 
formally approved, in some cases, by the Legislative Council. Until the mid-1980s, there 
was no election to the Legislative Council. The members were appointed by the Governor 
and had no constituents to whom they were accountable. Consequently, there was a single 
decision-making centre in Hong Kong - the government agencies - which dominated the 
policy process and controlled access to the domain of policy-making. 
The concentration of power meant that the political system in Hong Kong tended to 
have stable policy communities. As Jordan and Richardson (1987, p. 181) argue, there is 
a natural tendency for government to create policy communities because they make the 
policy process predictable and reduce the likelihood of overload and failing to find a 
solution. Despite the advantage of policy conu:nunities, they do not occur automatically. 
In countries like the United States, the policy process is so fragmented that it is difficult 
for policy communities to develop and maintain themselves (Smith, 1993, pp. 9-10). By 
, contrast, the Hong Kong government, as a single decision-making centre, had the ability 
to control access to the policy process. They could include certain groups and then 
\ 
exclude others. The institutionalisation of particular groups at the heart of policy-making 
normally constituted impregnable policy communities, as there was the lack of 
parliamentarians who could play the intermediary role which provided outsider groups 
with alternative access points to the policy process. Since there was a propensity for 
policy networks in Hong Kong to develop into stable policy communitie,s, issues within 
the domain of policy-making were often depoliticised, and policy outcomes were 
normally stable. 
Second, it seems that policy networks in Hong Kong tended to be elitist. They 
reflected the broader pattern of structural inequality in society and politics. In other words, 
the class structure in Hong Kong is important in accounting for the structure of policy 
networks in terms of who governed and in whose interests. Traditionally, the theory of 
elitism sees the business and related professional interests in Hong Kong constituting an 
elite class that had strong influence on policy and dominated the principal sources of 
• 
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. information feeding the government agencies. There were a number of bases of structural 
inequality. The business and professional interests had economic resources or knowledge 
unavailable to other groups. They had a powerful voice in the appointed governing 
institutions such as the Executive, Legislative and Urban Councils. Their political 
influence also derived from their socio-economic background which was in common with 
that of senior government officials. In addition, the government needed decent economic 
showing and social developments to shore up its legitimacy. As it abided by the 
laissez-faire ideology and the philosophy of small government, the cooperation of 
business and professionals was important in order to make and implement economic and 
social policies in the most cost-effective manner. Therefore, in terms of pressure group 
influence, business and professionals were constantly in a stronger position than the 
majority of groups. 
The structural inequality in society and politics affected the structure of policy 
networks. The case studies in this thesis suggest that it was easier for the business and 
professional elites to access the networks across a range of policy areas and sub-sectors. 
There was a pattern of inclusion and exclusion. It was likely that business and 
professional groups were over-represented in networks. By contrast, other interests like 
. organised labour, community groups and political activists were normally excluded from 
the domain of policy-making. In addition, policy networks like the ones in curriculum 
and ~anpower policy had the potential to be stable, cohesive and closed over a relatively 
long period of time if they included consensual business and! or professional interests. 
Third, apart from the nature of networks, the macro-level variables in Hong Kong's 
political structure also affected the way the networks operated. As the government actors 
had more resources than groups in the executive-dominated political system, the 
government! group relations in networks were apt to be asymmetric. The 
executive-dominated system enabled the government actors to control access. to the 
policy process. The government agencies also had the ability to impose policy against the 
wishes of integrated groups through legislation, because until the early 1990s they faced 
little difficulty in pushing legislation through the appointed Legislative Council. Since 
then, the legislature has changed to some extent, bufthere were institutional arrangements 
aimed at containing the emergence of a fully-fledged legislature that might threaten the 
executive-led governing model (see Chapter 2). 
In this situation, groups needed the government more than ,the government needed 
groups. Consequently, in most cases, it was the government actors who could determine 
the membership, the rules of the games and the parameters of policy within networks. In 
curriculum policy, the Education Department decided who had access to the network. It 
also held a grip on the main planks of curriculum policy, as most curriculum proposals 
emanated from the educational officials and sometimes it could choose to ignore the 
policy recommendations made by the network. In manpower policy, the major business 
associations, though highly resourced, were unable to thwart the EMB in its aims to 
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change the economic-oriented labour importation policy in the mid-1990s. As the 
government was the one which had the potential to call the shots within networks, policy 
outputs generally reflected the interests and goals of the government actors. 
Finally, the macro-level developments in Hong Kong's political structure 
influenced the trend of change in policy networks. Although networks in Hong Kong 
tended to be closed and integrated, since the 1980.s there has been a general shift in the 
government! group relations from stable policy communities to more open networks as a 
result of the colonial transition. The transition of Hong Kong to China triggered 
. politicisation at the societal level and the proliferation of pressure groups and political 
parties. It also created new issues and problems besetting established policy networks. 
The development of a representative system enlarged the political arena in Hong Kong 
and allowed some outsider groups access to the political system. Consequently, it was 
more difficult for the government and groups to maintain the pre-existing policy 
communities, and change was the likely outcome. In this thesis, both the manpower 
policy network and ~he curriculum policy network that can be seen as a policy community 
had become more open to some extent by the middle of the 1990s.-
Despite these propensities, it is important not to overestimate the general features of 
policy networks in Hong Kong. There are many exceptions to the overall pattern augured 
by the macro-level variables. This suggests that we need to be specific in understanding 
the factors that affected the nature of particular policy networks. In addition to the 
political structure in Hong Kong, a range of meso-level variables in networks was equally 
important. Hence, it is essential to examine particular policy arenas and networks in order 
to develop a fuller understanding of government! group relations and how policy was 
made and changed in Hong Kong. In this regard, the notion of policy network provides a 
flexible and sophisticated view of policy process and change. 
Due to the executive-dominated political system in Hong Kong, there was a 
tendency for policy networks to develop into stable and well-integrated policy 
communities. However, it is not difficult to find exceptions. The manpower policy 
network from the mid-1990s was erratic, loose and open to conflicting interests. It was 
close to the issue network end of the continuum rather than the policy community end. 
The other two networks in the thesis also differed from the curriculum policy network in 
the 1970s and the 1980s that can be seen as a policy community. Therefore, despite the 
tendency, policy communities did not occur automatically or in all policy arenas in Hong 
Kong. The case studies of curriculum and manpower policy indicate that the development 
of particular types of networks depended on a range of meso-level variables: the number 
of participants, the degree of consensus, the means of exclusion including 
institutionalisation, the nature of policy, and the structure of resource dependence. Apart 
from the executive-led political system, the right range of meso-level variables had to 
exist for a policy community to develop. 
It appears from the case studies that the nature of policy networks reflected the 
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broader pattern of structural inequality in Hong Kong's politics. It was easier for business 
and professionals' to access the policy networks than for other groups like organised 
labour. However, it was also the case that no single elite or interest dominated the 
networks across policy arenas and time. The business associations in the manpower 
policy network and the educational organisations and groups in the curriculum policy 
network did not constitute a single elite class because they had different interests, 
resources and concerns. Moreover, trade unions that were hostile to business interests 
gained access to the manpower policy network in the mid-1990s. Looking beyond the 
case studies in this thesis, there were plenty of policy arenas where business and 
professional groups were not dominant, such as transport and social welfare. In other 
words, contrary t6 elitism, the government as a whole did not represent business and 
related interests. Instead, it favoured various interests according to the arrangements that 
developed in particular policy areas or sub-sectors. Therefore, network analysis which is 
concerned with analysing government! group relations in particular policy arenas is vital 
. to understanding who governed and in whose interests. 
The meso-level variables within networks also explain how the networks operated. 
In Hong Kong's political system, the relationship between the government and groups 
tended to be asymmetric. However, recognising the importance of government does not 
mean that groups were insignificant in making policy. The case studies indicate that the 
integrated groups were likely to have substantial influence on the government and policy 
if mutual dependence and clear agreement developed within the networks. Network 
analysis is also important because it, as ar~ed before, explains why the political pressure 
arising from Hong Kong's colonial transition caused a greater deal of change in some 
networks and policies than others. ' 
Hence, neither context nor networks were a sufficient factor that determined the 
government! group relations in the policy process, how policy was m~de and how it was 
changed. In accounting for policy and change, it is important to integrate the macro-level 
analysis of Hong Kong's political context with the meso-level analysis of policy networks. 
Whilst the approach starting from the marco-level is crucial for explaining the general 
features of networks and the trend of change in networks and their policy decisions, 
network analysis is most appropriate in accounting for variation across policy sectors. We 
. need. to be aware of the contextual factors in Hong Kong, such as the 
executive-dominated political system, the elitist structure in politics, the development of 
a representative system and the transition of Hong Kong to China. Meanwhile, networks 
are an equally significant factor that needs to be included in the analysis of the policy 
process, policy outcomes and policy change in Hong Kong. 
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6. The Way Forward 
Having established the utility of network analysis in understanding policy outcomes 
and policy change in the context of Hong Kong, the last section ofthis chapter will return 
to the theoretical discussion of policy network. It will pay particular attention to the 
development of a policy network approach to the analysis of public policy in Asian 
semi-democracies. Here, I wish to highlight some issues regarding network research 
which emerge from this thesis and dem~d further investigation. They include the 
transferability of the policy network concept, the explanatory utility of network analysis, 
and, finally, the need to integrate the structural view of policy networks with associated 
approaches, notably the macro-level and micro-level analysis of networks. 
6.1 The Transferability of The Policy Network Concept 
To date discussions of policy networks have mostly been confined to the analysis of 
public policy in liberal democracies. This is not so much because policy networks have 
not existed in other regime forms, but because the policy network literature has paid little 
attention to the applicability of the concept to regimes beyond the category of liberal 
democracy. Hence, it is important for future policy network research to examine whether 
or not the concept is apposite to policy analysis in states which have not followed the path 
of western democratic systems. 
The case studies of Hong Kong demonstrate that the concept of policy network can 
be used to explain policy and change in the Hong Kong non-democratic regime. Based on 
elementary analysis of other' Asian polities, it could be suggested that policy networks 
also exist in other authoritarian capitalist regimes in East and Southeast Asia, such as 
Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines. In 
politics, these countries are all authoritarian in nature. Whilst power-holders use the 
rhetoric of constitutionalism and adopt parliamentary and electoral forms of rule, the 
political order is shaped into different patterns of semi-democracy, in which the electoral 
processes are concerned with mass mobilisation in support of the governing elites rather 
than popular participation. Through a variety of means, including vote-buying, corruption, 
legal oppression, scaremongering and gerrymandering, opposition parties and other 
non-state political actors are encouraged or compelled to adopt behaviour which is found 
accepta~le by the governing parties or bureaucrats and cannot threaten the status quo. 
Hence, in reality, there is little possibility of power alteration between the governing elites 
and opposition elements through a peaceful process of fair, open and transparent elections 
(Rodan, 1996a, pp. 13-14; McCargo, 1998, pp. 137-146). In economic management, as 
opposed to communist regimes, the states are market conforming rather than market 
avoiding, despite the fact that they all intervene in economie~ to varying degrees. They 
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rely massively on the private sector to provide capital, management and technology for 
export-oriented industrialisation (Case, 1998, p.258). 
Traditionally, analysis of state and group relations in the authoritarian capitalist 
regimes in East and Southeast Asia has been conducted within a dichotomous zero-sum 
framework. However, since the 1990s, a consensus has begun to grow that the boundaries 
between the state and society are not so distinct but rather blurred and obscure (Rod an, 
1996a, pp. 21-25). The state/group distinction is complicated by the existence of a range 
of institutional and informal forums through which societal groups are incorporated into 
government. The integrated groups are in constant contact with the same political parties 
and bureaucratic agencies in the policy process (McCargo, 1998, pp. 131-134). In this. 
context, a host of policy networks have developed, which allows state actors to intervene 
in society and groups to have regular access to the policy process. Policy networks infuse 
important dynamics into the state by the fact that they can affect the content of public 
policy (Rodan, 1996a, p. 28). To delineate the intricate relationships between the state and 
society, Ding (1994, p. 298) argues that the 'institutional structures are so closely 
intelWoven with each other in their actual operation that the formal demarcation of the 
scope of each other's activities or powers becomes insignificant'. 
Network analysis is important in liberal democracies because the policy process 
tends to fragment and specialise, with a number of well-established groups possessing 
significant resources (Campbell et al., 1989). Moreover, in liberal democracies, it is rare 
that the interests of state actors develop independently of society and are then imposed 
against the will of societal groups (Smith, 1993, p. 227). By contrast, state actors in 
authoritarian capitalist regimes have a greater ability to act autonomously. Due to 
different forms of authoritarianism, these state actors remain politically insulated from 
the interests and demands of the general public (Case, 1998, p. 251). To add to this state 
strength, the governments in East and Southeast Asia, particularly in Singapore, Taiwan 
and South Korea, are centralised, monolithic and efficient, which means that they are less 
dependent on private groups in policy-making and implementation (McCargo, 1998, pp. 
126-147). Therefore, at first glance, it appears that the policy network concept bears little 
relevance to policy analysis in semi-democratic states, yet appearances can be deceiving. 
The case studies of Hong Kong indicate that policy networks can develop and influence 
public policy in semi-democracies. This raises a question regarding why network analysis 
is also important in authoritarian capitalist regimes in East and Southeast Asia. 
In these regimes, the combination of political authoritarianism and economic 
capitalism facilitates the emergence of policy networks between. the state agencies and 
groups. The political and socio-economic systems create an environment in which policy 
networks are likely to develop and succeed in different policy arenas. Generally speaking, 
there are three mechanisms leading to the development and influence of policy networks. 
First of all, despite the absence of political pluralism, there are feisty civil societies. 
According to Callahan (1998, pp. 158-159), these civil societies have appreciably 
Chapter 9 Conclusion: Context. Policy Networks and Policy 196 
mellowed and expanded. since the 1980s, with an apparent mushrooming of 
non-governmental groups which are concerned with an array of different interests and 
demands, such as racial equality, women's rights, resource conservation and market 
liberation (Case, 1998, pp. 271-272). The vibrancy of civil societies stems from the fact 
that the regimes pay homage to market capitalism instead of central planning in order to 
pursue rapid economic growth. Consequently,' private groups are established in parallel to 
the burgeoning economic space to advance various economic and social interests. This 
function of civic society is particularly critical in authoritarian capitalist regimes in East 
and Southeast Asia. As the parliamentary procedures rarely respond to the changing 
needs of ordinary citizens, an increasing number of groups are created to articulate the 
interests of civil societies (Callahan, 1998, p. 151). Normally, interest groups are found 
acceptable or, at least, tolerated grudgingly by the states as long as they eschew the role of 
seizing state power and have no connections with opposition parties (Rod an, 1996b, p. 
109; Callahan, 1998, p. 151). 
The existence of civil society is important to the development and operation of 
policy networks in authoritarian capitalist states. The importance of civil society derives 
from it being 'the form of political space that affords the most substantive oppositional 
capacity and potential' (Rodan, 1996a, p.20). In other words, it contains a variety of social 
forces that are not domesticated by the state and can both resist and cooperate with the 
state actors in their own interests. As rapid industrialisation in East and Southeast Asia 
has generated a significant increase in both the middle and working classes from the early 
1980s, the pressure groups have become better resourced and organised in representing 
. 
their members' interests. Some of them have even become so effective in articulating 
alternative policies and mobilising local opinion that the government agencies have found 
it in their interests to incorporate and work in partnership with them in tackling policy 
problems (Callahan, 1998, p. 243; Case, 1998, p. 270). Consequently, policy networks 
have emerged. 
The second mechanism facilitative of policy networks in semi-democracies is that 
groups greatly need this form of policy-making structure to enhance their influence on 
public policy. This mechanism, together with the third discussed later, ensures that the 
operation of civil society leads not only to pressure group politics by means of mass 
mobilisation and lobbying, but also to policy networks characterised by internal 
negotiation between state actors and groups. Central to policy networks is the need for 
direct access to government on the part of groups. Only when groups wish to relinquish 
part of their autonomy from the state in exc~ange for routine relationships with 
government officials will policy networks occur. The issue of direct access is important to 
groups in liberal democracies, but it is even more critical in centralised and monolithic 
one-party states in East and Southeast Asia. The absence of strong opposition parties and 
fair electoral arrangements means that direct access to government is almost the only 
practical way in which groups can defend and advance their members' interests on a 
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regular basis. Some groups manage. to gain recognition by government as legitimate 
interlocutors, and thus policy networks develop . 
. Whilst civil society and groups' interests can go some way to answering why 
network analysis is important in authoritarian capitalist regimes, the major answer seems 
to lie with the need for the state agencies as a whole to create and maintain stable and 
institutionalised relationships with certain societal groups. On the whole, policy networks 
as a particular structure of policy-making fits with the authoritarian governance of 
semi-democratic states in East and Southeast Asia. This is the last and, perhaps, the most 
important mechanism prompting the development and influence of policy networks 
outside the western democratic systems. 
Policy networks have a number of advantages for state actors over complete 
isolation from civil society. First, in most Asian authoritarian capitalist regimes, dramatic 
economic growth has been accompanied by significant transformations in social structure. 
Increased prosperity has resulted in a more socially differentiated population with 
separate identities, values and organisational structures. There have been an increasing 
number of divergent social interests involved in pressure group politics. In this context, 
state actors need to create policy networks as a means of politically accommodating 
increasingly complex and divergent social interests without conceding state power to the 
political opposition. If there is 'opposition' at policy level, the state actors steer it through 
manageable forums by the creation of policy networks. Within the networks, they make 
necessary concessions in an attempt to divert the disaffected social interests from 
oppositional politics, which sets out to seize state power and change the regimes. On the 
other hand, the state actors, by manipulating network structures, manage to keep the 
disaffected within strict limits and boundaries (Rodan, 1996b, pp. 102-1 OS). In short, they 
use the structures of policy networks to condition the character of opposition. 
Second, policy networks occur in semi-democracies because it is usual for state 
agencies to sponsor close ties with certain well-organised groups in a bid to mobilise 
public support for the policy process in general and policy outputs in particular. In other 
words, central to policy networks in semi-democracies is the issue oflegitimacy. The case 
studies of Hong Kong indicate that a legitimacy problem often arises in non-democratic 
polities. The regimes are basically in a state oflegitimacy deficit, as they do not possess a 
significant level of legitimacy which can otherwise come through credible elections. In 
this situation, the state agencies are prompted to be extremely careful to secure popular 
support at every step of policy making. One of the approaches taken by the state agencies 
to tackle the legitimacy problem is the creation and maintenance of close networks with a 
number of societal groups with the ability to mobilise public opinion in various policy 
, 
arenas. 
Third, policy networks provide state agencies with an important means to intervene 
in society. Compared with liberal democracies, it cannot be denied that the regimes have a 
greater ability to act autonomously. To a certain extent, the lack of electoral retribution 
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insulates the state actors from the interests and demands of groups in society. Therefore, 
despotic power usually refers ~o authoritarian states (Smith, 1993, p. 52). However, 
political insulation does not necessarily mean that the state actors do not need routine 
relationships with groups. The operation of policy networks can be divided into political 
and administrative functions. Whilst the state actors in authoritarian capitalist regimes are 
less susceptible to vocal or physical opposition and the risk of losing an election, the cost 
of using despotic power might be rather high in terms of the difficulty in implementing 
policy decisions. Only in ideal totalitarian regimes are states omnipresent and omnipotent. 
In reality, though, the state agencies in authoritarian capitalist regimes have only a 
restricted ability to take and implement decisions independently of the demands of 
societal groups. 
In economic policy, the state agencies follow the strategy of market capitalism, 
which erodes their capability to exercise control over business groups and individual 
economic organisations, particularly when domestic capital becomes increasingly 
glob ali sed in East and Southeast Asia. In social policy, the strategic priority of rapid 
industrialisation means that public financial resources are concentrated on economic 
development (Callahan, 1998, p. 214). With scant investment in social policy, the state 
agencies have to implement logistically their policy decisions by relying on the 
cooperation of non-governmental organisations rather than solely through their 
administrative machinery. An interventionist approach taken by these states to deal with 
economic and social problems further exposes the state agencies to the difficulty of 
implementation (McCargo, 1998, p. 131; Callahan, 1998, p. 201). The consequence of all 
this is 0 that policy networks, which promote the consultation and coordin1ation of 
government and groups, have become an integral part of governance in authoritarian 
regimes in the Asia-Pacific. 
It is °not my intention to specify the ways in which every single policy network 
occurs in East oand Southeast Asian authoritarian capitalist regimes. Rather, I want to 
emphasise that network analysis can be important in these states because there is a 
tendency for networks to develop. In fact, the transferability of the concept has been 
borne out by the case studies in this thesis. Whilst some attempt has been made in that 
direction, more is obviously essential. 
6.2 The Explanatory Utility of Policy Networks 
Despite the fact that discussion of policy networks is common in the analysis of 
public policy in liberal democracies, there is rarely consensus as to whether the concept 
has any significant explanatory utility (Marsh and Smith, 2000, p. 4). Hence, more 
research needs to be conducted into this academically moot point. In terms of analysing 
the explanatory power of policy networks, the authoritarian capitalist regimes in East and 
Southeast Asia provide useful comparisons because their political systems contrast with 
Chapter 9 Conclusion: Context. Policy Networks and Policy 199 
those of liberal democracies. If it is proved that policy networks affect policy outcomes 
and policy change across various policy arenas in both democratic and non-democratic 
regimes, we can rule out, at least to a considerable extent, the possibility of the network's 
effect being the result of a specific political system. We can then generalise with a certain 
degree of confidence that the notion of policy network is not only a product of liberal 
democracies, but also important in accounting for policy in states outside the western 
democratic systems. 
. The authoritarian capitalist regimes in East and Southeast Asia also provide 
intriguing comparisons among themselves in order to establish the relative effect of 
networks and context on policy change. It is remarkable that since the mid-1980s a 
number of these regimes, such as Taiwan, South Korea, Thailand and Hong Kong, have 
moved towards the western democratic systems. Democratisation may be less apparent in 
other states, such as Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia. However, they are still 
conspicuous by the expansion of civil society which contains a growing number of 
oppositional forces to government's policies. In short, the countries in East and Southeast 
Asia share similar changes in contexts marked by politic'al liberalisation, which have 
posed a good deal of challenge to the traditional structures of policy making. If it is found 
that these countries had different types of networks, and the changes in policy were 
different, then this would suggest that networks have a significant impact on policy 
change. The relationship between context and networks is, therefore, dialectical rather 
than unidimensional in the course of change . 
. It is beyond the confines of this thesis to generalise the operation and influence of 
policy networks across semi-democracies in Pacific Asia. However, based on the case 
studies in this thesis, I wish to emphasise that the policy network concept is not only a 
metaphor or a heuristic device giving insights into the structure of policy-:making, but 
also a useful explanatory. tool when analysing policy and change in authoritarian 
capitalist regimes. Through the exclusion ofissues and groups, networks can significantly 
affect policy outputs and the pace and scope of policy change. Of course, more research 
needs to be done into the empirical question as to whether and how policy networks affect 
public policy in undemocratic regimes in East and Southeast Asia in order to further . 
establish the explanatory utility of the policy network concept. 
6.3 Policy Networks and Other Approaches 
There is an increasing amount of literature treating policy networks as a 
multi-theoretic notion, which means that the concept can be used within a range of 
broader theoretical frameworks. For example, Smith (1993, pp. 73-74; pp. 233-234) 
argues that policy networks are a meso-level concept concerned with analysing 
government and group relations. As such, the concept needs to be used in conjunction 
with a wider macro-level theory in order to understand the sorts of relationships that 
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develop. Likewise,· Marsh and Smith (2000) develop a dialectical approach to policy 
networks which argues for the need to integrate meso-level (networks) and macro-level 
(context) analysis. To add to this complication, they also emphasise the dialectical 
relationship between networks and the agents who occupy them. Multi-theoretic analysis 
of networks is academically desirable because it generates a series of intriguing 
propositions. More importantly, it is also vital practically when examining policy 
networks in authoritarian capitalist regimes, for policy networks are a concept mainly 
associated with liberal democracy and political pluralism. Hence, compared with treating 
policy networks as an isolated meso-level concept, the integration of network analysis 
into relevant theoretical frameworks has the potential for providing a more 
comprehensive account of the distinctiveness of policy networks outside the western 
democratic systems. Here, I shall su'ggest a number of ways in which different levels of 
network analysis can be integrated, so as to provide a path for further investigation, 
Integrating macro-level and meso-level analysis 
Meso-level policy network analysis needs to be integrated with a macro-level 
state-centred theory if the origins and structures of policy networks are to be explained. 
This is particularly important in analysing government! group relations in authoritarian 
capitalist regimes because, compared with liberal democracies, the regimes invariably 
have greater state strength. Although the state actors are not completely autonomous, they 
have their own interests and the potential to act autonomously. It is, therefore. essential to 
, examine the reasons for state actors to disgorge part of their inherent autonomy in 
exchange for routine relationships with certain groups, if the development ofa particular 
policy network is explicable. In this sense. analysis of policy networks within the 
parameters of a state-centred theory is significant. 
The state-centred model which is particularly pertinent here is cooptive politics. 
Cooption, as Saward (1992, pp. 1-2) argues, is: 'a strategy more or less available to state 
actors in pursuit of their goals, and as such can involve groups and individuals from a 
variety of professional, producer or promotional standpoints'. In cooptive politics, the 
incorporation of non-state actors into state bodies is often taken to enhance state 
legitimacy (Saward, 1992, p. 33). As we have seen in previous chapters, the notion of 
legitimacy is rather important to undemocratic regimes and, therefore, policy networks 
are created by state actors to mobilise public support for government policies. Acquisition 
of political support is not the only reason for policy networks to develop in authoritarian 
capitalist regimes. State actors also create networks to solicit policy inputs from groups 
within the policy process and to enhance their capacity to intervene in society. All in all, 
the model of cooptive politics demonstrates that in order to understand how policy 
networks develop, it is important to understand the interests of the state. As has been 
. , 
argued in the case studies, it is rare in semi-democratic regimes that policy networks 
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develop due to the intrinsic power of highly resourced groups. ~i1st the interests of state 
actors are not the detennining feature of policy networks, they are an important variable 
in affecting the development of networks. 
In authoritarian capitalist regimes, analysis of the development of policy networks 
needs to start with cooptive arrangements. However, it is important to point out that the 
notion of policy networks is conceptually different from cooptive politics. Whilst the 
concept of cooption is static and uni-dimensional, the relationships between state 
agencies and integrated groups within networks are dynamic and interactive (see 
Chapters 2 and 3). For cooptive politics to evolve into policy networks there are a number 
of meso-level reasons. Generally, cooptive arrangements turn into policy networks when 
there is a high degree of resource dependence, integration and institutionalisation. If state 
actors have policy agreements with integrated groups and depend on these groups for 
resources, they have to make concessions within the policy process and thereby create 
policy networks. This indicates the importance ofintegrating macro-level and meso-level 
analysis in investigating the development and operation of networks. 
Elitism is the other macro theory important to network analysis in authoritarian 
capitalist regimes. Like other state theories, there is no single theory of elitism, but central 
to the elitist doctrine is the belief that: .'the history of politics. is the history of elite 
domination' (Evans, 1995, p. 228). Elite dominance is a putative phenomenon in Asian 
politics, where governance is not a right but: 'the prerogative of a narrow set of 
interlocking elite interests, whose overriding aim is to maintain elite power (McCargo, 
1998, p. 126). As policy networks operatein a context where elite governance is an 
important element in political realities, it is essential to use the theoretical framework of 
elitism in understanding the membership and structure of policy networks that develop in 
the Asia-Pacific. 
Utilising the notion of policy networks within an elitist position would then 
generate a number of propositions. First, it is likely that, in authoritarian capitalist 
regimes, the structures of policy networks reflect. the broader pattern of structured 
inequality within society. Therefore, there is a cons~stent pattern of inclusion and 
exclusion across different networks. It is easier for elites, be they bureaucrats, unifonned 
officers from armed forces, politicians or businessmen, to access and dominate a variety 
of networks. Second, policy networks, especially those occupied by elite interests, are 
stable, integrated and exclusive. In the tenninology established by Marsh and Rhodes 
(1992a), many policy networks in semi-democratic regimes tend to develop into policy 
communities. Third, as many networks are elitist and tight, this structure of 
decision-making cramps popular participation in the policy process. Within these 
networks, most policies are hatched by small circles of politicians, bureaucrats and 
interest groups. Outsiders often find it difficult to penetrate the established networks. 
Fourth, the elitist feature of networks has a great impact on policy outputs. Nonnally, 
policy decisions are taken to allocate benefits to insiders, with little reference to the 
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public interests. 
But again, whilst the elitist position can be used to understand the nature and 
influence of policy networks in authoritarian capitalist regimes, it is important not to 
overestimate the effect on policy networks of the elitist governance. As has been 
highlighted before, it is not difficult to find an exception to the elitist pattern of networks. 
The nature of a particular network also depends upon the historical context and the 
specific arrangements between government and groups. Therefore, what we have to 
accept here is not that the elitist rule is a dominating feature of networks across policy 
arenas, but that networks are likely to be d,istinctive as a result of the idiosyncratic 
political systems in East and Southeast Asia. 
Integrating meso-level and micro-level analysis 
In this thesis, the view of policy networks that has dominated is a structural view 
which argues that policy outcomes and policy change greatly depends on the structure of 
relationships between government and groups within the policy process. However, the 
I thesis represents only the exploration of networks in Hong Kong, a regime beyond the 
confines of western liberal democracies. It does not exclude the possibility of an 
anthropological approach to network analysis in Asian semi-democracies. In fact, this 
conclusion will suggest that an anthropological approach has the potential to be a useful 
tool for analysin'g policy networks in these states. 
On the whole, an anthropological approach to policy networks is micro-level 
because its goal is to bring the individual back into the analysis and explain the behaviour 
of network members. It regards 'networks as based on personal relationships between 
known and trusted individuals who share beliefs and a common culture' (Marsh and 
Smith, 2000, p. 5). In this vein, McPherson and Raab (1988) argue that a policy network 
normally contains a small number of identifiable participants who know each other and 
are aware of the rules of the game. In short, the interactive relationships within networks 
are delineated by a 'common kinship' and an 'agreed culture' (see Chapter 3). 
Besides the structural view, an anthropological approach seems to be apposite to the 
study of policy networks in authoritarian capitalist regimes in East and Southeast Asia. 
This is because in these states, policy agendas are set and achieved as much by formal 
politics as by informal politics conducted within the parameters of personal relationships, 
common culture and a set of informal rules evolving as conventions and codes of 
behaviour. Informal politics is pervasive in many Asian regions, the political cultures of 
which are massively influenced by a Confucian legacy that emphasises personal 
relationships and reciprocity (Fukui, 2000, p. 12). Informal politics governed by implicit 
rules and personal ties is so pervading that, according to Pye (1985, p. 292), in order: 'to 
uncover the actual flow of power', it is essential to: 'look through the arrangements of 
authority to the dynamics of the informal relationships'. 
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If it is accepted that infonnal politics is prevalent in Asian governance, then we can 
go further to examine how it may affect the nature of policy networks. Influenced by the 
political cultures similarly stressing personal relationships, networks tend to operate 
through distinctive organisational fonns. They are created and maintained on the basis of 
. kinship, regional and friendship ties, common generational status and patron-client 
relationships aimed at the pursuit of common interests (Fukui, 2000, p. 13). The major 
element underlying this type of networks is the status of one's ties with another person (s), 
which comes from two broad aspects of interpersonal relationships: ascribed and 
interactive. The fonner refers to a collection of ascribed relationships shared by 
interacting individuals by way of blood association, common locality and even 
. hierarchical relations which evolve into lasting infonnal ties. On the other hand, the 
interactive aspect of personal ties denotes 'what is accumulated through actual interaction 
experiences between the two parties' (Yang, 2000, p. 100). It anses out of the exchanges 
either following the implicit scheme in which each fulfils the other's personal needs and 
interests, or the pattern of real affection between the members of a network. Whilst a 
network based on infonnal personal relationships may seem opaque, it is not necessarily 
fluid and loose. Rather, there is a set of prescribed affective and behavioural rules that 
regulate the interaction and generate the trust needed at different stages of network 
development (Yang, 2001, pp. 100-101). Therefore, it is important to probe these 
infonnal rules when analysing the operation and effect of a policy network in the 
Asia-Pacific. 
The utility of the anthropological approach to network analysis carries 
methodological implications. At the core of this approach, there is a certain degree of 
methodological uncertainty. As Ostrov (2000, p. 228) points out, it is tenuous to assume 
that a patron-client relationship exists between people who happen at some point to work 
together. It is also questionable to differentiate a cause (a patron-client relationship) from 
an effect (mutual support and policy outputs). This problem is probably less critical when 
. network analysis turns on a number of discernible factors, such as kinship and locality. 
However, it is still difficult to identify for certain if these explicit factors have escalated 
into close and affective ties superseding fonnal structures in policy making and serving as 
bonds of unity between agents, which are pivotal conditions of the creation and operation 
of networks. To remove the methodological uncertainty associated with the 
anthropological approach to policy networks, it is essential to conduct qualitative 
research by holding in-depth interviews with the parties involved and those close to them, 
and! or gaining access to personal and revealing memoirs. 
The above discussion has theoretically demonstrated that personal networks are 
potentially useful in understanding state and group relations or the relations among state 
agencies in East and Southeast Asia. Certainly, the potential of the anthropological 
approach needs to be verified by empirical investigation. Regarding the possible 
integration between the anthropological and structural approaches to policy networks,. 
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there are a number of salient issues. First, it is better to treat the two approaches as 
significant components of a tool-kit for analysing the policy process than as mutually 
exclusive. In other words, both have their own strengths and weaknesses, and thus are 
apposite to policy analysis in particular contexts. Second, the policy network literature 
often presents a dichotomy between the two approaches which is too stark, and ignores 
the fact that they have points of similarity in analysing public policy. Like the structural 
model, the anthropological approach also treats networks as structures to a certain extent 
. ' 
(Marsh and Smith, 1996, p. 9). In fact, both of them focus on how networks lead to 
persistent patterns of members' behaviour in order to' understand policy outputs. 
Therefore, one of the possible ways to integrate the two approaches is to see networks 
involving the. institutionalisation of micro-level factors, such as beliefs, values and 
cultures which, in additi~n to structural factors like resource dependence and consensus, 
serve as structural constraints on the action of network members. By analysing how I 
networks shape agents' attitudes and behaviour, it is possible to explain policy outcomes' 
and change. 
Third, the structural approach is concerned with the degree of integration and 
exclusion which can be evaluated and explained by focusing on the anthropological 
. dimension to policy networks. Within a personal network, there are interpersonal ties and 
prescribed cultures and rules that guarantee trust among participants. Personal ties give 
assurance during interaction as the trust is established by the obligations inherited in 
those ascribed and interactive relations shared among network members. This trust 
lubricates transactions between agents and defines who is excluded from the network. 
Consequently, a policy network with strong interpersonal ties and trust is highly 
integrated and closed., Hence, in addition to meso-level factors, a set of micro-level 
variables, including personal relationships, common cultures and prescribed rules, can 
also be used to examine the structural features of a policy network. 
The gist of the discussion above is that, despite conceptual differences, the three 
levels of network analysis can be integrated to provide a comprehensive understanding of 
public policy in authoritarian capitalist regimes in East and Southeast Asia. This is a 
subject for further investigation. 
7. Conclusion 
Three major points emerge from this thesis. First, it demonstrates the explanatory 
utility of policy networks in the context of Hong Kong. The notion of policy networks 
provides a flexible and effective means of conceptualising the relationship between the 
government and groups in policy-making in Hong Kong. The government and group 
relations in policy networks were one of mutual dependence, resource exchange and 
reciprocal advantage~ which is in marked contrast to the concept of cooption. Once 
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networks and inter-dependence developed, policies were products of negotiation and 
cooperation instead of supplication and political largesse. Contrary to elitism, the nature 
of government and group relations in the policy process varied across policy sectors, 
which can be explained by a range of meso-level variables in networks. Moreover, policy 
networks can be used as explanations of policy outcomes rather than purely descriptions 
of government and pressure group relations in Hong Kong. The networks affected policy 
outcomes in a number of ways. They provided the government with a source of 
infrastructural power, defined the nature of problems, created a certain range of policy 
options and excluded opposed interests from the policy process. In short, they created the 
mechanisms that allowed particular groups to influence policy. Therefore, the existence 
of networks explains why policies in particular areas favoured the interests of some 
groups over time in a fairly consistent way against pressure to the contrary. 
Perhaps more importantly, policy networks significantly affected the trajectory of 
policy alteration in Hong Kong during the colonial transition, despite the fact that outright 
rejection of change was unlikely. The relationship between context and networks proved 
to be complex and dialectical. The effect of contextual factors on policy greatly depended 
on the nature! types of particular networks. Generally speaking, policy communities or 
the networks with a high degree of stability, internal integration, institutionalisation and 
independence were able to survive and withstand the mounting political pressure. They 
controlled the scope and pace of policy change by coopting certain reform pressure and 
excluding others inimical to the dominant interests. Hence, policy change tended to be 
tardy and minimal in areas where integrated policy networks existed. On the other hand, 
less integrated and independent policy networks, particularly issue networks, were 
susceptible to the changes in Hong Kong's political environment and more likely to 
buckle under the external pressure. Therefore, where weak and less consensual networks 
existed, substantial changes in networks, policy agendas and policy outputs were the most 
likely outcome. In short, network analysis is important in explaining the policy process, 
outcomes and change in Hong Kong. 
The second major point to emerge from this thesis is the complexity of the 
relationship between context and networks. It is clear that, despite their ability to affect 
policy outcomes and create continuity, policy networks were not completely isolated 
entities from the domestic and international contexts of Hong Kong. On the one hand, the 
nature of policy networks reflected the political structure in' Hong Kong. The 
establishment and success of policy networks in resisting change were also, to a certain 
extent, due to the political, economic a'nd international contexts within which the 
networks operated. Therefore, we need to be aware of the contextual factors when we 
analyse networks and how they affected policy outcomes and policy change. On the other 
hand, the analysis of meso-level variables in networks is just as important because they 
account for variation across policy secto~s. They explain why policy networks in some 
sectors might differ from the overall pattern predicted by the general theories focussing 
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on the contextual factors in Hong Kong. They also account for the differences in policy 
change across sectors even though the networks were subject to similar challenge. Hence, 
policy networks are a significant factor that needs to be included in the analysis ofpolicy 
process, policy outcomes and policy change in Hong Kong. 
Third, the thesis highlights a number of issues for the future of policy network 
research, paying particular attention to the development of a policy network approach to 
policy analysis in Asian authoritarian capitalist regimes. The case studies of Hong Kong 
demonstrate that the concept of policy networks, developed in western liberal 
democracies, can be used to examine public policy in an authoritarian capitalist regime. 
More research is essential in order to further establish the transferability and, more 
specifically, the mechanisms which allow for the creation and success of networks in 
states outside the western democratic systems. 
It is also important to probe the explanatory utility of the concept in authoritarian 
capitalist regimes which provide useful comparisons. They are contrasting states with 
western liberal democracies. If there is evidence that networks affect policy and change in 
both democratic and non-democratic regimes, it is possible to argue with greater certainty 
that the notion of policy networks is not only a product of liberal democracies but also 
.important in explaining public policy in other political systems. Moreover, a number of 
these regimes have moved towards the western democratic systems since the mid-1980s. 
Therefore, they provide useful comparisons in order to establish the relative effect of 
context and networks on policy change. Finally, network analysis needs to be integrated 
with associated approaches at different theoretical levels if the distinctiveness of 
networks in East and Southeas~ Asia is to be comprehensively understood. Whilst the 
thesis does not provide a conclusive answer to all these issues, it offers, in my view, some 
significant ideas for further investigation. 
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